Experts disagreed on Tuesday about the proper reforms for future post-conflict situations in the wake of reconstruction efforts in Iraq that were fraught with fraud, waste, and a lack of coordination and oversight.
The last U.S. combat troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011 after an almost nine-year conflict. U.S. appropriations for reconstruction have reached $60 billion since 2003.
However, investigators have identified more than $1.6 billion of that spending as questionable or misallocated. Examples include a dormant prison in the Diyala province that cost almost $40 million but was never completed and a subcontractor charging $900 for a control switch valued at $7.05, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) final report.
The former SIGIR and author of the report, Stuart Bowen, recommended establishing a U.S. Office for Contingency Operations to prevent such waste in future conflicts during a panel discussion at the Stimson Center.
No one was officially in charge of Iraq’s reconstruction, with five offices considering it an "additional duty," Bowen said. The lack of central management prompted situations such as the State Department overseeing rebuilding contracts that were mostly arranged by the Department of Defense.
"There are five different offices in five different stove-piped agencies. Yet there is no one bringing this together," Bowen said of the reconstruction operations in Iraq. "Serendipity is not a strategy—we need planning."
Bowen said "work is being done" on an "ambitious" House bill sponsored by Rep. Steve Stockman (R., Texas) that would create the office and could be brought to the floor for votes this year.
Yet James Schear, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for partnership strategy and stability operations, said the proposal would still carry significant limitations.
Appointing a central office to lead reconstruction operations could "relieve pressure" on agencies that should have a stake in the process and also neglects to address the flawed "if you build it, they will come" mentality, Schear argued.
"I’m not convinced that this actually makes the chain of command easier. I think it may actually complexify it," he said.
"An ambassador will never report to a general and a general will never report to an ambassador."
While U.S. policymakers debate the best method for managing future conflicts, violence continues to rage in Iraq. About 500 convicts—some al Qaeda leaders—escaped from the Abu Ghraib prison last month, raising concerns about renewed sectarian violence between the Shiite government and Sunni jihadist groups. Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been accused of marginalizing Sunni Arabs.
More planning from the start in Iraq could have prevented some of the current instability, Bowen said.
"You have to begin thinking about the end before it starts, before the first foot even lands on the country that’s being aided," he said.