To Harvard’s FAS Dean, RIO, and CPC Chair:

Happy New Year!


Now I am forced to submit an additional complaint with nearly 50 allegations, including over half a dozen examples never seen before. Some of them occur in a publication by Gay that was until now believed to be free from allegations of plagiarism. Others occur in the dissertation. Harvard’s “independent review” missed them. **For this reason and others, a new research misconduct inquiry must be opened (Inquiry 1).**

Since my 12/19 complaint, public reporting as well as public statements made by Harvard have revealed further evidence of misconduct on the part of Harvard personnel, including Claudine Gay and the members of the Harvard Corporation board. I am also reporting that evidence here anonymously for fear that Gay and Harvard will make good on their recently publicized threats to retaliate against me.

Upon receiving allegations sent initially by the New York Post on 10/24, Harvard states that on 10/29, “President Gay asked the Harvard Corporation to conduct an independent review.” But, as I wrote on 12/19, Gay and all FAS personnel are obligated by Harvard’s policies and procedures to report even “apparent research misconduct” to the RIO/CPC Chair. It is not enough to report the conduct to the board. The board is not mentioned at all in the FAS policy on allegations of research misconduct. The policy states: “All individuals subject to this Policy will report observed, suspected, or apparent research misconduct to the RIO or to the Chair of the CPC.” We know that the allegations submitted by the New York Post were “apparent research misconduct” because Gay and the board would not have felt the need to conduct any review if they were not.

As I also wrote on 12/19, the FAS policy on research misconduct applies to Gay because she holds a faculty position in FAS. Look at the policy yourselves to see how clear it is about this.

So I repeat my question: Did Gay report the apparent research misconduct to the RIO/CPC Chair, as she was required to do by the FAS research misconduct policy? If she kept the allegations to herself and the board, this is another violation of Harvard policy, as she has no standing to determine that “the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest” (not the appearance of one?) justifies violating Harvard policy. Nor does the board. **An investigation should be opened to determine whether any Harvard personnel subject to the policy on research misconduct failed to report “observed, suspected, or apparent research misconduct” by Claudine Gay to the RIO/CPC Chair (Inquiry 2).** “Covering up or otherwise failing to report observed, suspected, or apparent research misconduct by others” is a violation of the “governing” FAS policy.
Harvard admits that its handling of the allegations did not follow regular FAS policies and procedures. “It was determined that these issues should not go through the University or Faculty of Arts and Sciences’ Research Integrity Office because due to the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest, because these offices ultimately report to the President.” But Harvard does not clearly state who made this determination. Harvard states that “President Gay asked the Harvard Corporation to conduct an independent review.” Are we to understand that it was Gay herself, the very person against whom the allegations were leveled, was involved in the decision about how to investigate them? Was she involved in recommending against referring the allegations to the RIO/CPC Chair, as required by the FAS research misconduct policy? Why did Gay, the “respondent,” have any say in the matter if Harvard wanted to avoid “the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest”?

Harvard expects the public to believe that if the tenured faculty who “ultimately” report to Gay had investigated her, this would have created “the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest,” so Gay herself needed to influence the investigative process.

As for the remaining board members, they appear to have “unresolved personal, professional, or financial conflicts of interest” in this case because, as one Harvard Law School alumnus said to the Jewish Insider, “managing the public’s awareness of their potential failures to do proper diligence” on Gay could potentially “impact their own continued tenures.” Michael Goodwin, writing for the New York Post, adds, “despite the scandalous plagiarism findings, the same people who picked her continue to protect her — and themselves. Because they did such a shoddy job of vetting her, the board members are refusing to honestly evaluate her history and performance because it would make them look bad for hiring her in the first place.”

The board is conflicted. More conflicted than a committee of tenured Harvard faculty formed by the RIO/CPC Chair or FAS Dean. This merits attention. If the board really wanted to avoid “the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest,” their irregular investigation ought to have been carried out with an irregular commitment to transparency. It wasn’t. It was instead carried out with an extraordinary amount of secrecy.

A secret subcommittee of the board secretly appointed “an independent panel of three experts” to investigate the allegations against Gay in secret.

Will Harvard or Gay tell us who was on the four-person subcommittee of the board? Will Harvard or Gay tell us who the three “experts” were? Harvard states that the three “experts” have “no ties to Harvard.” Harvard neglected to mention whether they have any ties to Gay. Did Gay have any say over who was appointed? Who advised the board in appointing these three “experts”? Did Gay know who among her colleagues in political science would be reviewing her work for plagiarism? If so, did they know that she knew? Peer review is normally blind for a reason. Is Harvard keeping the identities of the “independent panel” secret from the public while revealing them to Gay?

This is problematic at two levels. Given the above I have to ask whether, on a pretext of avoiding “the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest,” Gay asked to shut the RIO/CPC Chair
out of an investigative process in order to (1) keep this information from the Harvard faculty and FAS Dean and (2) move the investigation from FAS to three cherry-picked political scientists.

According to the New York Post’s recent reporting,

On October 24, the New York Post sent 27 plagiarism allegations to Harvard.

On October 27, the New York Post received a “blistering letter” Thomas Clare, counsel for both Gay personally and Harvard, which called the allegations “demonstrably false” and said all the examples were “cited and properly credited.” This was a false statement of material fact by Harvard’s counsel, acting at Harvard and Gay’s direction.

On November 2, Harvard’s investigation into the allegations began. It only concluded on December 9.

So we now know for certain that **the board’s investigation was a sham.** Gay and Harvard, who conveniently omitted to mention any of this in their timeline of events to the Chronicle of Higher Education, had already made up their minds before launching their investigation. That’s why they let their lawyer tell the Post that the allegations were “demonstrably false” days before an investigation even began. The investigation was just for show.

Determined to quickly absolve Gay and prevent the allegations from becoming public, **Gay and Harvard tried to silence the Post and by extension me by threatening to sue for “immense” damages** if the proposed article was published. See here: [https://nypost.com/2023/12/22/news/plagiarism-harvard-cleared-claudine-gay-then-investigated/](https://nypost.com/2023/12/22/news/plagiarism-harvard-cleared-claudine-gay-then-investigated/).

