NEW AMERICA

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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ALL JIHAD IS LOCAL

What ISIS' Files Tell Us About Its Fighters

JULY 2016

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Nate employs mixed-methods approaches to understanding local dynamics in fragile parts of MENA states. He has published his analysis in several foreign affairs outlets, including *Foreign Policy*, the *Daily Beast*, War on the Rocks, and the Atlantic Council. He has briefed senior U.S. government officials and United Nations staff on findings related to his work on Syria in 2013–14. Nate can be found on Twitter at **@naterosenblatt**.

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INTRODUCTION

Until now, the threat posed by ISIS' foreign fighters has been understood mainly through rough estimates of their countries of origin: 36,500 recruits have come from at least 100 countries since 2012, including 6,900 from the West, according to Senate testimony in February 2016 by U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.[1] Analysts have also examined, albeit roughly, what factors drive militants to join extremist groups, such as joblessness and the spread of radical, violent ideology.

But to understand the nature of the global threat of violent extremism, the focus must be set on the local politics that created it in the first place. By using personal information volunteered by over 3,500 foreign fighters to ISIS officials—nearly 10 percent of the intelligence estimate—this paper conducts the first quantitative analysis on the subnational origins of some of these fighters.

The data analyzed in this report come from foreign fighter registration forms collected by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) officials on the Syria-Turkey border between mid-2013 and mid-2014. These data, leaked in early 2016 by a defected ISIS fighter who stole the records before fleeing to Turkey, represent an unprecedented cache of personal information about foreign fighters, including names and phone numbers of family and friends and notes about fighters' potential roles within ISIS.[2]

This report uses these data and publicly available contextual information to identify the subnational origins of fighters and create rough typologies of who they are.

In doing so, the report demonstrates the geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic diversity of foreign fighters joining ISIS. Foreign fighters identified in this study include Uyghur fighters from Xinjiang, China, who are generally older, poorer, and more likely to join ISIS with their families alongside younger, relatively wealthier, and unmarried Arab fighters from the Arabian Peninsula. There are hardened jihadist veterans from Derna, Libya, next to a sample of Tunisian fighters in which only 16 in 590 reported any previous combat experience prior to joining ISIS.

The report also finds that, across nearly every top origin province, recruits join ISIS in regions with restive histories and tense, local-federal relationships. For example, over 95 percent of those who joined ISIS from China in 2013-2014 come from the country's western Xinjiang province, where there are significant economic disparities between the ethnic-majority Han Chinese and the local Uyghur Muslim population, who are subjected to substantial state repression through restrictions on Islamic practices like growing beards or wearing head coverings.

> **Learning who ISIS' fighters are and where they come from is essential to developing effective policy responses to local conflicts that ISIS effectively links to its ideology and agenda.**

In Derna, Libya, which had the highest per capita rate of any province in the sample, there has long been local support for an Islamic insurgency at odds with the federal state. In the late 1990s, the entire town was put under curfew for supporting the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. In 2011, it declared an Islamic caliphate while the rest of the country was fighting against then-leader Muammar Gaddafi. Similar frustrations with federal institutions are evident in the Tunisian heartland—the famous 2011 self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid being one example. Residents in Kebili and Sidi Bouzid, both with top ten rates of ISIS joiners, have long been frustrated by national governance failures to offer services and economic opportunity. The same is true in North Lebanon, where the local Sunni Muslim population has not only been marginalized from the state, but also from the Sunni political establishment that supposedly represents them. Similar stories of protest are evident in various forms in all the other provinces profiled in this report.

Over Ramadan 2016, ISIS and people inspired by it killed and wounded hundreds in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, the United States, and elsewhere, demonstrating the urgent need for local responses to the challenge the group poses.[3] With ISIS losing territory in Syria and Iraq[4], and some foreign fighters trying to return home[5], the war against ISIS may evolve from a battle over territory in Syria and Iraq to a decentralized fight against former foreign fighters committed to continuing the battle in their home countries. Learning who ISIS' fighters are and where they come from is essential to developing effective policy responses to local conflicts that ISIS effectively links to its ideology and agenda.

Figure 1 | National Counts of Foreign Fighters by Raw Number



Not pictured: Australia (13), Canada (18), Mauritius (1), South Africa (2), Trinidad and Tobago (2), United States (9).


Number of Fighters
50
100
150
200
250

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this report are based on similar, though possibly not identical, content as that which is outlined in the West Point Combatting Terrorism Center's (CTC) report, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce*.[6] The CTC reported to have received over 11,000 entries from NBC News, from which it found approximately 6,700 duplicates, using 4,188 entries for their report. I received files that were mostly de-duplicated, and removed an additional 156 blank or duplicate forms, so the files used for this report number 3,581 entries.[7] The discrepancy between the number of entries analyzed in the CTC report and the number analyzed here is likely due to the absence of exit records from this report. Exit records were not analyzed in this report because the questions asked in those records do not overlap with the larger database enough to allow for comparison.[8] The data informing this report has not been reviewed side-by-side with the CTC data, however the basic variables (e.g., age, nationality, marital status, date of entry into IS territory) that were reviewed in the CTC report map closely with the findings in the dataset used here.

This study is split in two parts. First, it identifies key subnational regions from which many foreign fighters originate based on 1) the rate of foreign fighters joining from these regions as a proportion of the local Muslim population, and 2) the percentage of joiners from a specific subnational region as a proportion of an entire country's foreign fighter contribution. For the purposes of this paper, these regions are defined as the largest subnational administrative areas defined by each country. However, in some areas—particularly Western Europe—most of the fighters in the dataset reported to have lived in cities (e.g., Paris, London, Strasbourg). As a result, this report occasionally focuses on cities or key sub-districts as units of analysis. This is based on answers in the form to a question about home residence.[9] Second, the paper uses self-reported personal information from fighters to create a rough typology of the backgrounds of fighters in the key subnational regions identified in part one.

