Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) argued the crisis in Syria is closely tied to U.S. national security during Tuesday's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on military intervention in Syria:
SENATOR MARCO RUBIO (R-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by answering a fundamental question that I get asked a lot as we discuss this very important issue, and that is, why do we even care about what's happening in Syria? And I want to very clear my belief that I think reflects the belief of most of the members of this committee. And that is that what happens in Syria is a -- is of vital national interest to the United States and to our national security for reasons that have already been outlined.
The Syrian relationship with Iran is very significant, it's a key part of their ambitions to be the regional power, the dominant regional power. In fact, the Iranians love to brag that Syria gives them a border with Israel.
Number two, Assad is an anti-American supporter of terrorism, is a supporter of Hamas, he's a supporter of Hezbollah. And by the way, he's a supporter of al-Qaida in Iraq, the same al-Qaida in Iraq that's responsible for the death and maiming of countless brave young men and women who served our country in uniform.
It's also of interest to us because of the instability that this is creating in Syria, instability that's allowing portions of Syria to quickly become kind of what Afghanistan was before 9/11, the premier operational space for global jihadists from abroad to come train and fight and plan attacks in the future.
And now added to that is this chemical attack which undermines and -- the post-World War II world order, which basically said that these things are unacceptable. And allies that look at the United States and our capabilities of living up to our security promises is all at risk now as a result of all of this.
This is why Syria and what's happening in Syria matters to our national interests, which it's so clearly tied to a critical national security interest of the United States.
By the way, most of if not all of this was true two years ago, when I joined other voices on this committee and in the Senate and beyond that advocated that at that time, when Assad was on the ropes, the United States should engage in trying to identify moderate elements and equip them so that they became the predominant rebel force in Syria and not others. But that didn't happen. Instead, the choice was made to lead from behind.
The choice was made to watch at this thing unfolded, as others advocated that we should just mind our own business. And what we're seeing here now is proof and an example that when America ignores these problems, these problems don't ignore us; that we can ignore them but eventually they grow and they come to visit us at our doorstep. And now we're faced with what we have.
In fact, as -- Secretary Kerry, a moment ago, you said that one of the calculations that Assad used in deciding to use chemical weapons was that the U.S. wouldn't do anything about it. Now I understand, perhaps, why he made that calculation because, yes, this is a horrible incident where a thousand people died. But before this incident, a hundred thousand people had died, including snipers that were used to pick off civilians, including women that were raped as part of -- they were going to these villages and carried this out. And nothing happened. So of course he reached that calculation.
So this is a reminder of what happens when we ignore the world, when we look inwards sometimes and we ignore these problems: They only get worse and more difficult to solve. And that's the mess that we have here right now. We are left with options, all of which are less than ideal. And I want to walk through the three that have been presented to us by different voices and then ask specifically about the one the president is considering.
The first option is to decide to help Syrians remove Assad and replace (with ?) a more -- a more moderate government. I think that's the ideal outcome, but it has its own complications. Today the rebel forces on the ground are not just the moderate rebels, they're nonmoderate rebels. They're jihadists that now control major portions of the country, and in other parts of the country are intermingled with these rebels forces, creating a real prospect that after the fall of Assad, a new civil war could be triggered -- one that could involve sectarian violence, massacres of minorities, et cetera. (As I said ?), this comes with its own set of complications.
The other, which some voices have advocated, is doing nothing. But that would guarantee the following outcome: an emboldened Assad, an emboldened Iran, increased instability in the country because portions of that country will still be ungoverned. And it will also send a message to the world that there is no red line that they should fear crossing. So Iran will move forward toward nuclear weapons. North Korea can act crazier, if that's even possible. Our allies in South Korea and Japan may start to doubt their security arrangements with us. Israel may decide it needs to strike Iran unilaterally. Iran will move towards the bomb, which, by the way, it won't just be an Iranian bomb.
It'll be a Turkish bomb as well and a Saudi bomb and maybe even an Egyptian bomb one day.
The third is the action the president is asking us to consider, what he termed, not me, what he called a shot across the bow -- a military strike of limited duration and scope that has three goals, as I understand it, that have been outlined here today. Goal number one is to hold Assad accountable. Goal number two is to deter this behavior in the future. And goal number three is to degrade Assad's capacity to carry out these attacks in the future. This is -- the president wants us to authorize a limited strike that would accomplish these three things.
The question that I have, quite frankly, I'm a bit skeptical that the act -- that what the president is asking for will provide the support needed to achieve these objectives, and that these objectives are even realistic at this point. So here's my first question, and I think I'll ask this of General Dempsey. The calculation that Assad has made is that the reason why he's using these chemical weapons is because he's afraid that if he doesn't he could lose this war, be overthrown and killed. That's the calculation that he's made. That's why he used these chemical weapons. He wants to beat the rebels.
So my question is this: Can we -- can we structure an attack that tips that calculation where he'll basically decide that he would rather risk being overrun by rebels than risking a limited attack from the U.S. if he uses these chemical weapons. He has to decide: I'll use chemical weapons and take on a limited U.S. attack in the future or I'll risk being overrun by the rebels. How are we going to unbalance that and lead him to calculate that he's better off risking losing to the rebels?