Even worse, the New York Post reports that Gay and Harvard “threatened to use legal means to out who had supplied the comparisons,” a shocking admission that **Gay and Harvard sought to retaliate against me personally.** At one point Gay and Harvard asked the Post, “Why would someone making such a complaint be unwilling to attach their name to it?” I was unwilling because I feared that Gay and Harvard would violate their policies, behave more like a cartel with a hedge fund attached than a university, and try to seek “immense” damages from me and who knows what else. Since I’ve answered their lawyer’s stupid question, allow me to ask a reasonable question of my own. Why would an institution assessing allegations made in good faith, and ultimately substantiated, threaten to use its enormous resources to expose the identity of a whistleblower? Did Gay wish to personally thank me for helping her to improve her work even if I drove her harder than she wanted to be driven? Gay and Harvard sought to silence and retaliate against a journalist and a whistleblower.

Retaliation against complainants is a clear violation of FAS Policy: “Harvard community members may not retaliate in any way against complainants, witnesses, the RIO, or committee members.” It is also potentially a violation of university HR policies.

The members of the board are Claudine Gay, Timothy Barakett, Kenneth Chenault, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Paul Finnegan, Biddy Martin, Karen Gordon Mills, Diana Nelson, Penny Pritzker, Tracy Pun Palandjian, Shirley Tilghman, and Theodore Wells, Jr. **They should all be**
investigated for retaliation against a misconduct complainant (Inquiry 3). As should any other Harvard personnel who were privy to this extraordinary abuse of Harvard’s power and institutional resources to pursue a personal vendetta and to cover up a decades-long pattern of research misconduct. If Gay authorized these threats without consulting with the board, the board should tell us.

In addition to perverting the course of the investigation and threatening complainants, the board obstructed their own investigation in numerous other ways.

Gay’s 1993 article in Origins was “initially” included in the scope of their review. But Gay and Harvard eventually decided that “the article was outside its purview due to the age of the article and because articles included in that journal generally do not include citations or quotations.”

As I wrote in December, Harvard’s research misconduct policy, which Harvard said is “the governing policy” in this case, applies to “allegations of research misconduct (as defined by this Policy) involving any person who, at the time of the alleged research misconduct, was employed by, was an agent of, or was affiliated by contract or agreement with FAS, including without limitation officials, tenured and non-tenured faculty, teaching and support staff, researchers, research coordinators, technicians, post-doctoral and other fellows, students, volunteers, and agents.” I added that Gay was a graduate student in Arts and Sciences from 1992-1998. To clarify, 1993 falls between 1992 and 1998. Harvard policy, the policy Harvard publicly states is “governing” throughout this process, requires that you consider Gay’s 1993 article as well as the plagiarism found in the 2014 working paper, which was also excluded from the review in violation of FAS policy.

Harvard’s policies and procedures make no exceptions for plagiarism published in outlets that “generally do not include citations” either. Plagiarism in an op-ed is plagiarism. Plagiarism in an oral speech is plagiarism. (The President of the University of South Carolina resigned for plagiarism in a speech.) Plagiarism in a book review is plagiarism. Plagiarism in an academic outlet like Origins, which only “generally” does not include citations, is plagiarism. Also, your “experts” should take another look at Origins. There are quotations, despite what Harvard said, as can be seen from the fact that Gay’s article includes a number of them.

The board and the board subcommittee should be investigated for violating Harvard’s policies and procedures, which nowhere make exceptions to research misconduct for “age” or for outlets generally without “citations,” while pretending to the public to adhere to them faithfully (Inquiry 4). Excluding Gay’s 1993 Origins article in clear violation of the FAS policy should be investigated specifically as an attempt at “covering up … observed, suspected, or apparent research misconduct” by the board’s subcommittee.

Gay’s 1993 work in Origins contains copious amounts of plagiarism. Was this article excluded from the review in violation of Harvard’s policies and procedures because the board and the “distinguished political scientists” couldn’t think of any other way to brush this plagiarism under the rug? I ask whether Gay and the board took over responsibility for investigating Gay’s work from the RIO/CPC Chair so that they would not need to carefully adhere to the policies and procedures “governing” investigations into research misconduct? To justify ignoring the
standards of plagiarism found in Harvard’s guide to using sources, Harvard told the Chronicle on 12/20 that the guide was a “reference resource,” not a “governing policy.” Harvard said that the FAS policy on research misconduct “was the governing policy under which this review was conducted.” Like so much of what Harvard said, this is not true. If the FAS policy on research misconduct is the governing policy, Gay’s 1993 work in Origins should be considered. Harvard misled the public by calling the FAS policy a “governing policy.” Who made the decision to selectively apply the “governing” policy? This must be investigated by the RIO/CPC Chair.

Earlier this month Gay stated, “I stand by the integrity of my scholarship. Throughout my career, I have worked to ensure my scholarship adheres to the highest academic standards.” To Gay, I pose a question: do you stand by the integrity of your scholarship in your 1993 work in Origins? If so, you should ask for its inclusion in the review in accordance with FAS policy so that the integrity of your scholarship can be established.

The board subcommittee determined that the new allegations submitted on 12/19 were “without merit.” But Harvard sneakily admitted by omission that the “independent panel” was not involved in making this determination. So the board subcommittee violated not just the FAS policy that Harvard falsely claimed was “governing” for them, but even their ad hoc “independent review” procedure. Why? Further, I ask, why were the allegations determined to be “without merit”? Such a blithe attitude is not warranted. If the board subcommittee made this determination for good reason, they should want to share it. Gay and the board threw out the FAS policy and devised a novel procedure to investigate the 10/24 allegations: an “independent panel.” Then, when new allegations came out on 12/19, they threw out the “independent panel,” and let a subcommittee of the board reject the new allegations in about a day.

Knowing what you know now, if under pressure from Gay and the board, the RIO/CPC Chair declines to open an investigation into mishandling of the plagiarism allegations, failure to report the allegations to the FAS authorities, and threats of retaliation against complainants, then the RIO/CPC Chair should be assumed to be unable or unwilling to do their jobs under FAS policy.

In that case, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts Sciences must ensure that FAS policy and procedures are enforced. Dean Hoekstra has said that FAS will be “leaning into our longstanding policies and practices.” Retaliation against whistleblowers, failure to report misconduct to the RIO/CPC, and plagiarism are all violations of that policy, and the FAS Dean is ultimately responsible for compliance with the policy.

DATA FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE RESEARCH INTEGRITY OFFICE AND CHAIR OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT


   On June 18, 1978, representatives from a number of Afro-Brazilian organizations, outraged by a series of racially-motivated incidents, joined forces in Sao Paulo to form the Unified Movement Against Racial Discrimination (MUCDR).

   As their first project, MUCDR organized a July 7, 1978 demonstration to protest two
acts: (a) the April 28 beating death of black worker Robson Silveira da Luz, by a Sao Paulo policeman; and (b) the May expulsion of four young black athletes from the volleyball team of the Tiete Yacht Club because of their color. Two thousand people participated in the protest on the steps of the Municipal Theater. The organizers read an open letter to the population in which they outlined their campaign against "racial discrimination, police oppression, unemployment, underemployment and marginalization."