While it is tempting to make broad claims about the nature of fighters joining ISIS, or even participating in violent Islamic extremism in general, from the data in this report, caution is required regarding generalizing this report's findings. The report can *suggest* discernible trends in regions and localities in major origin countries for ISIS foreign fighters because these data represent a massive detailed cache of information about foreign fighters. However, the data are simply a collection of personal details about 3,581 fighters who joined ISIS between mid-2013 and mid-2014, mostly from foreign countries, and almost entirely via the Turkish-Syrian border. In addition to these geographic and temporal limitations, all the information analyzed in this report is based on self-reported content from

the fighters themselves, which means there may be additional, unknown biases in some reporting.

Between mid-2013 and mid-2014, ISIS' holdings in Syria and Iraq were the primary destination for jihadists, and ISIS mounted the most prolific and successful recruitment campaign in the history of Islamic extremism, making its entry documents a useful glimpse into the broader subject of jihadist recruitment. However, this dataset likely under-represents countries where violent Islamic extremist groups may attract recruits by offering local alternatives to Syria for jihad, such as in Pakistan, Mali, and Nigeria.[10] Nor does the dataset provide information on those fighters who joined and remained with Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, or other non-ISIS extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. As a result, the data here is limited in the extent to which it can be applied to analyze the global jihadist movement as a whole.

THE AVERAGE ISIS FIGHTER

The average fighter at the time of joining ISIS was 26 to 27 years old, single, had traveled to less than two foreign countries, had the educational equivalent of a high school degree, had basic religious knowledge, reported no previous fighting experience, and had the professional equivalent of someone between an unskilled laborer and a blue-collar worker. This profile was developed by reviewing seven personal questions from the registration forms. This average profile serves as a point of comparison in order to understand, in the next sections, how fighters from certain regions deviate from this general profile. Questions analyzed:

1. **Birthdate:** The average fighter was born in 1987, which means the average age of a fighter in the data was approximately 26 or 27 at the time of their crossing into Syria.
2. **Marital Status:** Fifty-nine percent of the fighters reported to be single, 23 percent were married with children, 7 percent were married without children, 1 percent were "other" (e.g. had multiple wives or were divorced), and the remaining 10 percent had left the space blank.
3. **Level of Schooling:** Only 5 percent of the fighters reported little to no education. Fifteen percent reported basic elementary school education, 32 percent reported a high-school degree or rough equivalent (i.e., basic technical or religious training), 10 percent reported partially completed university studies, and 13 percent reported completing university studies or advanced degrees. Approximately 25 percent of all respondents left their answers blank.

The average fighter at the time of joining ISIS was 26 to 27 years old, single, had traveled to less than two foreign countries, had the educational equivalent of a high school degree, had basic religious knowledge, reported no previous fighting experience, and had the professional equivalent of someone between an unskilled laborer and a blue-collar worker.

4. **Level of Religious Education:** Fifty-five percent reported "basic" religious knowledge, 20 percent reported "moderate" religious knowledge, 5 percent considered themselves "advanced," and the remaining 20 percent of responses were left blank.

5. **Previous Employment:** In all forms, 19 percent reported being unemployed or working at a subsistence-level (i.e., farmers and shepherds), 30 percent reported being students or unskilled laborers, 34 percent reported blue-collar work (i.e., electricians or mechanics), 14 percent reported professional work (i.e., pharmacists or managers), and 3 percent reported advanced skills work (i.e., engineers or doctors).

6. **Countries Visited:** Of the 75 percent of fighters who self-reported traveling abroad, the average fighter traveled to 1.5 countries with a standard deviation of 1.6, meaning most traveled to between zero and three countries. Only 89 of the fighters (3 percent) reported traveling to more than five countries.

7. **Previous Jihad Experience:** Eigthy-two percent of fighters in the database reported that they did not have previous jihad experience, while 11.5 percent had previously fought—primarily in Libya, Afghanistan, or with another group in Syria—prior to joining ISIS. The remaining 6.5 percent of respondents did not answer.

In order to get a quantifiable, composite socioeconomic typology of fighters from different areas, responses to some of the questions above were scored and weighted in the following manner:

1. **Marital Status:** Marital status and family size is a loosely correlated indicator of socioeconomic wellbeing. Since most fighters' origin countries require the cost of marriage to be largely borne by the male and his family, being married is usually a sign of some degree of fiscal responsibility.[11] However, this indicator is weighted at 50 percent since the correlation with socioeconomic status is not always strong, particularly with large family sizes.[12] The scoring system is based on the following three possible fixed responses in the form.

   1 = Single
   3 = Married
   5 = Married with Children

2. **Level of Schooling:** As there is a stronger relationship between educational attainment and socioeconomic status,[13] this variable is weighted fully based on the following five levels.

   1 = No education/minimal education
   2 = Completed elementary school education, or equivalent
   3 = High school education, Baccalaureate, Religious Study
   4 = Part university education or technical degree
   5 = University education or greater

3. **Level of Religious Education:** Since religious knowledge requires commitment and, usually, access to some amount of financial resources, it can be considered a fair, but imperfect indicator of socioeconomic status. With minimal literature connecting religious education and socioeconomic status in the Muslim world, this variable is weighted at 50 percent. The scoring system is based on the following three possible fixed responses in the form.

   1 = Simple
   3 = Moderate
   5 = Advanced

4. **Previous Employment:** Since past employment is directly related to socioeconomic status, it is weighted fully in the scoring system. Those with multiple jobs received the score for the most advanced job that they worked. For example, someone who reports to be a student and a government employee would be scored a "4" based on the rubric below.

   1 = Unemployed, Farmer, Day Worker
   2 = Student, Unskilled Laborer
   3 = Blue Collar Worker, Trader
   4 = Owner, Professional Worker, Military/Government
   5 = Advanced Skills Work

5. **Countries Visited:** Another useful indicator of socioeconomic status is the number of foreign countries visited by the respondent. Because of the imperfect nature of the responses,[14] this variable is weighted at 50 percent. Based on the average number of countries visited (1.46) and the standard deviation of respondents (1.69), the ranking was classified as follows.

