

# In Bed with Hamas: International NGOs in the Gaza Police State

## Introduction

As the international community seeks to develop and implement a post-war reconstruction strategy, it is essential to understand how Hamas weaponized aid before October 7th. Based on internal Hamas documents, this report spotlights the terrorist group's systematic control of foreign NGOs operating in Gaza.

Hamas operatives describe their surveillance of NGO officials and offices, methods for manipulating foreign-funded humanitarian groups, and the military and intelligence-gathering considerations that guide the limitations they impose on NGO activity. Similarly, the documents reveal that NGOs were complicit in this regime, hiding or downplaying Hamas abuses, and acquiescing to its demands.

Perhaps the most invasive and egregious mechanism, as exposed by these documents, is the “guarantor” system, whereby Hamas requires formal liaisons between its internal security apparatus and the international NGOs.

The 2018-2022 Arabic-language documents originate from the Gaza Interior Security Mechanism (ISM),<sup>1</sup> a unit within the Hamas Ministry of Interior and National Security

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<sup>1</sup> The [Ministry](#) commands the [police force](#), along with other [interior security forces](#) responsible for surveillance, counter-espionage, political dissent, civil defense, border crossings, enforcement of Islamic law, and handling of prisoners in Gaza. After seizing control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas assigned the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades to oversee the security forces under the Ministry. The [Interior Security Mechanism](#) is [responsible](#) for uncovering, preventing, and investigating crimes that threaten “national” security and government bodies. It combats espionage, provides protection and security for officials and leaders, and responds to external threats that may affect security, including political opposition. It is also responsible for operating informants and defending against cyber attacks. In January 2021, [Naser Maslah](#) was appointed as Minister of Interior and National Security in the Hamas government. A month prior to the October 7th Hamas attacks, Maslah met with “[representatives of the resistance factions in Gaza](#)” in a meeting set up by the ministry's “unit for factions coordination” in order to strengthen cooperation and coordination with the terror groups. Participants included members of Hamas and PIJ. As of [January 2025](#) and until his death in [March](#)

(MoINS). The documents were removed from Gaza and then declassified by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The evidence confirms that NGOs in Gaza do not operate independently or neutrally. Rather, they are embedded in an institutionalized framework of coercion, intimidation, and surveillance that serves Hamas' terror objectives.

Hamas' efforts, as described in these documents, complement myriad other stratagems and activities for commandeering international aid, and directing it to its members, sympathizers, and others with whom the organization wishes to curry favor. As previously reported by NGO Monitor, these include inserting Hamas operatives to administrative positions within international NGOs operating in Gaza; generating beneficiary lists for cash-assistance, which are then utilized by the UN and aid organizations; and outright theft.

(For more information, see NGO Monitor's "[European Government Funding for Programs Involving Hamas-Controlled Ministry](#)," "[Hamas Influences UK Funded Gaza Cash Programme](#)," and NGO Monitor's [Written Testimony to the US Subcommittee on Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations](#).)

### Ministry of Interior and National Security (MoINS)

All NGOs operating in Gaza are required to adhere to strict Hamas security protocols, which include regular engagement with the terror group's Ministry of Interior and National Security (MoINS) and Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), and other ministries relevant for specific projects, such as the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and Ministry of Education (MoE).

NGOs – both local and international, including ones operating under the auspices of UN projects – are not permitted to provide services or operate projects in Gaza without Hamas' approval and maintaining an ongoing line of coordination with the abovementioned Hamas ministries.

This framework effectively grants Hamas veto power over humanitarian operations, enabling the regime to block, reshape, and exploit aid delivery based on its political and military priorities. NGOs are compelled to comply, ensuring that their activities do not contradict Hamas' authority and narrative or obstruct its military agenda.

In other words, this compulsory engagement with MoINS is not a matter of standard regulatory compliance, but rather a Hamas political and security mechanism to control the activities of civil society organizations.

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[2025](#), the Minister of Interior and National Security was Mahmoud Abu Watfa, named by multiple news [outlets](#) as "[a leading commander in Hamas](#)."

## The Role of “Guarantors”

A central mechanism by which Hamas maintains control over NGO activities in Gaza is through “guarantors.” Local Gazans, approved by MoINS, serve as the point of contact between Hamas authorities and NGOs. Hamas requires that such “guarantors” hold senior administrative positions, such as director, deputy director, or board chair, ensuring access to the highest levels of the NGOs’ local branches and operations.