The earliest manifestation of the MNU was the Unified Movement Against Racial Discrimination (MUCDR). Representatives from a number of Black organizations, entidades, met at the Center of Black Art and Culture in São Paulo on June 18, 1978. They resolved to create a movement to defend the Afro-Brazilian community against racial exploitation and human disrespect. They designated as their first activity a demonstration to be held at 6:30 p.m. on July 7, 1978, at the Chá viaduct in São Paulo. The demonstration was to protest two acts: (a) the torture and assassination of a Black worker, Robson Silveira da Luz, by policemen in São Paulo on April 28, 1978; and (b) the dismissal of four Black male children from the volleyball team of the Tiete Yacht Club in May, 1978, because of their color (Gonzalez, 1982, p. 43).

The demonstration was held on the designated date on the steps of the Municipal Theater of São Paulo. Two thousand people were present (Gonzalez, 1982, p. 48). An open letter to the population was read. Its principal features were (Gonzalez, 1982, pp. 48-50):

1. A campaign against racial discrimination, police oppression, unemployment, underemployment, and marginalization.

[Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” David Covin’s work is not mentioned there.]

2. Gay, Claudine. “Between Black and White,” p. 28:

The fundamental organizational unit, as approved by the founding National Assembly in 1978, was to be the Center of Struggle (Centro de Luta). Centers were to be formed in work areas, villages, prisons, candomble and umbanda temples, samba schools, churches, and favelas.


In the basic organizational structure which they approved, the Centers of Struggle were the fundamental organizational units. These were to be formed in work areas, villages, prisons, candomblé and umbanda temples, samba schools, afoxês, churches, and favelas.
3. Gay, Claudine. “Between Black and White,” p. 28:

It was a younger generation of Afro-Brazilians, many with one or more years of university education, that were among the first and most eager respondents to the MNU's organizational call. Their eagerness was in large part a measure of the economic and political exclusion they had suffered under the military dictatorship.

As their numbers grew, it was their aspirations and rhetoric which came to define the organization. The movement became an expression of frustration among upwardly mobile Afro-Brazilians denied admission to the middle-class status to which their education and qualifications entitled them. To that extent, the aspirations of these activists were too removed from the lives of the poor to facilitate cross-class linkages.


a younger generation of Afro-Brazilians, many with one or more years of university study, were starting to organise a new black movement in response to the economic and political exclusion which they were experiencing under the dictatorship. This movement, most vividly symbolised by the Movimento Negro Unificado, created in Sao Paulo in 1978 …

This new movement of the 1970s and 1980s was to a large degree the expression of frustration among upwardly mobile Afro-Brazilians denied admission to the middle-class status to which their education and qualifications entitled them. Its activists worked hard at recruiting support in the slums and favelas of the urban periferia, but their rhetoric and aspirations often seemed somewhat removed from the lives of poor and working-class blacks facing the immediate, grinding problems of poverty, crime and hunger.


Theory predicts an interaction between county partisanship and party control, such that the more Democratic a county, the more LIHTC allocations it should receive when the state is under Democratic control; if the relationship is symmetrical, as Hypothesis 1 predicts, a more Republican county should benefit when the state is under Republican control.

Theoretical arguments predict an interaction between partisanship of voters and party control of state government. Democratic counties are expected to receive more transfers when the state is under Democratic control than when the state is under Republican control; and Republican counties should receive more transfers when the state is under Republican control.

[Gay cites Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006 twice in parentheses on p. 46. She does not cite the paper anywhere thereafter, including on p. 51.]

5. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 52:

The key tests of the partisan allocation argument are whether the coefficient on Democratic vote share is positive and significant for Democratic governors; for Republican governors, the coefficient should be either negative and significant (Hypothesis 1), or indistinguishable from 0 (Hypothesis 2).


The key tests of the majoritarian argument are whether the slope on Democratic Vote times Democratic Control is positive and the slope on Democratic Vote times Republican Control is negative. The coefficient on Democratic Vote times Divided Control should lie between these two and possibly be indistinguishable from 0.

[Gay cites Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006 twice in parentheses on p. 46. She does not cite the paper anywhere thereafter, including on p. 52.]

6. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 51:

To measure the direction in which the governing party skews funds, I include the interaction between which party holds the governor’s office (Dst) and county partisanship (DemVoteist); this specification allows for different slopes on Democratic vote share for Republican and Democratic governors. The estimated coefficient $\rho_1$ represents the average within-county relationship between Democratic vote share (in the most recent election) and LIHTC allocations under a Republican governor.


First, to measure the direction in which the governing party skews funds we include the interaction between which party controls the state government and the partisanship of the county. Specifically, average Democratic Vote is interacted with Democratic Control, Republican Control and Divided Control. (The sum of these three variables is the average
Democratic vote share.) This specification allows for different slopes on average Democratic Vote for the three cases of party control. In Table 2 these variables are labeled: Democratic Vote times Democratic Control, Democratic Vote times Republican Control and Democratic Vote times Divided Control.

[Gay cites Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006 twice in parentheses on p. 46. She does not cite the paper anywhere thereafter, including on p. 51.]


Under this assumption, one knows that the treatment impact for the noncompliers (i.e., individuals who did not use the voucher) is zero, making the ITT estimate \( \pi_{\text{ITT}} \) a weighted average of the impact on compliers and the zero effect on noncompliers (Bloom 1984); the weights are the portions of the sample that are compliers and noncompliers. As a result, the TOT impact can be estimated by dividing \( \pi_{\text{ITT}} \) by the program compliance rate for the treatment group (for similar approaches to estimating MTO impacts, see Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Ludwig et al. 2008; Orr et al. 2003).


Under these assumptions, we know that the average outcomes of the noncompliers in the treatment group and of the potential noncompliers in the control group are the same. Put differently, we know that the experimental impact for the noncompliers was zero. Thus, under the TOT assumptions, the ITT estimate is simply a weighted average of the impact on compliers and the zero effect on noncompliers—the weights are the portion of the sample that are compliers and the portion that are noncompliers (Bloom 1984). This result implies that the TOT impact can be calculated by simply rescaling the ITT estimate by the program compliance rate.

[On p. 160, Gay cites Ludwig et al 2008, among others, writing: “(for similar approaches to estimating MTO impacts, see Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Ludwig et al. 2008; Orr et al. 2003).” Gay uses no quotation marks around verbatim language and does not cite specific page numbers.]

8. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 54:

I also construct a county-level measure that captures the financial incentives developers have to build or rehabilitate affordable housing in the most impoverished places (Hollar and Usowski 2007).

As an instrument for low-income housing development, we construct a county-level measure that captures the incentives developers have to build or rehabilitate affordable housing in certain tracts.

[Gay never cites Freedman and Owens 2011. She thanks the two of them for letting her use their data (p. 66n.22).]

9. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 55:

As QCT coverage increases, so does the ability of developers to take advantage of the larger tax credit by siting new housing in the county.


As QCT coverage increases, however, so does the ability of developers to take advantage of the larger tax credit.

[Gay never cites Freedman and Owens 2011. She thanks the two of them for letting her use their data (p. 66n.22).]

10. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 43:

The LIHTC is widely considered one of the nation’s most successful housing programs, and accounts for an estimated one-sixth of all multifamily housing—subsidized or unsubsidized—built in the United States since program inception (Schwartz 2010).

Williamson, A. R. “Can They Afford the Rent? Resident Cost Burden in Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments.” *Urban Affairs Review* 47(6), 2011, p. 776:

The LIHTC is responsible for an estimated one-sixth of all multifamily rental housing—both subsidized and unsubsidized—produced in the United States each year (Schwartz 2010).

[Gay never cites Williamson 2011.]

11. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 64n2:

Demand for credits declined sharply during the financial crisis, as the most active investors in the tax credits (large financial institutions bound by the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act) pulled out of the market.

The strength of this interest has declined since the global financial crisis, however, chiefly because the most active investors in the tax credits were large financial institutions that purchased the credits not only for investment purposes but also to fulfill Community Reinvestment Act requirements.

[Gay never cites Williamson 2011.]

12. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 43:

What began as a modest item in the Internal Revenue Code has evolved over time into the nation’s single largest subsidy for affordable housing, replacing nearly all previous tax incentives for investing in rental housing of any kind.


The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit has evolved from an esoteric financial instrument to the single most important source of equity for low-income rental housing in the United States. Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax credit replaced virtually all previous tax incentives for investing in rental housing of any kind.

[Gay cites Schwartz twice in this paragraph. She cites Schwartz once in the first sentence, and again in the last sentence. The second reference to Schwartz is part of a sentence copied verbatim from Williamson. See #10 above. Gay does not cite specific page numbers and uses no quotation marks around verbatim language.]

13. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 43:

What began as a modest item in the Internal Revenue Code has evolved over time into the nation’s single largest subsidy for affordable housing, replacing nearly all previous tax incentives for investing in rental housing of any kind.


The single largest subsidy for low-income rental housing is not a federal housing program but an item in the Internal Revenue Code.

[See #12 above.]


Again, part of this failure can be attributed to the political environment—particularly, the party reform of 1979, which allowed the opposition to return to multi-party competition. Operating in much the same way as in the Second Republic, party competition and the promise of free elections encouraged competition for black electoral support. Parties adopted anti-discrimination platforms, and
organized commissions to investigate race relations. Affiliation with one of these political parties served a critical function which the MNU could not: it created a sense of attachment to the mainstream political apparatus, thus defusing the perceived need for racially defined political activity.


A major part of the explanation for this success may be found in the 'party reform' of 1979. Prior to that time, the dictatorship had permitted the existence of only a single opposition party, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro. Eventually recognising that such a policy provided the perfect mechanism for its opponents to join forces, in 1979 the government freed the opposition to return to multi-party competition. The Movimento Negro Unificado had been founded just the year before and, inspired by its example, local-level black organisations were coming into existence throughout Brazil. As the newly created opposition parties competed among themselves for electoral support, they directed particular attention to this burgeoning black movement, inserting anti-racism planks into their platforms, and creating special working groups and commissions to investigate racial problems.

[Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” In that section, there are 5 works mentioned, the first of which is the following book: Andrews, George Reid. Blacks & Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988. University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.]


Later, "racial democracy" was grafted into official state policy and rooted in the official view that Brazil is a country in which race makes no difference to opportunity or status. Furthermore, the Brazilian government claims that the country is free of both institutional and informal forms of discrimination. Access to public resources—be it education, health care, employment, political participation—is equally available to all citizens. Therefore, the potential for upward mobility is perceived as simply a matter of fair competition and individual merit.

By insisting that Afro-Brazilians enjoy opportunities to better themselves and freedom to compete


The concept of racial democracy asserts that Brazil is a land entirely free of legal and institutional impediments to racial equality, and largely … free of informal racial prejudice and discrimination as well. The nation offers all its citizens, black, brown, or white, virtually complete equality of opportunity in all areas of public life: education, politics, jobs, housing. Thus Afro-Brazilians enjoy opportunities to better themselves, and the freedom to compete.
Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” In that section, there are 5 works mentioned, the first of which is the following book: Andrews, George Reid. Blacks & Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988. University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.]


At the First National Congress of MUCDR, held in Rio in December 1979, the organization changed its name to the Unified Black Movement (MNU)


At the First National Congress of the MNUCDR, held December 14-16, 1979 in Rio, the name was shortened to the Unified Black Movement (MNU) (Gonzalez, 1986, p. 128), after considerable discussion.

Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” David Covin’s work is not mentioned there.]


The Brazilian concept of "whitening," symbolized in the popular saying "we are becoming one people," represents an ideology entirely different from white European and North American phobias about race mixture prevalent at the turn of this century. In the Brazilian view, the mixing of whites and non-whites (be they of Indian or African descent) led to the "breeding out" of non-white racial characteristics, and the propagation of white racial heritage and attributes. Over many generations and on a wide scale, interbreeding would lead to the eventual "whitening" of Brazil.

Miscegenation, or racial interbreeding, has had a long history in Brazil, dating back to the colonial period …


The Brazilian adage that 'we are becoming one people' rests on an implicit assumption that this final amalgam will be, at worst, a light mulatto phenotype and at best a moorish Mediterranean physical type. The ideal of whitening differs so categorically from white European and North American phobias about race mixture, that the Brazilian willingness to accept mixed bloods according to a varying scale of racial categories has often led to the false conclusion that there is no hierarchy of color values. In other words, the Brazilian familiarity with, and qualified acceptance of, miscegenation has misled observers into concluding that the outcome of race mixing was a matter of indifference.
Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” In that section, there are 5 works mentioned. Skidmore’s piece is one of them.