   1 = Zero countries
   2 = 1 country
   3 = 2 countries
   4 = 3-4 countries
   5 = 5+ countries

Using this scoring system creates a rough, average socioeconomic profile of the fighters in the dataset. While imperfect, this quantifiable profile provides a useful point of comparison for fighters from specific regions.

Figure 2 | Responses to Select ISIS Files Questions

Marital Status



59%
Single

23%
Married with children

7%
Married without children

1%
Other

10%
Blank

Previous Job



18%
Unemployed or subsistence-level

28%
Students or unskilled laborers

32%
Blue-collar work

13%
Professional work

3%
Advanced skills work

6%
Blank

Level of Schooling



5%
Little to no education

15%
Basic elementary school

32%
High school or equivalent

10%
Partially completed university

13%
University or advanced degrees

25%
Blank

Countries Visited



25%
Zero countries

23%
One country

14%
Two countries

10%
Three or four countries

4%
Five or more countries

24%
Blank

Religious Education



55%
"Basic" knowledge

20%
"Moderate" knowledge

5%
"Advanced" knowledge

20%
Blank

Figure 3 | Socioeconomic Typology of the Average ISIS Fighter

THE FIGHTERS: A PROVINCE-BY-PROVINCE ANALYSIS

Using self-reported home residence addresses in the data, this section identifies key subnational regions that may be contributing to the foreign fighter migration. The section is divided into two parts. The first highlights origin provinces that contribute large numbers of foreign fighters in proportion to the local Muslim population, called "High-Volume Origin Provinces."[15] The second section highlights origin provinces that contribute large numbers of foreign fighters *as a proportion of the total number of fighters reporting to come from a given country* in the data. Examining high proportion provinces in addition to high-volume provinces highlights areas that may be of concern to a specific country, even if the country as a whole does not contribute foreign fighters to ISIS at a high rate. Each section will profile key provinces by creating rough typologies of the foreign fighters in the sample from those areas and incorporating contextual information.

High-Volume Origin Provinces

Table 1 shows the top 20 provinces "of interest" based on the *by volume* methods explained below. Provinces in **red** are ones that will be examined in greater detail in this section.

The figure in the right-hand column shows the rate of fighters joining ISIS per 100,000, normalized as a proportion of a) the country's or city's[16] Muslim population and b) the population of the province. So if nine fighters join ISIS from a province of 100,000 people, 90 percent of whom are Muslim, then the rate would be: (9/(100,000*0.90))*100,000 = 10. Or, a rate of 10 people out of every 100,000 Muslims from that province is joining IS. To ensure a usable sample size for analysis, the findings in the table are restricted to provinces with at least 10 fighters.

Table 1 | Top 20 Provinces of Interest by Volume

Rank	Top High-Volume Origin Provinces (min. 10 fighters)	Number of Fighters from Province in Dataset	Province Population	Percent of Country/City Population Who Are Muslim	Province Rate of Joiners by Muslim Population (per 100,000)
1	Derna, Libya	34	163,351	97%	21.5
2	Kebili, Tunisia	27	156,961	100%	17.2
3	Tunis, Tunisia	134	1,056,247	100%	**12.7**
4	Muharraq, Bahrain	19	189,114	81%	**12.4**
5	Skopje, Macedonia	12	303,257	33%	**11.9**
6	Qassim, Saudi Arabia	135	1,215,858	97%	11.4
7	Bizerte, Tunisia	57	568,219	100%	**10.1**
8	Paris, France	24	2,249,975	13%	**8.5**
9	Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia	35	429,912	100%	**8.2**
10	Strasbourg, France	13	1,099,269	15%	**7.9**
11	Ariana, Tunisia	41	576,088	100%	**7.1**
12	Benghazi, Libya	46	670,797	97%	**7.1**
13	Sousse, Tunisia	39	674,971	100%	**5.8**
14	Kasserine, Tunisia	25	439,243	100%	**5.7**
15	Frankfurt, Germany	12	2,221,910	12%	**5.6**
16	Osh, Kyrgyzstan	17	999,576	33%	**5.2**
17	Hail, Saudi Arabia	30	597,144	97%	**5.2**
18	Medenine, Tunisia	24	479,520	100%	**5.0**
19	Moscow, Russia	66	11,503,501	14%	**4.1**
20	Hamburg, Germany	12	5,046,182	6%	**4.0**

Figure 4 | Provinical Counts of Foreign Fighters by Volume



Not pictured: Melbourne, Australia (0.4), Edmonton, Canada (4.9).

Provinces in countries with three or fewer fighters not shown.


Rate of Joiners by Muslim Population (per 100,000)
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0

Derna, Libya

By volume, as a proportion of its Muslim population, Derna has the single highest rate of foreign fighters joining ISIS of all provinces in the dataset.[17] Derna has long been a permissive environment for violent Islamic extremism: Dernawi veterans of the Afghanistan jihad against the Soviet Union returned and radicalized many in the community in the late 1980s.[18] Then, in the late 1990s, the entire town was put under curfew for at least a year by the Gaddafi regime for their support of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's insurgency campaign.[19] According to the Sinjar papers, a collection of personal information about foreign fighters in Iraq from August 2006 to August 2007, 53 out of the 112 Libyans (47 percent) in the total sample of 606 names were from Derna.[20]

At the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings in 2011, Dernawi Islamists proclaimed an "Islamic caliphate" in the eastern Libyan city, triggering a series of violent claims and counterclaims over control of the city between local Islamist groups affiliated to varying degrees with al-Qaeda, who then faced returnees from ISIS arriving in Derna mostly starting in the spring of 2014.[21] It was no coincidence one of ISIS' first major headquarters outside Iraq and Syria was in Derna, which Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi—ISIS' self-proclaimed caliph—officially recognized in November 2014.[22] As of April 2016, after intense fighting, militants with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) completely expelled ISIS-affiliated forces from the city, though ISIS had relocated its headquarters from Derna to Sirte between March and August 2015.[23]

Figure 5 shows the socioeconomic indicators found among the fighters in the database who self-reported to be from Derna.

