In rare public signs of dissension within its upper ranks, Hamas figures and influential supporters are expressing doubts about the organization’s wisdom in entering into a 50 day war with Israel this summer.
A prominent Palestinian journalist sympathetic to Hamas, Salah al-Nuami, criticized Hamas for being "dragged" into the war without thinking through its devastating implications for Gaza and for making demands, like asking for Israel's consent to a seaport and airport for Gaza, that only lengthened the war’s duration.
"Forcing Israel to meet these demands was impossible," he wrote in an article published on several pro-Hamas websites.
Although Hamas spokesmen continue to claim victory in the war, concern over the war’s results were voiced by the second highest figure in Hamas’ political wing, Moussa Abu Marzouq.
Marzouq said that the situation was so dire that Hamas might have to engage in direct political negotiations with Israel in violation of a basic Hamas tenet. Some Hamas leaders have called for a redoubling of the organization’s military budget but others seem to believe it will be years before another round of fighting is feasible.
The war, in which 2,600 Gazans were killed, destroyed or severely damaged 20,000 housing units and displaced more than 400,000 residents. Israel’s losses were minor by comparison.
Hamas leaders have begun to abandon the idea of "fortress Gaza", which envisioned the narrow coastal strip being the major springboard for a Palestinian military confrontation with Israel, according to Ehud Yaari, Arab affairs commentator for Israel’s Channel Two television.
The shift began when Hamas agreed to form a National Unity Government with the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by President Mahmoud Abbas, without a single Hamas minister.
Gaza’s economic plight was the principle reason for this low profile but the military limitations revealed by the war has reinforced Hamas’ intention to stop being the exclusive face of Gaza. Hamas is labeled a terrorist organization by many Western countries and is also largely isolated in the Arab world. "Hamas", writes Yaari, "is perfectly willing to let the PA run the Gaza administration, taking full responsibility for provision of services and any future reconstruction."
Instead, the organization has increased its efforts to resuscitate its political and military infrastructure in the West Bank which, geographically, is a larger threat to Israel since it borders the Jewish state’s heartland and endangers its international airport.
Hamas’ popularity on the West Bank increased sharply in the wake of the war because of the organization’s willingness to wage war with Israel and because of its ability to continue firing rockets every day for seven weeks. If elections were held today it is conceivable that Hamas could take control of the West Bank from the Palestinian Authority.
Yaari writes that Hamas has hopes in the West Bank to replicate Hezbollah’s control in Lebanon by being partner to a coalition government while at the same time building up its own political and military infrastructure.
However, Hamas faces a formidable opponent—the Israeli Security Services (Shin Bet), which has deeply penetrated Palestinian society and, until now, unraveled most Hamas cells on the West Bank shortly after they were formed. The most recent battle between Hamas and Israel has ended but the war continues.