18. Gay, Claudine. “A Room For One’s Own?” p. 43:

The LIHTC incentivizes private development of affordable housing by allowing investors to reduce their federal income taxes by US$1 for every dollar of tax credit received, with the amount of the tax credit dependent on the cost, location, and projected occupancy (by low-income households) of the housing development. When the program was introduced, it represented a departure from an historical approach that had relied heavily on direct public funding and management of affordable housing inventory.

Unlike other tax breaks associated with real estate, the housing tax credits are not awarded automatically. Rather, authority to issue tax credits is allotted to states on an annual basis; the total dollar amount of credits available is determined by state population. Developers must apply to designated state agencies (ordinarily, the state’s housing finance agency) for credits.

Schwartz, Alex F. *Housing Policy in the United States*, p. 83-84:

The LIHTC allows investors to reduce their federal income taxes by $1 for every dollar of tax credit received. Investors receive the credit for 10 years; the property must remain occupied by low-income households for at least 15 years. The amount of the credit depends on the cost and location of the housing development and the proportion of units occupied by low-income households. Unlike other tax breaks associated with real estate, the LIHTC is not awarded automatically. Tax credits are assigned to individual housing developments by designated state agencies (usually state housing finance agencies, or HFAs). The total dollar amount of credits available is determined by state population. As of 2004, states may allocate $1.80 per capita per year in tax credits, with the amount adjusted for inflation thereafter. Developers apply to HFAs for tax credits.

[See comments on #12, 13, and #10 above, all of which are drawn from this same paragraph. Gay does not use quotation marks around language copied verbatim and does not cite page number.]


The concept of racial democracy was already taking shape in Brazil in the early part of the twentieth century, to be fully developed in the 1930s by Brazilian Gilberto Freyre. After witnessing the overt racism of the United States, Freyre extolled the virtues of the Brazilian racial order, linking its tolerant and democratic nature to the nation's more humane experience of slavery.

The concept of racial democracy received its fullest and most coherent exposition in the writings of Gilberto Freyre, beginning in the 1930s. It was visibly taking form during the early decades of the 1900s, however, and its roots run well back into the nineteenth century.

[Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” In that section, there are 5 works mentioned, the first of which is the following book: Andrews, George Reid. Blacks & Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988. University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.]


While the MTO demonstration was not designed to address issues of racial and ethnic concentration directly, the racial characteristics of the new neighborhoods differed modestly from the original locations and between voucher groups.


MTO was not designed to address issues of racial or ethnic concentration directly.

[Orr et al 2003 is not cited in this paragraph, or any at any later point in the paper. It is cited early in the previous paragraph on p. 154, and it is cited on p. 155 in the text accompanying Figure 1. No quotation marks are used around verbatim language.]


Thus the TOT effects, unlike the ITT effects, are nonexperimental, in the sense that they are not directly observed for whole randomly assigned groups.


The TOT estimates are non-experimental, in the sense that they are not directly observed for whole randomly assigned groups.

[Orr et al 2003 is not cited in the paragraph where the passage quoted above occurs. It is cited at the end of the next paragraph, in the same reference discussed earlier: see comments on #7 above. No quotation marks are used around verbatim language.]

22. Gay, Claudine. “Moving to Opportunity,” p. 159:
The TOT impact is inferred from the ITT impact $\pi_{\text{ITT}}$ based on the weak assumption that the effect of the treatment occurs entirely through moving using a program voucher


Under the weak assumption that the effect of the treatment occurs entirely through moving using an MTO program voucher or certificate

[See again comments on #7 above. The parenthetical citation mentioned there includes Orr et al 2003, among others. Gay’s text here appears in the first sentence of the paragraph. The citation—“(for similar approaches to estimating MTO impacts, see Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Ludwig et al. 2008; Orr et al. 2003)”—occurs at the end of the last sentence. There are no quotations used around the verbatim language.]


Poor people who live in high-poverty neighborhoods may be different in politically relevant ways from poor people who seek out and settle in low-poverty neighborhoods. Past research potentially has confused the effects of neighborhoods with the effects of the (unobserved) characteristics of individuals who live in different types of neighborhoods.


Until recently such effects could only be studied by comparing the behavior and life outcomes of low income residents of high-poverty areas with those of poor families in low-poverty neighborhoods. Such comparisons potentially confused the effects of neighborhood with the effects of the characteristics of families who lived in those two types of residential areas.

[Gay does not cite Orr et al 2003 in this paragraph or on this page. She cites Orr et al 2003 on p. 167 and (in text accompanying a graphic) on p. 168. She does not cite the piece again after that.]


The standard errors for the TOT estimates are similarly adjusted. Thus, while TOT impact estimates are substantially larger than ITT estimates (because they are not attenuated by zero effects of the intervention on the noncompliers), they are statistically significant only if the ITT estimate is significant.
this makes the TOT estimates substantially larger than the ITT estimates. However, since the standard errors for the TOT estimates are adjusted in the same way, TOT impacts are statistically significant only if the corresponding experimental ITT estimates are significant.

[Gay never cites Orr et al 2003 in the footnotes. The passage from Gay here is the text of an endnote. The endnote does not contain any citation to Orr et al 2003. It does not use quotation marks around verbatim language.]


There are two estimates of interest that follow from MTO’s experimental design and are reported in the tables: the intent-to-treat (ITT) and the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects. The ITT effect, estimated from the difference in mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups as a whole, is the effect of being offered the voucher, regardless of subsequent compliance (i.e., whether or not the family offered the voucher actually used it to lease up). The TOT effect is the effect of the voucher on the compliers—the MTO sample adults who actually leased up using the program voucher. Whereas the offer of a voucher was extended to every member of the experimental and section 8 treatment groups, not every group member used their assigned voucher. Thus the TOT effects, unlike the ITT effects, are nonexperimental, in the sense that they are not directly observed for whole randomly assigned groups, but only for the subset of compliers within the groups.


We focus on two types of estimates that follow from MTO’s experimental design—termed “intent to treat” and “treatment on the treated” in the experimental literature. Roughly speaking, the MTO intent-to-treat (ITT) effect on a given outcome is the simple difference between the outcome for all individuals assigned at random to MTO’s experimental condition, regardless of whether they “complied” by actually moving through MTO to a low-poverty neighborhood, and the outcome for all individuals assigned to the control group. In contrast, the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates are of outcome differences for families actually moving in conjunction with the program.

The distinctions of black and white—or even white and non-white—that exist in other societies such as the United States, are not used by Brazilians. Instead, they refer to a multi-category system, based not on origin, but on phenotype (i.e. appearance). Essentially, Brazilians are "color-conscious" whereas as Americans and Western Europeans tend to be "race-conscious."