“Guarantors” also serve another function, allowing Western NGOs to circumvent various government restrictions on direct engagement with Hamas. For instance, an April 2022 Hamas intelligence report<sup>2</sup> notes that “American associations present in the Gaza Strip do not engage with the Gaza government **directly, but via an intermediate individual**” (emphasis added). Although this arrangement is seemingly contradictory – namely, if the guarantor is also an employee of the NGO, how does this avoid direct contact – it appears that both Hamas and the NGOs considered the guarantors as a sufficiently informal backchannel to the terror group. Finally, as described in detail below, Hamas views “guarantors” as potential high-value intelligence assets to gain access to the NGOs’ internal information and operations.

Even more disturbing, according to a December 2022 document produced by MoINS’ Foreign Associations Department<sup>3</sup> and reviewed by NGO Monitor, at least ten such “guarantors” who served as senior NGO officials were Hamas members or supporters, or employed by Hamas-affiliated authorities (all quotations and information, including affiliation claims, in the following bullet points taken from the Hamas December 2022 document):

- MAP-UK’s “administrative director” in Gaza who works in Hamas’ military arm and “is affiliated with Hamas and has pledged allegiance to its rule.” Moreover, MoINS detailed that “he is employed in the [Hamas-affiliated] Islamic University [of Gaza],” and that “his circle of friends is from the Hamas movement.”
- Human Appeal’s director in Gaza who “is affiliated with the Hamas movement” and has “held several positions and management posts in the [Hamas] movement.”

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<sup>2</sup> The report was submitted on April 5, 2022, by the Director of the Division of Public Activity to the Deputy Director General of [the Sector of] Intelligence Affairs, ISM’s head unit for monitoring NGO activity as of the start of 2022.

<sup>3</sup> “Report on the employees in foreign associations that have the right to submit a request for a foreign visitor” was submitted on December 14, 2022 to the Director of the Division of Associations.

- CIVITAS' executive director in Gaza who is "affiliated with Hamas" and "pledged his commitment during the First Intifada...was organized with the Da'wa groups of the [Hamas] movement, and he pledged his allegiance to the movement [i.e. Hamas]."
- A member of a CESVI "representative body" who is "affiliated with Hamas."
- International Medical Corps' (IMC) Gazan Administrative Director, who "was committed for a long time in the area [for Hamas operations], and was one of the supporters of Hamas. He is currently a Naqib (Hamas rank for captain) in the Daawa in the Sabarin mosque."
- Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) Gazan Administrative Director, who "supports the Hamas movement but is not affiliated with the movement," and "He is employed by the government of Gaza and has the rank of Naqib (Hamas rank for captain)."
- El Baraka Association For Charitable and Humanitarian Work's Gazan Director who "was affiliated with the Hamas movement in the past and is currently without any affiliation." He also worked in the past at [Hamas'] Al-Aqsa TV as an accountant."
- Rahma Worldwide's Gazan Director who "is now affiliated with the Hamas movement."
- Handicap International's Gazan Director" is affiliated with the Hamas movement."
- El-Amal Rehabilitation Society's Gazan Executive Director "works as a civilian employee (teacher) in the Government of Gaza."

In addition, the document mentions that the "guarantor" for US-registered Catholic Relief Services (CRS), director of the NGO in Gaza, is "affiliated with the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] (PFLP)" – designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, and Canada.

(For details about funding for the NGOs mentioned in this section, see Appendix 1.)

## Surveillance and Coercion: March 2020 and December 2022 MoINS Documents

A March 2020 MoINS document<sup>4</sup> clearly identifies multiple local and international NGOs as important targets for Hamas security and espionage efforts, viewing them as “security dangers and a threat.” Thus, Hamas’ internal security mechanism is directed to:

- “identify the guarantors and local employees inside organizations and associations”
- “classify guarantors according to security criteria in order **to make use of them**” (emphasis added)
- “prepare security reports on all active and operating guarantors”
- “place associations and international organizations **under constant technological surveillance**, i.e. cameras.” (emphasis added)
- “**infiltrate international organizations’ headquarters and their employees**, both technologically and by human sources” (emphasis added)

Hamas appears to have worked diligently to achieve those aims. A December 2022 document<sup>5</sup> provides an alarming glimpse into surveillance of NGO officials by Hamas’ police state, and the terrorist organization’s intention to further cultivate or coerce “guarantors” as intelligence assets.

