According to Michael Hayden, the only man ever to hold both the posts of CIA and NSA director, 9/11 was a seismic event for the U.S. intelligence community, and its effects still reverberate today. Hayden begins this excellent and very personal narrative by describing in the run-up to the attacks how the NSA, like the CIA, had suffered major budget and personnel cuts through the 1990s triggered by belief in a "peace dividend" that had accrued from the breakup of the Soviet Union.
That belief proved dangerously naïve, leaving the U.S. intelligence community short of skilled personnel, especially those with critical linguistic skills, and with flagging technological capabilities that had failed to keep pace with the vast increase in global communication. As a result, soon after becoming NSA director in 1999, Hayden had to confront not only a new major threat to national security, but to do so with a damaged organization beset by a litany of problems, including "rapid technological obsolesce and an inward looking culture."
There were other challenges: disgruntled employees, complex legal questions regarding the scope of NSA’s authorities, congressional staffers eager to work against Hayden’s organizational priorities, and an often skeptical media. Joining the chorus of critics were European officials and commentators, whom he holds in particular disdain ("a self-righteous nuisance.")
Hayden’s tenure at the CIA, which began in May 2006, was no less fraught. The previous CIA director, Porter Goss, and the entire organization suffered a bureaucratic body blow when legislation aimed at reforming flaws in the intelligence community resulted in the creation of a Director of National Intelligence and a new staff to oversee the sprawling intelligence community, diminishing the agency’s status.
Morale at the agency already had been shredded by the divisive actions of Goss’s staffers and a scandal that erupted involving the agency’s executive director. The CIA also was heavily involved in highly controversial aspects of U.S. counter-terror strategy, notably the rough interrogation of high-value captured terrorists, including the use of waterboarding. Hayden looked deeply into the interrogation program and concluded "that pushing forward would bring its own risks and inevitable controversies."
Hayden’s approach to managing these problems ought to serve as a case study in how to revitalize a dispirited organization. In the memoir, Hayden demonstrates that he is willing to acknowledge his own mistakes, while respecting and touting the contributions of senior and junior colleagues. That combination does much to advance the book’s credibility, setting it apart from similar efforts by other government officials who seem intent on settling scores.
Hayden also shows willingness to wade into complex policy issues, notably the debate over the pace and scope of Iran’s nuclear program. He sheds considerable light onto the interaction between policy views and intelligence products, providing those outside the process keen insight into what CIA could and could not do to assist policymakers.
For all these lengthy and sometimes complex discussions, Hayden never loses sight of the critical question of how intelligence agencies fit into and support democratic values, beginning with the right to privacy. Hayden does not presume to have complete answers, even years into his retirement from government service.
Those seeking soaring prose should look elsewhere. This is a gritty and unvarnished account of years at the forefront of the war on terror, a phrase derided by some but more important than ever given the current administration’s tepid counter-terror strategy in the Middle East.
Hayden offers insights into the personalities and decisions that shaped his time at NSA and later CIA while capturing the important work of those in the trenches. Those seeking an understanding of the challenges confronting not only U.S. intelligence but the nation’s fundamental values will not find a more honest account than that contributed by Hayden.