Brazilians evaluate an individual based on certain physical characteristics: namely, amount of pigmentation, hair type, nose, and lips. From this assessment, an individual is placed along a color continuum, anchored at the two extremes by those with either no (visible) African traits or no (visible) European attributes.


Definitions of racial categories: The greatest single difference in race relations between the United States and Brazil is the practical definition an individual's race. The United States has developed a bi-racial system: one is either 'white' or 'black' (the latter category formerly termed 'Negro' or 'colored'). The individual case is resolved not by the person's physical appearance, but by his ancestry. State law in most states (including the North) had developed a functional definition (e.g. one 'Negro' grandparents made the offspring 'Negro') either by statute or practice. The only escape from the ancestrally defined 'Negro' caste was by 'passing', i.e. by being able to appear white in one's physical characteristics and thus conceal one’s ancestry.

In Brazil, on the other hand, race has been primarily defined by physical appearance, thereby creating a multi-racial system. In place of two rigidly defined castes, there has been a sliding spectrum, with three principal categories: white, mulatto, and black. In practice Brazilians have used a wide variety of racial subcategories, which shade into one another. Individual judgements are based on an evaluation of the physical characteristics (hair, skin color, lips, nose, general physical bearing), as well as the person's apparent social status.

[Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” In that section, there are 5 works mentioned. Skidmore’s piece is one of them.]

27. Gay, Claudine. “Between Black and White,” p. 27:

In this new political environment, Brazilians of color came to question publicly the reality of "racial democracy."

Brazilians of color began to question publicly the myth of racial democracy.

Gay’s article has no citations. At the end of the article (p. 28), there is a separate section entitled, “Suggestions for Further Reading.” In that section, there are 5 works mentioned. Skidmore’s piece is one of them.


The average turnout rate seems to increase linearly as African-Americans become a larger proportion of the population. This is one sign that the data contain little aggregation bias. If racial turnout rates changed depending upon a precinct’s racial mix, which is one way to think about bias, a linear form would be unlikely in a simple scatterplot. A linear form would only result if the changes in one race’s turnout were compensated by changes in the turnout of the other race across the graph.


… the average turnout rate seems to decrease linearly as African Americans become a larger proportion of the population. This is one sign that the data contain little aggregation bias. If racial turnout rates changed depending upon a precinct’s racial mix, which is one description of bias, a linear form would be unlikely in a simple scatter plot (resulting only when changes in one race’s turnout rate somehow compensated for changes in the other’s across the graph).

Palmquist and Voss 1996 is never cited.


The idea behind the “method of bounds” is that the beginning point for any ecological inference should be the knowledge a researcher has for certain. This knowledge includes the fact that any proportion is by definition bound by 0 and 1. Furthermore, the marginals of a table, Xi (black population density) and Ti (total turnout) dictate the minimum and maximum possible values of the cells in the table. King’s method makes direct use of this information to establish absolute bounds on the values of the quantities of interest.

The beginning point for any ecological inference should be with the knowledge we have for certain. Almost from the beginning of methodological work in this area, researchers have used the fact that proportions must by definition be between 0 and 1 (Duncan, Cuzzort, and Duncan 1961; Achen and Shively 1995). Recently, Gary King (n.d.) has emphasized the particular advantages of using the precinct-by-precinct constraints. Making direct use of this information to establish absolute (i.e. not probabilistic) bounds on the percentages of the internal cells is entirely straightforward. For any single table (either of a precinct or of a the state as a whole), the marginals dictate a minimum and maximum possible value for each of the cells.

[Palmquist and Voss 1996 is never cited.]


I am also grateful to Gary: as a methodologist, he reminded me of the importance of getting the data right and following where they lead without fear or favor; as an advisor, he gave me the attention and the opportunities I needed to do my best work.

... 

Finally, I want to thank my family, two wonderful parents and an older brother. From kindergarten through graduate school, they celebrated my every accomplishment, forced me to laugh when I’d lost my sense of humor, drove me harder than I sometimes wanted to be driven, and gave me the confidence that I could achieve.

Hochschild, Jennifer L. Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation. Princeton University Press, 1996, p. xx:

Bill Wilson taught me how to think about the relationship between race and class, gave me confidence that I could write a book on the subject, and provides me and many others with a model of how to express the courage of one’s convictions with dignity, evidence, and toughness. Sandy Jencks showed me the importance of getting the data right and of following where they lead without fear or favor. His example of iconoclasm about what the right answer is combined with passion for finding the right answer drove me much harder than I sometimes wanted to be driven.

[Hochschild 1996 is never cited.]

Bobo and Gilliam (1990) stands as the most complete research to date in this area, focusing on black elected officials at the city-level. Using 1987 survey data, Bobo and Gilliam found that African-Americans in “high black-empowerment” areas—as indicated by control of the mayor’s office—are more active than either African-Americans in low empowerment areas or their white counterparts of comparable socioeconomic status. Empowerment, they conclude, influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious orientation towards politics and by greatly increasing black attentiveness to political affairs.

As for whites, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) found that they pay less attention to local politics when blacks control local offices; however, they do not become generally less trusting and efficacious as a result.


In the most complete research to date, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) find that African Americans in areas of high black empowerment—as indicated by control of the mayor’s office—are more active than either African Americans in low empowerment areas or whites of comparable socioeconomic status. Empowerment, they conclude, influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious orientation toward politics (see also Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Howell and Fagan 1988) and by greatly increasing black attentiveness to political affairs. As for whites, the findings suggest that they pay less attention to local politics when blacks control local offices but do not become generally less trusting and efficacious as a result.


The results show that blacks in high-black-empowerment areas—as indicated by control of the mayor’s office—are more active than either blacks living in low-empowerment areas or their white counterparts of comparable socioeconomic status. Furthermore, the results show that empowerment influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious orientation to politics and by greatly increasing black attentiveness to political affairs.

Bobo and Gilliam 1990, p. 383:

In sum, whites tend to pay less attention to local politics when blacks control local offices but do not become generally less trusting or efficacious as a result.

[Gay uses no quotation marks around verbatim language.]

King et al. (2001) identify four conditions, all of which must hold, in order for listwise deletion to be preferable to multiple imputation: (1) The analysis model is conditional on $X$ (i.e., explanatory variables containing missing data), and the functional form is known to be correctly specified; (2) There is nonignorable (NI) missingness (i.e., the probability that a cell is missing depends on the unobserved value of the missing response) in $X$, and there are no other variables available that could be used in the imputation model to predict $X$; (3) Missingness in $X$ is not a function of $Y$ (i.e., the dependent variable containing missing data) and unobserved omitted variables that affect $Y$ do not exist; (4) The number of observations left after listwise deletion should be so large that the efficiency loss from listwise deletion does not counterbalance the biases induced by the other conditions.