The document includes the names and personal details of 55 individuals serving as guarantors across 48 NGOs (see Appendix 4). It emphasizes that these individuals “can be exploited for security purposes in order to infiltrate foreign associations, their foreign senior personnel and their movements.”

In addition, the December 2022 memo emphasizes that orchestrating an “infiltration of the aforementioned names [guarantors]...will be an outstanding security-intelligence accomplishment.” Hamas instructs that these personal details be used “for the purposes of security operations by the Division of Human [Intelligence] Sources.”

In service of these aims, Hamas collected extensive personal information on guarantors, including regarding their relationships, correspondences, professional backgrounds, religious

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<sup>4</sup> “Working paper on international organizations and associations that pose a threat and security dangers, and how to engage with them.” The document was authored by [Ayman] Abu Islam Rouqa the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity on March 4, 2020 and sent to the Director of the Interior Security Mechanism Abdul Basit Al-Masri (nom de guerre Abu Yasser).

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3.

observance, political activity and affiliations (including with designated terror groups), and criminal backgrounds. Revealingly, Hamas officials rate the level of cooperation between the NGOs and Hamas government bodies. Some NGOs are listed as “not cooperating,” indicating that they participate in the guarantor system after being pressured and intimidated by Hamas. The following are excerpts from Hamas’ intelligence reports on guarantors:

- “She leaves her house in exposed clothing that transgresses sharia law.”
- “He is morally suspicious due to obtained information against him, from close people, about his immoral relationship with a female employee at the Hassad Al-Khair association.”
- “On August 28, 2017, it became known that while checking [NAME REDACTED] phone, who is an employee at NRC, embarrassing photos of her, which were sent to the aforementioned [NAME REDACTED], were confiscated.”
- “She has a very strong personality and is not susceptible to pressure and extortion.”
- “He is morally corrupt.”
- “She has an internet connection and a Facebook page and also an account, and she does not have hostile activity on Facebook.”
- “He is religiously devoted and prays all the prayers in Al-Yaseen mosque.”
- “He goes running daily on the Al-Sudaniya beach after the Asr [afternoon] prayer.”
- “She wears clothes in line with fashion due to her work.”
- “He hates the Hamas movement.”
- “His religious observance is low.”
- “He is a communist.”

Similarly, MoINS documents detail background checks on other NGO officials and raise concerns about aid organizations that employ Jewish individuals in key administrative positions. For instance, a June 15, 2020 MoINS memo<sup>6</sup> lists the fact that Oxfam’s “media

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<sup>6</sup> The report, “Report on the Oxfam association,” was authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations, and was submitted to Director of the Division of Foreign Activity Aqid (Hamas rank for Colonel) Ayman Rouqa (nom de guerre “Abu Islam”).

and public relations head is of Jewish descent” as one of the NGO’s “threats and insecurities.”

Hamas’ ability to intimidate NGO and UN officials through these Stasi-like tactics was noted in the August 2024 Colonna Report on abuses at UNRWA.<sup>7</sup>

## Guarantors as Intelligence Assets

A June 22, 2021 MoINS’ report<sup>8</sup> describes a meeting between the director of Mercy Corps operations in Gaza and MoINS personnel. MoINS told the Mercy Corps director that “his latest transgressions and concealing of information have created a serious security aim against him.” The NGO official relayed that he was “ready for any cooperation [necessary],” agreeing to supply MoINS, through his handler, Mohammed Abu Salama, “with any security, administrative or financial observations that arise during his work at Mercy Corps or during his collaboration with active foreign associations.” MoINS emphasized “the need to engage with the Ministry of Interior [and National Security] and security officers and the need to serve the nation’s interest rather than personal interests,” and confirmed it would continue to “exploit the aforementioned [Mercy Corps employee] in [its monitoring of] the foreign [NGO] activities.”

Another document<sup>9</sup>, dated July 28, 2021, addressed to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity from the Branch of Foreign Associations, reveals that a former ANERA employee, [NAME REDACTED], “used to work as an intelligence source for the brothers at Public Affairs [an organ under MoINS].”

Yet another MoINS document,<sup>10</sup> dated June 6, 2021, emphasized the perceived threat posed by American NGOs attempting to not engage with Hamas authorities, and the “lack of an

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<sup>7</sup> [The Colonna report notes](#) that, prior to the Hamas-orchestrated October 7th massacre, “in Gaza and its field offices, the volatile context and security challenges may prevent reporting of allegations and investigating at the local level,” adding that “Field office investigators in Gaza risk their personal security.

<sup>8</sup> The document titled, “Meeting of Exploiting Citizen [NAME REDACTED] from Mercy Corps Association,” was authored by the Western Associations Department under the Branch of Foreign Associations and addressed to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity.

<sup>9</sup> The July 28, 2021 document was titled “Testimony of [NAME REDACTED].”

<sup>10</sup> The report, titled “Regarding the meeting of the committee of non governmental associations” was authored by the Branch of Security of Associations and submitted to the Director of the Division of Public Activity under ISM.



intelligence grip over American associations,” Hamas expressed concern that “there is no administrative relationship with the government body in the Gaza Strip,” and “the funding is directed to renewing and strengthening associations with views that oppose the ideology of the resistance [euphemism for Hamas].” The report instructed officials to “strengthen the [intelligence] sources and friends (local workers) inside American associations by all parties [in MoINS]” in order to alleviate the problem.

## **Hamas Review of NGO Financial Data**

As part of its intelligence penetration of NGOs, MoINS insists on reviewing their finances.

In one representative example, according to a November 20, 2019 intelligence report<sup>11</sup> on the activities of Save the Children, the NGO “does not yield to the administrative and financial inspection carried out by the Public Affairs under the Ministry of Interior due to its lack of cooperation with the Ministry of Interior.”

Therefore, the report orders Hamas officials to “impose restrictions on the association and its programs and projects until attaining cooperation with the Ministry of Interior,” and to “force the association to yield to the administrative and financial inspection carried out by the Public Affairs [Unit] under the Ministry of Interior.”

Similarly, the aforementioned July 28, 2021 report<sup>12</sup> claims that “ANERA is among the American associations that does not cooperate with the Ministry of Interior [and National Security], and has refused for a long time to carry out financial and administrative inspection. Following some persistence by the Ministry of Interior, a financial and administrative inspection was carried out. During the inspection, many financial violations were detected with the association.”

In another report,<sup>13</sup> dated June 28, 2020, MoINS reports that it shut down the offices of International Medical Corps (IMC) “for a week because it refused to submit financial and administrative reports, and it reopened it [the NGO] after it did so.”

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<sup>11</sup> The report was authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations and submitted to Director of the Division of Foreign Activity Aqid (Hamas rank for Colonel) Ayman Rouqa (nom de guerre) “Abu Islam”.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 8.

<sup>13</sup> The report, titled “The most dangerous foreign associations working in the Gaza Strip” was authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations and submitted to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity Aqid (Hamas rank for Colonel) Ayman Rouqa (nom de guerre “Abu Islam”).



## **Hamas' Exploitation of NGO Projects to Secure Military Positions**

A June 16, 2021 document<sup>14</sup> suggests that Oxfam worked with a Hamas-linked local group on an infrastructure project that appears to have contributed to Hamas military preparations.<sup>15</sup>

The file details an Oxfam water project slated to take place in **“a border area and is security sensitive, since it is a place of interest for both the occupation and the resistance alike.”** MoINS officials added, **“The project concerns irrigation of fruit trees...[which] are known to be a cover for resistance activities in border areas”** – referring to Hamas military activity (emphases added).<sup>16</sup> MoINS officials mentioned Oxfam's local implementing partner Rai-Consult – touting that “the founders and the people in charge of the company, and many of the employees in it have an Islamist view and **its director is affiliated with the Hamas movement**” (emphasis added). The document names Rai-Consult employees associated with the project, categorizing all of their “moral” and “security” statuses as “excellent.”

In other words, through a Hamas-linked company, Hamas ensured this Oxfam project was implemented in a manner consistent with maintaining and concealing tactically advantageous positions for its forces.

## **Hamas Interference in NGO Programming**

MoINS documents reveal Hamas restrictions on NGO activity, in order to safeguard the location of Hamas military installations, the identity of its members, and more.

For instance, in relation to the above-mentioned Oxfam project, MoINS notes that “after the recent campaign” – referring to the May 2021 Gaza conflict – “the territory is very sensitive.

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<sup>14</sup> The report, titled “The Rai-Consult company carrying out a field survey in Al Fukhari area,” was submitted by the Deputy Director General of [the Sector of] Intelligence Affairs to the Director General of the ISM.

<sup>15</sup> A 2020-2024 Oxfam Novib project – [funded by the EU](#) – fits the timeframe, description, and location of the project described by MoINS.

<sup>16</sup> Criticising Israel for damaging trees and agricultural land has been a staple of NGO reporting on Gaza, both before and after the October 7th massacre. This includes reports from groups such as EuroMed Rights, Forensic Architecture, and Gisha, and also features in NGO accusations of “starvation.”

Because of this, moving about in order to collect information and data requires inspection and monitoring.” As such, MoINS ordered the redaction of 13 Oxfam survey questions, as “the respondent could possibly mention matters that concern the resistance’s activity” or “does not serve the purpose of the study and the respondent’s political and ideological orientation could be observed.” Likewise, on July 27, 2020, MoINS reviewed a [UN-funded Mercy Corps cash-assistance project](#),<sup>17</sup> noting that NGOs create questionnaires “in order to reach the groups that are in the gravest need.” Hamas, though, worked “to erase questions that do not have any relation to the questionnaire’s goal or that have security aspects, in order to minimize and diminish any security threat.” For the specific Mercy Corps project – where over half of the beneficiaries were provided by the Hamas-controlled ministries of Social Development (MoSD) and Agriculture (MoA) – MoINS ordered Mercy Corps to delete certain questions citing “concerns that the goal [of the question] is to identify resistance members” or because it “related to the Return March wounded,” and “concerns that the data...will be exploited by hostile parties.” (This reflects Hamas’ deliberate manipulation of casualty data from periods of armed conflict.) Moreover, MoINS conditioned final approval for the project on receiving the names of Mercy Corps field researchers “in order to investigate them.”

Similarly, an April 2022 MoINS report<sup>18</sup> focusing on an ANERA infrastructure project in Gaza City seeks to mitigate operational security concerns regarding the location of the intended project in an area “that contains resistance activities.” In addition to interrogating and performing background checks on an ANERA employee, MoINS instructed that “authorization [be obtained] from the brothers in [Hamas’ military] intelligence...regarding the digging maps and areas field sites,” presumably to prevent the exposure of Hamas military infrastructure. Furthermore, the report mentions that the project was funded by Islamic Relief US; in 2014, [Israel designated Islamic Relief Worldwide](#), accusing it of funding Hamas.

## **Silence and Complicity from the NGO Sector**

In some instances, NGOs adopted a policy of silence in response to the humanitarian risks and challenges caused by Hamas’ control of Gaza. A March 29, 2022 report<sup>19</sup>, authored by

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<sup>17</sup> The project review was authored by the Branch of Security of Associations and sent to the Director of the Division of Public Activity under ISM. The title of the original document was “Response on the project ‘urgent aid for vulnerable families in the Gaza Strip’.”

<sup>18</sup> See footnote 2.

<sup>19</sup> The March 29, 2022 report was titled “Testimony of [NAME REDACTED] Director of NRC [Gaza].”

the Department of Western Associations and submitted to the Director of the Branch of Foreign Activities, illustrates this dynamic. Specifically, according to Hamas, and as described below, when Norwegian Refugee Council employees were confronted with complaints from civilians regarding terror infrastructure in residential areas, they did not follow up.

The report recounts testimony from the head of NRC's Gaza office following a Hamas authorities-led investigation. As part of an NRC program, [funded by the UK and EU](#), to provide cash assistance to families selected by Hamas-controlled Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), an NRC delegation, including the Gaza head and five other employees, visited a beneficiary's apartment. The resident was chosen because of "his medical condition," "since he is elderly, weak sighted and his partner has a broken pelvis," and the "poor shape of his apartment's floor and one of the walls was about to collapse."

During the visit, the beneficiary asked whether "the reason that the floor collapsed was that there was a tunnel" beneath his home. According to the NRC senior official, **"neither the foreign delegation nor the association's employees asked whether there was a tunnel under the civilian's...apartment which caused the floor to collapse**, rather it was the apartment's owner who asked the researchers...**nevertheless the researchers did not reply to him"** (emphases added).

## Conclusion

NGOs operating in Gaza are fully aware of the realities of working under Hamas rule. Instead of disclosing the coercive conditions under which they operate, NGOs consistently omit or downplay Hamas' violations, refusing to expose how deeply the terror group has infiltrated, distorted, and exploited the humanitarian space.

Worse still, many of these organizations are quick to level public condemnations of Israel, while failing to acknowledge Hamas' systematic abuse of humanitarian mechanisms. This one-sided narrative enables Hamas to operate with impunity, shielding its criminal behavior from scrutiny and distorting the international understanding of the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

By choosing to stay quiet and cooperate with the regime, NGOs not only provide cover for Hamas' abuses, they begin to internalize and adopt Hamas's own agenda and propaganda. The result is an aid sector that, in many cases, no longer acts independently or impartially,

but instead functions within a terror-controlled system and becomes an integral part of misinformation and disinformation campaigns.

## Appendix I:

### Funding to NGOs Mentioned in the Report

Catholic Relief Services: [Funded](#) by [Ireland](#), United States, and United Nations.

CESVI: [Donors](#) include European Union, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations

CIVITAS: CIVITAS does not include any financial data, donor information, or sources of funding on its website, reflecting a complete lack of transparency and accountability.

El-Amal Rehabilitation Society: [Funded](#) by the United States.

El Baraka Association For Charitable and Humanitarian Work: El Baraka Association For Charitable and Humanitarian Work does not include any financial data, donor information, or sources of funding on its website, reflecting a complete lack of transparency and accountability.

Handicap International: [Donors](#) include France, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, European Union, United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden, United States, United Nations.

Human Appeal: Human Appeal does not include any financial data, donor information, or sources of funding on its website, reflecting a complete lack of transparency and accountability.

International Medical Corps (IMC): [Donors](#) include European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations

Medical Aid for Palestinians: Donors in [2023-2025](#) have included UNICEF, UN OCHA, World Health Organization, Trocaire, and Islamic Relief.

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC): [Donors](#) include United States, United Kingdom, Europe Union, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium, United Nations

Rahma Worldwide: Donors include [two Kuwaiti organizations](#) – Al Najat Charitable Society, and Namaa Charity.

Table taken from December 2022 document, “Report on the employees in foreign associations that have the right to submit a request for a foreign visitor,” translated by NGO Monitor.

## Appendix 2


### List of documents by order of appearance.

- April 5, 2022. “Regarding the implementation of the urgent project for water and sewage by the East Gaza Society.” Authored by the Director of the Division of Public Activity. Submitted to the Deputy Director General of [the Sector of] Intelligence Affairs.
- December 14, 2022. “Report on the employees in foreign associations that have the right to submit a request for a foreign visitor.” Authored by the Department of Foreign Associations under the Branch of Foreign Activity. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Associations.
- March 4, 2020. “Working paper on international organizations and associations that pose a threat and security dangers, and how to engage with them.” Authored by [Ayman] Abu Islam Rouqa the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity. Submitted to the Director of the Interior Security Mechanism Abdul Basit Al-Masri (nom de guerre Abu Yasser).
- June 15, 2020. “Report on the Oxfam association.” Authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity Aqid (Hamam rank for Colonel) Ayman Rouqa (nom de guerre “Abu Islam”).
- June 22, 2021. “Meeting of Exploiting Citizen [NAME REDACTED] from Mercy Corps Association.” Authored by the Western Associations Department under the Branch of Foreign Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity.
- July 28, 2021. “Testimony of [NAME REDACTED].” Authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity.
- June 6, 2021. “Regarding the meeting of the committee of non governmental associations.” Authored by the Branch of Security of Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Public Activity.
- November 20, 2019. “Report on the international association Save the Children.” Authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations. Submitted to Director of the Division of Foreign Activity Aqid (Hamam rank for Colonel) Ayman Rouqa (nom de guerre “Abu Islam”).

- June 28, 2020. “The most dangerous foreign associations working in the Gaza Strip.” Authored by the Branch of Foreign Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Foreign Activity Aqid (Hamis rank for Colonel) Ayman Rouqa (nom de guerre “Abu Islam”).
- July 27, 2020. “Response on the project ‘urgent aid for vulnerable families in the Gaza Strip.’” Authored by the Branch of Security of Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Division of Public Activity.
- June 16, 2021. “The Rai-Consult company carrying out a field survey in Al Fukhari area.” Authored by the Deputy Director General of [the Sector of] Intelligence Affairs. Submitted to the Director General of the ISM.
- March 29, 2022. “Testimony of [NAME REDACTED] Director of NRC [Gaza].” Authored the Department of Western Associations. Submitted to the Director of the Branch of Foreign Activities.

## Appendix 3

**MoINS’ hierarchical chart of bodies assigned to monitor and control NGO and humanitarian activity (from analysis of documents, as of mid 2022)**



## **Appendix 4**

MolINS December 2022 document, “Report on the employees in foreign associations that have the right to submit a request for a foreign visitor,” translated by NGO Monitor. Names and personal information have been redacted.

EMBARGO