An examination of ISIS' files suggests a profile of foreign fighters from Derna that emphasizes the role of ideology. Self-reported religious education is surprisingly high relative to the rest of the socioeconomic indicators, which are otherwise extremely low. This adds to the reputation of Derna as a hub for Islamic extremism, with at least a generation of Islamic indoctrination starting in the late 1980s. Derna also had an extremely high rate of jihadi experience. Eighteen of 34 respondents from Derna (53 percent) noted previous jihad experience, almost 5 times more than the average of all fighters in the dataset (11.5 percent). And while most noted their experience consisted of fighting in Libya in 2011, several reported fighting in Afghanistan and with other groups in Syria.

Dernawis in the sample were relatively undereducated and underemployed: The average Dernawi was unmarried, had the rough scholastic equivalent of some years of high school, and had the professional experience of a day laborer. Dernawis self-reported traveling at nearly the average of the entire dataset. While normally this might be a positive socioeconomic indicator, it more likely indicates the nature of Derna as a border town: Neighboring Egypt and Tunisia were the most frequent destinations for Dernawi travelers. It also reflects the prior jihad experience of the Dernawi fighters.

Perhaps the most disturbing factor in the sample of 34 Dernawis in the database is that the average birth year for the fighters is 1991–92, which would make the average Dernawi who was recorded joining ISIS between 22 and 24 years old at the time of their joining. This suggests that the next generation of Dernawi radicals have inherited the mantle of violent extremism from their parents. With the combination of extremely poor socioeconomic conditions and a relatively high self-reported understanding of Islam, the problem is likely not just economic but also ideological. As it transcends generations, Islamic extremism may be becoming a cultural phenomenon among Dernawis that state and local institutions are not equipped to combat. The city may have been recaptured from ISIS, but it remains a near-independent quasi-state for violent extremists: The city's conquerors replaced the IS banner with an al-Qaeda one.

Figure 5 | Derna, Libya
Location and Fighter Typology





Note: The colored circles represent the province's score. The black circle represents the overall average score, and the line represents the standard deviation.

Kebili, Tunisia

Kebili is one of many Tunisian provinces sending fighters to Syria and Iraq. The data suggest that the Tunisian foreign fighter phenomenon is diffuse across the country, as opposed to countries like Libya, where 79 percent of fighters come from Benghazi or Derna, or Saudi Arabia, where 67 percent of the fighters come from three provinces (Riyadh, Mecca, and Qassim). Four of the top 10 high-volume provinces in the entire sample come from Tunisia, yet Tunisia's top three origin provinces only comprise 40 percent of the country's total sample: 23 percent of Tunisia's foreign fighters come from Tunis, 10 percent come from Bizerte, and 7 percent come from the governorate of Kebili. While this report will profile Kebili, the data suggest that violent radicalism in Tunisia is a county-wide problem.

Kebili is the highest by-volume contributor in Tunisia once indexed for its relatively small population compared to well-populated littoral governorates like Tunis and Bizerte. Kebili itself is an arid, underpopulated desert oasis region in the Tunisian hinterland. There is little economic opportunity as compared to the coastal regions or the vibrant informal economy along the Algerian and Libyan borders.[24]

Figure 6 shows the socioeconomic indicators found among the fighters in the database who self-reported to be from Kebili.

Foreign fighters reporting to be from Kebili in this sample are relatively worse off than the average, though they fare better compared to fighters from Derna (previously assessed). Kebili fighters from the sample marry at the average rate of other fighters in the database, and reported receiving relatively better educational opportunities—the equivalent of a high school degree, with some even attending university. However, there appear to be few opportunities relative to economic mobility in Kebili. Residents have the employment equivalent of an unskilled worker (e.g. construction) and travel surprisingly little—one country abroad on average—even though Tunisia is a "prime emigration country in the Mediterranean region," according to the Migration Policy Institute.[25]

The fighters from Kebili may reflect the relative *newness* of the phenomenon of violent Islamic extremism in Tunisia. No one from Kebili reported having had previous jihadi experience, despite the sample spanning a wider age range versus the largely youthful but more experienced Dernawis. Moreover, Kebili fighters reported low rates of familiarity with religious doctrine. Only 15 percent reported having more than a basic understanding of religion, which is about half as frequent as the average (25 percent).

The newness of the phenomenon of violent Islamic extremism does not appear to be simply a quirk of Kebili. Only 16 out of all 590 fighters from Tunisia (2.7 percent) reported any previous jihad experience, far less frequent than the average of 11.5 percent in the entire data set. Additionally, Tunisian fighters comprise 16.5 percent of the total number of fighters in the sample, but report having advanced religious knowledge at a rate of only 9 percent, or about half as much as expected.

Contextual indicators support the idea that violent extremism is new for Tunisia as well. Tunisians were not nearly as heavily represented in earlier records on foreign fighters, such as the Sinjar records of 2007 or in a list of foreign fighters at Camp Bucca.[26] This may be because, under the rule of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, "parts of Tunisian society were still traditional and conservative but denied any kind of religious education or practice with meaning," according to Haim Malka, deputy director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "After [Ben Ali's ouster in] 2011," Malka continued, "many young people were searching for meaning—they wanted to find some role for religion to play in their lives."[27] It was in Tunisia's post-revolutionary climate that Salafists and jihadi-Salafists "jumped on the opportunity of an open market of ideas" and were able to radicalize thousands of young Tunisians.[28]

Figure 6 | Kebili, Tunisia
Location and Fighter Typology





Note: The colored circles represent the province's score. The black circle represents the overall average score, and the line represents the standard deviation.