For listwise deletion to be preferable to EMIs, all four of the following (sufficient) conditions must hold. (1) The analysis model is conditional on $X$ (such as a regression model), and the functional form is known to be correctly specified (so that listwise deletion is consistent, and the characteristic robustness of regression is not lost when applied to data with measurement error, endogeneity, nonlinearity, and so on). (2) There is NI missingness in $X$, so that EMIs can give incorrect answers, and no $Z$ variables are available that could be used in an imputation stage to fix the problem. (3) Missingness in $X$ is not a function of $Y$, and unobserved omitted variables that affect $Y$ do not exist. This ensures that the normally substantial advantages of our approach in this instance do not apply. (4) The number of observations left after listwise deletion should be so large that the efficiency loss from listwise deletion does not counterbalance (e.g., in a mean square error sense) the biases induced by the other conditions.

[Gay uses no quotation marks around verbatim language.]


Multiple imputation, which assumes that information in the observed data provides indirect evidence about the likely values of the unobserved data, can correct for the inefficiency and bias that result from listwise deletion.

Gay, Claudine. “Moving to Opportunity,” p. 158:

Multiple imputation, which assumes that information in the observed data provides indirect evidence about the likely values of the unobserved data (and that, after
controlling for the observables, missingness is independent of the unobserved data), is
known to outperform listwise deletion (i.e., removing all out-migrants from the analysis)
by correcting for the inefficiency and bias that result from the latter approach (Schafer
and Olsen 1998).

Missing-Data Problems: A Data Analyst's Perspective,” *Multivariate Behavioral
Research*, 33:4, p. 546:

In any incomplete dataset, the observed values provide indirect evidence about the likely
values of the unobserved ones. This evidence, when combined with certain assumptions
(described in the following section), implies a predictive probability distribution for the
missing

[In “Spirals of Trust?” Gay cites Schafer and Olsen 1998 only in the previous sentence.
She uses no quotation marks around verbatim language.]

34. Gay, Claudine. Taking Charge: Black Electoral Success and the Redefinition of
American Politics. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Government, Harvard
University, 1997, p. 146:

Preston (1978) argued that descriptive representation is “not only desirable but necessary
for Black Americans,” because, in part, it fulfills a host of psychological needs.

Swain, Carol M. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans

The presence of black representatives in Congress, regardless of their political
party, fulfills a host of psychological needs that are no less important for being intangible.
One need only attend an annual Black Caucus legislative weekend to see the pride that
the hundreds of blacks who attend the affair have in the group of congressional black
representatives. Black representatives are celebrities-icons for their group.
Michael Preston writes: "Symbolic representation is not only desirable but necessary for
black Americans."

[Swain 1995 cited elsewhere (p. 144 and 148, etc.) but not here.]

Participation,” Working Paper, April 15, 2014, p. 5n4:

For a project to be eligible for tax credits one of two income criteria for occupants must
be met, 20–50 or 40–60: Twenty [40] percent of the units must be rent restricted and
occupied by households with incomes at or below 50 [60] percent of area median
income.
Properties must meet one of two criteria to qualify for tax credits: either a minimum of 20 percent of the units must be occupied by tenants with incomes less than 50 percent of Area Median Income (AMI), or 40 percent of units must be occupied by tenants with incomes less than 60 percent of AMI.

[Khadduri et al cited in the next note, p. 5n5, not in this one.]


LIHTC program guidelines provide higher tax credit amounts to projects developed in areas designated by HUD as ‘qualified census tracts,’ defined as tracts where at least 50 percent of the households have incomes below 60 percent of their metropolitan area’s median family income or where the poverty rate exceeds 25 percent.


Projects that are built in qualified Census tracts (QCTs), defined as neighborhoods where at least 50 percent of the households have incomes below 60 percent of their metropolitan area’s median family income, receive a 30 percent bonus in their qualified basis.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) In 2000, the definition of QCT was modified so that localities could use a 25 percent poverty threshold instead, which on average is equivalent.

[Prochnow and O'Regan 2011 is cited by Gay only once, on p. 3.]


To date, social scientists have concentrated their analytical efforts on the ambiguous link between minority office-holding and minority public policy agendas, between descriptive representation (the statistical correspondence of demographic characteristics) and substantive representation (the correspondence of legislative goals and priorities).

Swain, Carol M. Black Faces, Black Interests, p. 217:

Pitkin distinguishes between "descriptive representation," the statistical correspondence of the demographic characteristics of representatives with those of their constituents, and more "substantive representation," the correspondence between representatives' goals and those of their constituents.

For the last 40 years, the most widely used statistical approach to ecological inference (m 2 x 2 tables) has been Goodman's Regression. Briefly, the method involves a regression of total vote on the proportion of the population that is black and the proportion that is white, with no constant term. The coefficients generated from this least squares regression are assumed to be estimates of the district aggregates, Bb (the proportion of black residents who vote in the district) and Bw (the proportion of white residents who vote in the district). There are a number of problems with this method. Among them:

- Goodman's procedure incorrectly assumes that the precinct-level parameters, Bb and Bw are constant over the precincts.

- Goodman's model does not take into account information from the "method of bounds."


“The most widely used statistical approach to ecological inference, Goodman's regression”

“In terms of the notation in Table 2.3, Goodman's method involves a regression of T1 (proportion of the voting-age population turning out to vote) on X1 (proportion of the voting-age population who are black) and (1 — X1) (proportion who are white), with no constant term. The coefficients from this least squares regression, Bb and Bw, are intended to be estimates of the district aggregates Bb (the fraction of blacks who vote) and Bw (the fraction of whites who vote) since the precinct-level parameters β1 and βw are assumed constant over precincts.”

Goodman's model also does not include information from the method of bounds.

[Swain 1995 is cited elsewhere, but not here.]

Since the 1950s, the reelection rate for incumbent House members has rarely dipped below 90%. In 1994 it was 92.3% (Swain 1997).

Swain, Carol M. Black Faces, Black Interests, p. 31:

Since the 1950s the reelection rate for House members has rarely dipped below 90 percent.

[Gay uses no quotation marks around verbatim language and miscites Swain in the next sentence.]

40. Gay, Claudine. The Effect of Minority Districts and Minority Representation on Political Participation in California. Public Policy Institute of California, 2001, p. 7:

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is often cited as one of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation passed in our nation’s history.

…

The central parts of the measure are Section 2 and Section 5. Section 2 reiterates the guarantees of the 15th amendment, prohibiting any state or political subdivision from adopting voting practices that “deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” Section 5, imposed only on “covered” jurisdictions with a history of past discrimination, requires Justice Department preclearance of changes in any electoral process or mechanism.


The VRA is often cited as one of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation passed in our nation's history (Days 1992, 52; Parker 1990, 1).

…

The central parts of the VRA are Section 2 and Section 5. The former prohibits any state or political subdivision from imposing a voting practice that will "deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." The latter was imposed only on "covered" jurisdictions with a history of past discrimination, which must submit changes in any electoral process or mechanism to the federal government for approval.\(^3\)

[Canon 1999 is cited on p. 2 and nowhere else.]
41. Gay, Claudine. The Effect of Minority Districts and Minority Representation on Political Participation in California, p. 8, 7n1, 8n2:

Last, the list of “covered” jurisdictions, at first narrowly targeted to include just the six states of the Deep South (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia), has continually evolved with various “bailouts” and additions. Currently, 22 states have covered jurisdictions, including four counties in California (Merced, Yuba, Kings, and Monterey) with a history of low Latino registration. For these four counties, reapportionment of electoral districts after the 2000 Census will require Justice Department approval.

^1 “Covered” jurisdictions were originally defined as states in which less than 50 percent of the voting-age population either registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election and that had various discriminatory prerequisites for voting as of November 1, 1964.

^2 States or jurisdictions can “bail out” from coverage if they can prove the absence of discriminatory practices.

Canon, David. Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts. University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 279n3:

The original "covered" jurisdictions were the six states of the Deep South, twenty-six counties in North Carolina, Alaska, and one county in Arizona. States in which less than 50 percent of the voting-age population either registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election and that had various discriminatory prerequisites for voting as of November 1, 1964 were subject to Section 5 preclearance. States and jurisdictions could "bail out" from coverage if they could prove the absence of discriminatory practices. The list of covered states has evolved with various bailouts and the addition of other jurisdictions in the 1970, 1975, and 1982 amendments. There are currently twenty-two states that have at least some covered jurisdictions.

[Canon 1999 is cited on p. 2 and nowhere else.]


Thus, not only does the model allow for white Democratic voting to vary according to factors such as wealth, or education levels, but it also allows for the possibility that whites vote more (or less) Republican depending on the makeup of the voting pool.

the model allows the proportion of blacks $\beta$ and whites $\beta_{TM}$ voting to vary over districts randomly or according to the wealth of the community, development of the mass transit systems, degree of residential mobility, education levels, or other factors. But in addition, the model now also allows for the possibility that blacks vote at higher (or lower) rates according to the degree of racial homogeneity of their neighborhood.

[King 1997 is not cited on p. 193. He was last mentioned, not cited, on p. 188. King 1997 is not cited again after.]


This emphasis on attitudes builds on prior research which has made the case for the analytical link between attitudes and actions. For example, research has demonstrated that policy preferences, or how one perceives and evaluates government, are correlated with electoral participation (Converse 1966, Campbell et al. 1960, Verba and Nie 1972). On the issue of race, sociologists have attributed inter and intra-group differences in political participation to individual and group political orientations—namely, to the presence of racial group consciousness or group identification (Converse 1984; Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk 1981; Shingles 1981).


Political attitudes are also important because of their connection to patterns of political behavior (Converse 1966; Zaller 1992). Research suggests that how and why one perceives and evaluates government is correlated with rates of electoral participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 1972). With regards to race, recent work indicates that inter- and intra- group differences in rates of participation are identifiably connected to individual and group political orientations (Abramson 1983; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Dawson 1994; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Guterbock and London 1983; Tate 1993).

[Gilliam 1996 is cited after the next sentence. There are no quotes around verbatim language.]


Historically, politics has been an important vehicle in the mobility (and “mainstreaming”) of racial and ethnic groups in the United States. As a consequence, minority office-holding should alter how people evaluate and relate to government and the political world. With that in mind, this research repositions the camera to place constituents—rather than legislators—squarely in the center of the frame. The significance of black
electoral success may not rest in its implications for legislative priorities, but is visible in the political lives of constituents.


> Historically, politics has been a vehicle for upward mobility among racial and ethnic groups in the United States (Dahl 1961; Gosnell 1968; Hunter 1953; Ladd 1966; Wilson 1960). Minority political incorporation and the redirection of public resources that is hypothesized to come with it, should alter how people evaluate and relate to their local governments.


> Even in the absence of behavioral change, black congressional representation is significant for its impact on political attitudes. For black constituents, in particular, black congressional representation confers a degree of legitimacy on politics. In a representative democracy, where levels of trust and confidence are critical to systemic stability, how citizens orient themselves towards politics is very important.


> Missing from this research is attention to the impact of minority empowerment on attitudes concerning politics and public policy. At the level of theory, neglecting the attitudinal dimension of minority empowerment implies that attitudes are analytically unimportant. That attitudes are important to the very nature of democratic government is obvious on its face. How citizens orient themselves to their government is an important feature of a representative democracy because levels of trust and confidence (in large part) determine systemic stability (Dahl 1961).


> The central question of this chapter is “How does black representation impact attitudes?” More explicitly, what is the distribution of political attitudes between and within racial
groups in black-represented districts? How do groups evaluate the presence of black incumbents? What are the important demographic and political correlates of how citizens respond to minority political leadership? In the answers to these questions is the link between black representation and political behavior. The aggregate patterns observed.


This paper explores two models-symbolic politics and governing coalitions-that focus on how minority office-holding affects people's political orientations. In other words, after an extended period of minority empowerment, what is the distribution of political attitudes between and within racial and ethnic groups? Which groups and subgroups positively evaluate the results of governmental action and which groups will hold more negative views? What are the important demographic and political correlates of how citizens respond to minority empowerment?

[Gilliam 1996 is not cited on p. 139-40. The nearest citations are on p. 136 and p. 143.]


The posterior distribution of each of the precinct parameters for precinct i is derived by the slice it's tomography line cuts out of this bivariate distribution.

King 1997, p. 118:

The posterior distribution of each of the precinct parameters within the bounds indicated by its tomography line is derived by the slice it cuts out of the bivariate distribution of all lines.

[King last mentioned on p. 34. Next mention is on p. 181.]

The board’s review of Gay’s work was too brief to inspire confidence. Experts on plagiarism told CNN that “Independent reviews into plagiarism typically last much longer—anywhere from six months to several years.” Harvard concluded its sham review prematurely, within weeks, but you should still expect to hear more of my own review over the coming months.