In August 2013, Esmail Ali Taqi Heydari and Hadi Baghbani were preparing to defend a base in Syria held by forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad. A rebel detachment was approaching to take the base, which was close to a strategic hill that, if captured, would allow the rebels to control southern Aleppo. Most of the pro-Assad side was made up of Syrian militiamen, but Heydari and Baghbani were members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.
After a rebel ambush, both men were killed and returned to their hometown in Iran to be buried with full honors. State media covered the funeral, and Heydari and Baghbani "were hailed as martyrs who died ‘defending the holy shrine of Sayyida Zaynab’ in Damascus," a revered site in Shia Islam.
This story, told by Afshon Ostovar in his new comprehensive history of the IRGC, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, illustrates how conflict and Shia religiosity are both fundamental to the organization’s identity. The IRGC today has its own army, navy, and air force, the latter of which controls Iran’s ballistic missile program. Unlike Iran’s regular military, which protects the country’s territorial integrity, the IRGC is charged with defending Iran’s revolution and safeguarding its theocratic system.
To bolster this effort, the IRGC oversees the Basij, a massive volunteer force performing domestic security functions inside Iran, and the infamous Quds Force, a unit responsible for special operations abroad. The IRGC has also become an economic empire, controlling billions of dollars in part from lucrative no-bid contracts given by the government.
Ostovar proposes in Vanguard of the Imam three factors that have shaped the organization’s development: pro-clerical activism, devotion to Iran’s supreme leader, and the impact of violent struggle.
Pro-clerical activism comes from the clergy’s central role in Shiite Iran. Historically, local clergy in Iran and the Shiite centers of Iraq formed close relationships with their communities but also with local strongmen and gangs. These groups served as advocates for the clerics, protected their status, and collected taxes through coercion. In 1979, many of these pro-clerical militants were divided, with loyalties to specific individuals. Ayatollah Khomeini needed these forces united under one banner to succeed after the revolution, and forming the IRGC was the way to achieve this goal.
Loyalty to the supreme leader is another central theme of Ostovar’s book. He explains how the Islamic system of clerical rule (velayayt-e faqih) is the core aspect of Iran’s revolution, which gives the supreme leader ultimate political and spiritual authority. Because the IRGC’s fundamental purpose is to safeguard this revolutionary system, by definition that requires supporting its leader. "If the supreme leader represents the power of the pen, the IRGC is his sword," writes Ostovar. The leader and IRGC have a symbiotic relationship in which the Guards pledge loyalty to the cleric in return for unique privileges, influence, and status.
The IRGC’s experience with conflict—the organization was heavily engaged in the Iran-Iraq War, among other clashes—has also been fundamental in shaping the organization into its present form.
Ostovar discusses these three concepts while chronologically surveying the IRGC’s development through the present day. The chapters on the early years of the Islamic Republic and the formation of the IRGC in the 1980s are the best parts of the book. They detail how the Khomeneists emerged victorious with their vision for clerical rule and how the eight-year Iran-Iraq War allowed the IRGC to cement its status through the use of human wave attacks to overwhelm the enemy.
Less space is devoted to the 1990s, but the story of that decade sheds light on how a domestic divide in Iran between the conservative right, led by Ali Khamenei, and a reformist camp dominated Iranian politics. During this time the IRGC aligned itself with Khamenei’s faction and by the end of the decade was prepared to bypass a reformist president to put down domestic unrest. As Ostovar writes, "It was a proclamation of the IRGC’s arrival as a political heavyweight. It would no longer be ignored."
When Ostovar turns his discussion to the 21st century, the book begins to have problems. The chapter titled "The War on Terror" might have been replaced with a slogan: Blame Bush. One can make a sound, intellectually honest argument that Bush’s Middle East policies and rhetoric gave Iran opportunities to expand its influence and an excuse not to compromise with the West, but Ostovar’s arguments come off as simplistic and close-minded.
Take, for example, his case that Iran was willing to help the United States fight the Taliban in Afghanistan until Bush’s "axis of evil" speech in 2002. Iran did almost go to war with the Taliban in 1998 and shared intelligence with the United States at the time, but Ostovar never mentions that Iran and the Taliban had a relationship going back before 9/11, which included arms sales.
It is not hyperbolic to say this chapter portrays a U.S.-Iran rapprochement as a likely possibility if not for Bush’s aggression—a stretch at the very least. Ostovar also argues that the IRGC’s power greatly increased at this time along with so-called "hardliners" inside Iran, which is true, but not simply because of America. One cannot ignore how then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former guardsmen himself, richly rewarded the IRGC with cabinet positions and billions in no-bid government contracts. Ostovar mentions the cabinet positions but not the IRGC’s economic empowerment, a point he discusses very little throughout the book, but which is an important aspect of the IRGC’s development.
One reason Ostovar’s focus on Bush is so striking is that he barely mentions Barack Obama during the chapters that coincide with his presidency. It is curious that he blames U.S. policy for Iran’s belligerence from 2001 to 2008 but makes virtually no mention of America or its leader from 2009 to 2016, despite a quite aggressive Iranian foreign policy during this time.
Nonetheless, here Ostovar gives an interesting description of both the 2009 Green Revolution and the Arab Spring and how they changed the IRGC’s role internally and externally. Ostovar details Iran’s human rights violations to stop the protests, its surge in terrorist activity during this time, and the IRGC’s involvement in Iraq and Syria to pursue its interests and set up essentially IRGC replicas in each state—with Shia militias in Iraq and the National Defense Forces in Syria. Interestingly, however, there is little discussion in the book of Iran’s nuclear program or negotiations to curtail it, despite the IRGC’s central role in the program—a noteworthy absence.
Ostovar’s book is a strong contribution to the existing body of knowledge on Iran and the IRGC, giving a comprehensive overview of the latter while serving as a broader history of the Islamic Republic’s regime. It is scholarly enough to appeal to experts but is written clearly and concisely enough to be digestible to a foreign policy novice.
So how should the United States handle the IRGC? First, it is necessary to understand the threat. An April 1980 issue of the IRGC’s biweekly journal Payam-e Enquelab (Message of the Revolution) promises: "We will export our revolution throughout the world. As our revolution is Islamic, the struggle will continue until the call of ‘There is no God but God …’ echoes around the globe." Perhaps some sanctions on specific individuals and companies will not be enough.