These same Salafists could preach and organize with unprecedented openness thanks to the chaotic dismantling of Ben Ali's security state, added Malka, who co-authored an interactive web-based report devoted to exploring the phenomenon of Tunisian foreign fighters.[29] After 2011, the "police and internal security forces came under public scrutiny and were widely blamed for perpetrating decades of abuses" explained the report. "The security regime built by Ben Ali was unraveling. The contested political, ideological, and security space that emerged in its wake benefited jihadi-Salafists in a number of ways."[30]

Qassim, Saudi Arabia

Qassim, in the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula, is possibly Saudi Arabia's most conservative region. It has a history of challenging the country's leadership on reform initiatives and a reputation for sending young men to fight jihad.[31] Unlike relatively poor provinces such as Derna and Kebili, Qassim is better off. In Saudi Arabia, it is the region with the fewest residents living near or below the poverty line, according to a government study published in 2009.[32] The conservative nature of Qassim, particularly its provincial capital, Buraida, is evident in the number of clerics it produces, who until recently proffered conflicting messages. Some counseled youth to remain in Saudi Arabia, while many others were free to preach to young people to join militias and fight in the anti-Assad uprising in Syria.[33]

In addition to religious conservatism, anti-Shia Muslim sentiment is also a part of life in Qassim. One particularly unsettling example was in a widely-read 2008 online post, where a university student listed the names and personal details of dozens of Shia-denominated residents of Buraida, the provincial capital, to encourage residents to harass them into leaving. (While most of Saudi Arabia's 15 percent Shia population live in specific parts of its Eastern Province, some go to school or work in other parts of the country.)[34] Another post from October 2010 warned residents that "Shia thought" was "targeting Qassim" as part of an extensive plan to convert residents "because it is the capital of Wahhabi ideology, says the Rafidis! [a derogatory term for Shia]."[35] One of the first ISIS-directed attacks against the Shia population in Saudi Arabia—the 2014 Dalwah attack that killed eight and wounded 13 worshippers on the holy Shia day of Ashoura[36]—was planned at a base in Qassim.[37]

Of course, militant sectarianism is a problem in Saudi Arabia more broadly, where it is described by Fred Wehrey, an expert on sectarian politics in the Gulf at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as, "not only a deeply held belief [among hard-line clerics] but an expedient means to maintain political and economic relevance," resulting in a "pernicious, everyday sectarianism that afflicts ordinary citizens."[38] This "everyday sectarianism" may be particularly true for Qassim, with its high number of conservative clerics and its roots as one of the modern Saudi state's core ideological support centers of Wahhabism.[39]

Figure 7 shows the socioeconomic indicators found among the fighters in the database who self-reported to be from Qassim.

Fighters from Qassim, which provided the second-largest number of total fighters compared to all other provinces in the database before indexed to provincial population size,[40] tended to be well-educated but retained a substantial disparity in terms of employment. Qassim fighters in the sample reported the educational equivalent of university students, but their employment history is less than the equivalent of a blue-collar worker. Part of the reason why the fighters from Qassim report such a low economic score is that nearly one out of every three fighters in the sample left their studies to join ISIS. But more than one in five residents report having minimal work or no job at all, and among unemployed fighters, nearly one in three had a university degree. Compared to these underemployed fighters, 25 percent of Qassim residents left to join ISIS despite working jobs as accountants, engineers, and government employees.

Figure 7 | Qassim, Saudi Arabia
Location and Fighter Typology





Note: The colored circles represent the province's score. The black circle represents the overall average score, and the line represents the standard deviation.

While substantial additional research would be required to understand the issues in Qassim, data and context point to a restive, ideologically conservative region with well-educated residents who face poor job prospects after they graduate. Data from this sample support the notion that Saudi Arabia struggles to cope with economic inequality among its native population.[41] Almost 60 percent of the fighters in the Qassim sample reported being unemployed or having the professional equivalent of day laborers, despite relatively high levels of education. Meanwhile, of the 25 percent of Qassim fighters reporting professional or advanced professional work experience, only two in five explicitly reported being employed in the public sector. Though the figure may be higher because some fighters did not explicitly mention their state affiliation, it is still much lower than the Saudi rate (about 90 percent of local nationals).[42] Further research would be needed to probe whether Qassim fighters in this sample—or even the entire sample of Saudi fighters—reflect not only Saudi Arabia's income inequality problem, but whether it is possible that they experience poorer economic prospects across the board, relative to other Saudis.

In addition to Qassim's fighters reporting slightly above-average religious education, there is also contextual evidence that Qassim's significance as a source of extreme Wahhabi ideology occasionally places it at odds with the Saudi state. Here, Qassim reflects the modern Saudi state's challenge with its radical, ideological roots: Qassim residents were the *mutawa'a*, the Wahhabi proselytizers of the early Saudi state.[43] This tradition is embodied in residents such as Sheikh Saad bin Nasser Al Shathri, a hardline cleric fired from Saudi Arabia's high council for religious scholars for criticizing the government's decision to integrate men and women at a research facility at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.[44] But Qassim may also become a beacon of anti-government sentiment beyond the standard conservative tropes, as evidenced by the group of women who burned photos of Interior Minister and current Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Nayef, for the heavy-handedness with which the interior ministry arrested youth in Qassim in 2013.[45]

High-Proportion Origin Provinces

Table 2 shows the top 20 provinces "of interest" based on the province's contribution of foreign fighters as a proportion of the total country contribution. Provinces in **red** are ones that we will examine in greater detail in this section.

The figure in the right-hand column shows the rate of fighters joining ISIS by province as a *proportion of the total number of fighters reporting to come from a given country*. In other words, if 9 fighters report to come from a province in a country from which 10 total fighters joined IS, then the rate of joiners is 90 percent. The intention of reading the provincial breakdowns in this way is to highlight regions that may pose a foreign fighter threat to specific countries, though not necessarily a transnational challenge in terms of the sheer volume of fighters originating from that area.

Table 2 | Top 20 Provinces of Interest by Proportional Contribution

Rank	Top High-Proportion Origin Provinces (min. 10 fighters)	Number of Fighters from Province in Dataset	Number of Fighters from Country in Dataset	Percent of Joiners from Total in Country
1	Xinjiang, China	114	118	97%
2	North Governorate (Tripoli), Lebanon	22	28	79%
3	Skopje, Macedonia	12	17	**71%**
4	Muharraq, Bahrain	19	27	70%
5	Algiers, Algeria	12	26	**46%**
6	Benghazi, Libya	46	102	**45%**
7	London, United Kingdom	22	53	**42%**
8	Baghdad, Iraq	14	34	**41%**
9	East Java, Indonesia	34	86	**40%**
10	Osh, Kyrgyzstan	17	45	**38%**
11	Aleppo, Syria	19	53	**36%**
12	Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima, Morocco	83	239	**35%**
13	Absheron, Azerbaijan	35	102	**34%**
14	Moscow, Russia	66	194	**34%**
15	Dagestan, Russia	66	194	**34%**
16	Fergana, Uzbekistan	19	56	**34%**
17	Derna, Libya	34	102	**33%**
18	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	252	760	**33%**
19	Amman, Jordan	14	48	**29%**
20	Dushanbe, Tajikistan	13	45	**29%**

Figure 8 | Provinical Counts of Foreign Fighters by Proportional Contribution



Not pictured: Melbourne, Australia (39%), Edmonton, Canada (28%).

Provinces in countries with three or fewer fighters not shown.


Percent of Joiners from Total in Country
15%
30%
45%
60%
75%

Xinjiang/East Turkestan, China

Nearly all of the fighters originating from China reported that they came from the predominantly Chinese Muslim ("Uyghur") province of Xinjiang. All the fighters in the sample referred to the Xinjiang province as "Turkestan," or "East Turkestan," but since fighters not only included their province of origin but also the town from which they hailed, their origins could be pinpointed to this arid, restive, western Chinese province. Xinjiang's 114 fighters also represent, on a provincial, total number basis, the fifth-highest number of foreign fighters after Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (252), Qassim, Saudi Arabia (135), Tunis, Tunisia (134), and Mecca, Saudi Arabia (124).

Figure 9 shows the socioeconomic indicators found among the fighters in the database who self-reported to be from Xinjiang (East Turkestan).

Although the sample of fighters reporting to come from Xinjiang province suffers from a high non-response rate on some questions,[46] the data suggest a fighter typology associated with traditional rural societies. Marriage rates and family sizes are high, education levels are low, international travel rates are extremely low, and the professional experience of the fighter sample is equivalent to an unskilled laborer. Unlike in Qassim, where there was a disparity between education and employment levels suggesting an underemployment challenge, there was little disparity in the Xinjiang fighters' answers. No one reported attending university at all, only two of the 114 fighters reported having a professional or advanced professional job, and over 70 percent of those who reported their travel history had never left China before.

Fighters from Xinjiang vary widely in age: The average birth year of a fighter in the Xinjiang sample was 1987, while the standard deviation was a full 7 years. One "fighter" reported to have just turned 10 years old when entering ISIS territory on July 23, 2014, while another, Muhammed Amin, joined ISIS at the age of 80 after his son was killed fighting in Syria.[47]

The data suggest joiners from Xinjiang may consider their move to ISIS as a permanent relocation. This is loosely supported by several factors in the data. First, eight of the 114 registered joiners were 16 years old or younger, likely meaning they traveled to Syria with their families. (Several of the forms for these children explicitly stated they joined ISIS with their families.) Second, for every single fighter who self-reported travel from Xinjiang, Turkey and Syria represented the furthest distance they had ever traveled. The rural and poor typology of the Xinjiang fighter in this dataset means that the cost of reaching Syria—in financial and, likely, psychological terms—would be quite high. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine fighters in this sample choosing to join ISIS for short-term or for adventurist reasons. Third, not a single fighter in the sample reported to have previously fought in a jihad, suggesting that the sample is not comprised of seasoned veterans of foreign wars, such as with Uyghur separatists in the al-Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). Fourth and finally, while the entire dataset covers joiners who entered ISIS territory between mid-2013 and mid-2014, 73 percent of fighters in the Xinjiang sample entered ISIS territory *after* the group seized Mosul on June 9, 2014. This suggests, though by no means proves, that the sample may have waited for ISIS to become a more established entity before deciding to join.

Contextual evidence in China suggests the country's anti-terrorism campaign in Xinjiang could be a push factor driving people to leave the country and look elsewhere for a sense of "belonging." In a paper analyzing China's "de-extremization" of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Patrik Meyer, a New America fellow and expert on Uyghur politics, notes that, "between 1990 and 2010, the Chinese government gradually turned Uyghur national identity and Islamic practices into national security threats, i.e., extremized/securitized them."[48] It describes the great lengths to which the Chinese state used this framework to circumvent laws in order to "legitimately restrict many of the Uyghurs' cultural and religious rights."[49] Many of these findings were also identified by Bob Woodruff and Karson Yiu

Figure 9 | Xinjiang, China
Location and Fighter Typology





Note: The colored circles represent the province's score. The black circle represents the overall average score, and the line represents the standard deviation.

during their reporting from Xinjiang in March 2016 for ABC News, in which they described significant disparities in economic opportunity between Uyghurs and the Han Chinese, as well as restrictions on public displays of religious practice—including laws restricting beard growth and the age at which young men can attend prayers at mosques, and strong discouragement for women to wear the hijab. In his reporting, Woodruff explains the challenge of China's development efforts in Xinjiang province, describing the Uyghur community as "a group of people bristling in silence."[50]

ISIS, for its part, has released slick promotional videos to encourage a sense of belonging among potential Uyghur recruits. "I was subjected to oppression [in Xinjiang] at the hands of the Chinese idolators," explains Muhammed Amin, the 80-year-old Uyghur fighter, referring to joining ISIS ("hijrah") the same way Muslims refer to the prophet Mohammed when he fled persecution in Mecca in 622 A.D.[51] Later in the clip, Uyghur children in clean classrooms learn religion—forbidden in China—and spout anti-Chinese government slogans.[52]

North Governorate (Tripoli), Lebanon

Lebanon's North Governorate, in particular the provincial capital Tripoli, has long been a source of recruitment for violent Islamic extremism, as well as an extension of the Syrian battleground between Sunni Muslims and Shia-affiliated Alawites, the two largest groups living in the north. According to Faysal Itani, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, there is a long history of Salafi Islamic thought in northern Lebanon. The formative experience for North Lebanese was the Syrian Islamic uprising the early 1980s, which was definitively crushed in Hama in February 1982 by former Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad. "For Tripoli," Itani explains, "Hama was traumatic: Many Lebanese were 'disappeared' and shot. This was the beginning of the radicalization process in Lebanon."[53] After the country's civil war ended in 1990, the Lebanese government forced northern Lebanon's radical Islamist movements into operating more or less exclusively from the Palestinian camps. In 2007, the jihadist group Fatah al-Islam tried to create an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon, sparking an attack from the Lebanese Armed Forces on the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian camp, and starting a battle that lasted from May to September.[54] According to Itani, the Nahr al-Bared attacks were the "ultimate marginalization" of northern Lebanon from the Lebanese state.[55]

Today, the same radical ideologies that have dominated northern Lebanon are apparent in the Syrian conflict. Northern Lebanon not only experiences spillover from Syria, but often contributes fighters who cross the border to participate in it. Radicals in northern Lebanon see the conflict in Syria and that in Lebanon as "100 percent one and the same," explains Itani. "They see the Assad regime [in Syria] as being the heart of the problem" for northern Lebanon.[56]

Figure 10 shows the socioeconomic indicators found among the fighters in the database who self-reported to be from Lebanon's North Governorate.

With only 20 fighters reporting to be from the North Governorate of Lebanon, it would be unwise to draw any definitive conclusions from these data. However, the typology of the northern Lebanon fighter from this dataset shows one who is undereducated, relatively untraveled, and unmarried. In addition, while 7 in 20 (35 percent) report having previous experience in jihad, their jihadist experience was all highly localized to the areas around Lebanon and in the Syrian Qalamoun region, which lies across the border and experienced heavy fighting that also drew from Lebanese militias on both sides of the conflict in late 2013.[57] The violent Salafi heritage of northern Lebanon is not apparent in the data. Instead, the data suggests that the challenge of violent extremism in this region may have nothing to do with religion but is, at its core, about criminality. The challenge might be to understand the nature of the criminal networks, which use sectarian rhetoric to drum up support in the lower ranks to fight what may be economic competitors in the form of the

Figure 10 | North Governorate (Tripoli), Lebanon
Location and Fighter Typology





Note: The colored circles represent the province's score. The black circle represents the overall average score, and the line represents the standard deviation.

Shia Alawites in Tripoli and, more broadly, the Shia majority of Lebanon.

A competing explanation is that many ISIS fighters from northern Lebanon see the group as a way to express their frustration at being marginalized from the rest of Lebanon. Though this isn't borne out in the limited data in the sample, contextual indicators point to a split among North Lebanese foreign fighters between al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra supporters and ISIS. Itani notes that Jabhat al-Nusra may be a more attractive and familiar model for ideologically motivated fighters in northern Lebanon, and perhaps this is one reason why the sample for ISIS joiners shows slightly below-average religious knowledge. "The Islamic State offers something new," Itani explains, and may be drawing from a different brand of Salafi-jihadi than before.[58] This style may come from two key factors in northern Lebanon: the disintegration and decline of legitimate Sunni Muslim religious institutions in the country, and the fact that the region is the poorest area of the country. Explains Itani, residents of northern Lebanon "see the Sunni Muslims in the north as having the rawest deal in Lebanon."[59]

Muharraq, Bahrain

Muharraq is home to many in Bahrain's Muslim Sunni minority and is known for its religious conservatism and close historic ties to the Bahraini ruling family. "We call Muharraq the 'thighs' of the regime," explains Ala'a Shehabi, coauthor of a book on Bahrain's 2011 uprising. "When the country was captured by the ruling family nearly 300 years ago, members of the ruling family and their foot soldiers settled in Muharraq. These tribes are loyal to the ruling family and get senior positions in the security forces."[60] The island, 85–90 percent Sunni by some estimates,[61] was at the center of the Sunni-led resistance to the predominantly Shia uprising during the 2011 Arab Spring.[62] A few years later, Bahrain has had to contend with a burgeoning Salafist movement, which has elements in the state security structures.[63] As Shehabi argued in 2013, Bahrain's crackdown on Shia protesters and pro-democracy activists since 2011 has meant that "support for extremist groups has flourished."[64]

Figure 11 shows the socioeconomic indicators found among the fighters in the database who self-reported to be from Muharraq.

Two trends are evident from Muharraq. First, access to educational institutions and potential economic opportunities is average compared to other fighters in this dataset, which is somewhat surprising given that, as the historic seat of the ruling family, one might imagine better opportunities for Muharraq than the educational equivalent of a high school diploma and the job prospects of a painter or barber. Second, fighters from Muharraq in this data set show a much greater propensity to travel and a disinterest in marriage, factors that would correlate closely with the young average age of fighters from Muharraq. The average birth year was 1994, which is fully seven years younger than the overall average, and would mean the average fighter from Muharraq was 19 or 20 at the time of his joining ISIS. This suggests an adventuristic streak among these youthful fighters that is less evident in, for example, the Dernawis from Libya or the Uyghurs from China.

Contextual evidence suggests that sectarianism is also likely to play a strong role in recruitment. While the data do not provide a way to assess this explanation, it is personified in Turki al-Binali, one of ISIS' most prominent advocates for violent sectarianism. Al-Binali, a Bahraini resident whose registration form claims he is from the Busaiteen neighborhood of Muharraq, is a poster child for this phenomenon.[65] In a paper on the sectarianism of ISIS, researcher Hassan Hassan called al-Binali "a prolific critic of Shia and their 'warped' ideology." Hassan notes that al-Binali has publicly incited attacks against the Bahraini Shia community,[66] and al-Binali counts Sulayman Ibn Sihman, an early twentieth century Wahhabi scholar who called for the purging of the Shia from the Arabian Peninsula, as a major source of influence.[67]

But Muharraq residents may be growing more frustrated with the ruling family. After 2011,

Figure 11 | Muharraq, Bahrain
Location and Fighter Typology





Note: The colored circles represent the province's score. The black circle represents the overall average score, and the line represents the standard deviation.

Bahraini conservatives led by the al-Asalah Society, a Salafi political party that campaigns hard for support in Muharraq, began to criticize the government more forcefully, according to Kristian Ulrichsen, a Middle East fellow at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.[68] Ala'a Shehabi agreed that the relationship between Muharraq and the ruling family has changed in the past five years: "In 2011," she explained, "blind loyalty disappeared, and the pro-regime tribes [from Muharraq] started to say 'we will mobilize for you, but we want something in return.' But they didn't get something in return, and Muharraq residents are starting to question whether they can just be bought off."[69] And with oil prices as low as they are, the Bahraini government has little room to maneuver. "The problem is that the economic situation is so desperate in Bahrain," adds Ulrichsen, "that the government couldn't pay back the Sunnis who supported them in 2011 even if they wanted to."[70] Of course, ISIS tries to take advantage of this in propaganda directed at Bahrainis, such as when they published a video with four Bahraini nationals who called on their compatriots to "defect from the al-Khalifas [Bahrain's ruling family]," essentially calling them infidels.[71]

CONCLUSION

There is no clear common link between the fighters from top origin provinces by volume or as a proportion of the overall country contribution. While fighters from Derna (in Libya) and Kebili (in Tunisia) share similarly poor socioeconomic conditions, in Qassim (in Saudi Arabia), there are unemployed residents joining ISIS as well as wealthy ones. Derna and Qassim share a similar heritage of conservative Islamism, but in the Kebili sample, fighters reported very low awareness of religious doctrine, and contextually the phenomenon is very new to Tunisia as a whole.

Among top origin provinces as a proportion of their country's total foreign fighter population, fighters from Xinjiang are older, poorer, and more likely to travel with their families, while Muharraq residents are younger, well-educated, unmarried, and well-traveled. Fighters in northern Lebanon exhibit a socioeconomic picture suggesting substantial exclusion from state institutions and services, but in a different nature than those in Xinjiang. Finally, while sectarianism is a key issue in North Lebanon and Muharraq, it is virtually nonexistent for Uyghur Muslims, who do not face the same confessional tensions.

Though it would require a much more extensive study to confirm, anti-government sentiment or poor local-federal relations may be a common

thread that brings most provinces together. All six examined provinces exhibited some level of marginalization or frustration with state institutions, from the occasional protests in Qassim, to the anti-bourgeois undercurrents in Tunisia's violent Salafist movement, to the Dernawi Islamists who prevented Libyans from participating in the country's 2012 elections,[72] to the repressed Uyghurs denouncing the Chinese state in ISIS propaganda, to the marginalized Sunnis of North Lebanon. The sixth, Muharraq, while being outwardly pro-government and anti-Shia, may also exhibit signs of similar popular resentments with the ruling family, beneath the surface.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Analysts have long understood the need to help maintain strong state and local institutions to prevent the proliferation of terrorist safe havens. But the findings from this report suggest that supporting federal and municipal governments may be more important than we previously thought. If foreign fighters are more likely to come from restive regions with poor local-federal institutional relationships, then the proliferation of such regions does not just increase the likelihood that each *specific* region will become a terrorist safe haven, but it increases the likely rate of success of terrorist safe havens *anywhere*. The more regions in which state institutions fail to effectively govern, the more likely ISIS—or a group like ISIS—will be able to attract recruits.

The lack of effective state and local governance in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the reason why ISIS today can continue to attract recruits and carry out operations, despite losing territory in Syria and Iraq. Federal institutions in MENA struggle even to define what constitutes their basic territorial authority in places like Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, meaning this phenomenon is unlikely to disappear any time soon.

The first step the international community should take is to improve its ability to assess local environmental conditions. In order to be more effective, policymakers must put a greater demand on subnational contextual knowledge to tailor grassroots interventions that address the problem directly where it arises. In some places where violent extremism is already a way of life, such as Derna in eastern Libya, the problem is generational. In other locations, such as Tunisia, the phenomenon of global Islamisc extremism is newer, suggesting that subnational interventions may be able to prevent the spread of the ideology before it takes root. Contextual knowledge is

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important: If the motivations for foreign fighters are derived from highly specific local conditions, so must the solutions. When nearly one in three Tunisian foreign fighters claims to not have finished high school and over 75 percent report only basic religious knowledge, a Twitter account tweeting about moderate Islam will simply not reach them.

Second, the international community must improve its ability to work with Middle Eastern and North African partners to improve their capacity for state and municipal governance. This is true for security institutions, since countries have historically tried to manage their extremist problem by either exporting it elsewhere or by coopting it with money or promises of political power. But with thousands of fighters threatening to return to hundreds of provinces in dozens of countries, the problem may be too complex for state-specific solutions. The international community should work to reform the mechanisms by which foreign fighters are prosecuted by addressing the specific challenges faced by each country on a case-by-case basis. Tunisia, for example, needs to shore up the capacity of its national security institutions to deal with the new phenomenon of violent extremism, while the international community must work with Bahrain to recognize that some of its problem with violent extremism comes from within the tribes closest to its state security apparatus.

Federal and municipal governance reform is also essential beyond the security realm. State institutions must uphold rule of law and protect a free and independent press to decrease corruption and improve access to economic opportunities—particularly for long-marginalized regions or communities. Many have written on the importance of improving governance, but ISIS' success thriving in ungoverned spaces, while also knitting together recruitment from the diverse range of locales with governance failures, reveals how truly important this is.

APPENDIX

The following questions were asked on the registration form:

- Real name and title
- Kunia (aka *nom de guerre*)
- Mother's Name
- Blood Type
- Birthday and Nationality
- Marital Status (Single, Married, With Children)
- Place of Residence
- Level of Study
- Level of Religious Knowledge (Basic, Intermediate, Advanced)
- Profession before joining ISIS
- Countries Traveled to and Duration of Stay
- Where you Entered ISIS Territory and Who Facilitated Your Entry?
- Who Recommended You to Join ISIS?
- Date of Entry (to ISIS territory)
- Previous Jihad Experience and Where
- Do you want to be a: Fighter, Martyr, Suicide Bomber?
- Specialty in ISIS: Fighter, Sharia, Security, Administrator
- Current work location
- Personal belongings brought with you
- Level of obedience to orders
- Point of contact (e.g., family, friends) that can be reached
- