

The Faces of Intelligence Reform

Perspectives on Direction and Form

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Foreword by

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
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with

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James T. Kirkhope

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needs to occur across borders.

Much as U.S. intelligence has required a major reworking to facilitate better sharing and handling of information, so now does the international intelligence community. While mistrust and ownership issues have historically prevented the very idea of a multilateral intelligence body from gaining traction, the threat we find ourselves presently facing makes that rejection less sustainable. The looming danger posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of forces not compelled by the norms of civil society requires that we rethink how intelligence flows across borders.

To date the majority of international intelligence cooperation has focused on ad hoc arrangements rather than on building more formal links that could serve as part of a comprehensive strategy against terror. Exchanges have revolved around specific incidents, such as sharing of information gleaned from specific individuals. We need to go beyond this level.

Among the key recommendations of the recent Club de Madrid's Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security was a call for governments to improve coordination in intelligence efforts by "promoting international engagement, cooperation and dialogue." The Bush administration needs to seize upon this idea, and then work to energize international support for a formalized structure for multilateral cooperation.

America cannot go it alone in the setting we currently find ourselves in. We need only to look to the dearth of American HUMINT in much of Africa and South Asia to recognize the importance of improving intelligence sharing. The prospect of ever again making decisions as we did regarding Iraq's WMD despite not having a single agent on the ground is absurd.²

It is particularly vital in this period of our history when we appear to be on an almost constant wartime footing that we do not become closed-minded and unable to recognize the value of diverging analysis. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that, despite our tremendous intelligence capabilities, we remain mutually dependent on our allies, both old and new, in this war on terror.

2 *The Economist* (London: Nov 20, 2004), vol. 373, issue 8402, 54.

International Partnerships in Intelligence Reformation

Westley Moore

President George W. Bush recently signed into law the most sweeping piece of intelligence reform in the nation's history since the National Security Act of 1947, consolidating fifteen intelligence agencies and creating a new National Intelligence Director. While the full impact of this reform has yet to be felt, it is certainly a step in the right direction. Changes in our intelligence structure were needed. However, unilateral improvements in intelligence infrastructure will not be enough to increase security against terrorism. Both our force structure and our ability to effectively reduce attacks from radical terror organizations can either be tremendously bolstered or hampered by our ability to convince our international partners to show the same commitment and concern for reform.

On December 17, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the most sweeping piece of intelligence reform in the nation's history since Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. The new 563-page bill effectively consolidated fifteen different spy and intelligence agencies and created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, has been nominated to serve as the first DNI. While the full impact of this reform has yet to be felt, it is certainly a step in the right direction.

Since the attacks of September 11, there has been an outpouring of support from lawmakers, pundits, and individual citizens, including some of the families of the victims of the attacks, for a massive overhaul in our intelligence collection and dissemination system. Many feel with the passing of the 2004 intelligence reform bill, Americans can rest assured that they are

safer today than ever and our intelligence forces now have a better chance to properly protect the American people. While America has led the charge to improve the efficacy of its intelligence forces, other nations have failed to take the same steps to improve their own intelligence forces. Washington is not the only capital where intelligence reform is needed. Unless Paris, Riyadh, Buenos Aires, Tripoli, Moscow, and many other capital cities around the world enact similar reform, the effect of the U.S. intelligence reform will be fruitless.

It will take more than a national intelligence czar sitting in Washington to break up potential terror attacks. The fact remains that the vast majority of the terror attacks that have taken place this decade have not been committed on U.S. soil. Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Hamas, etc. have been responsible for over twenty-five attacks in as many different countries since the attack on the United States in 2001. Additionally, no terror attacks committed in this decade have been planned solely on American soil. It is imperative that intelligence sharing and process improvement among America and its international partners become as much a linchpin of our intelligence reform as any other initiative.

The United States has already begun to take steps to promote intelligence reform within our international partner's own jurisdictions. Former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge announced a new initiative to urge collective action in fighting terrorism and improving intelligence collection efforts between the United States and Europe. Tom Ridge said January 13, 2005 at the European Policy Centre in Brussels that the United States will establish a full-time attaché from the Department of Homeland Security to the European Union. As Secretary Ridge himself indicated, this initiative "aims to promote international understanding of the importance of intelligence reform and give international partners some of the tools needed to initiate their own intelligence reform." The United States has also been working openly with Pakistani intelligence forces to help our Pakistani partners catch the terrorists that live within their jurisdiction and thwart the attacks that are planned there. Steps like these are important, but alone will not do anything to protect the people any better.

The internationalization of intelligence reform takes on a new importance when you consider the fact that many radical organizations increasingly possess the financial resources to prepare and execute attacks. Jessica Stern claimed in her most recent book, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, "Today's multinational terrorist leader is an entrepreneur who brings together mission, money and market share. He hires skilled and unskilled labor and often pays competitive rates." We are dealing with groups with the organizational and fundraising skills of multinational businesses, and we need to match their creativity and resourcefulness with creativity, resourcefulness, and unity of our own. Unfortunately, many of our international partners have not shown the ability to plan or use adequate resources in the appropriate and necessary manner. Argentina, for example, presents a prime example of the danger of inadequate intelligence collection and understanding. In 2003, it was discovered that Argentine intelligence officials had found Hamas literature in an old warehouse, only to later discard it since none of the Argentinean intelligence agents could decipher the Arabic writing. Incidences like this are not uncommon, nor are they acceptable in a true international war on terror.

I applaud the new U.S. effort for intelligence reform. Changes in our intelligence structure were needed. Our force structure and ability to effectively reduce attacks from radical terror organizations can either be tremendously bolstered or hampered by our ability to convince our international partners to show the same commitment and concern for reform.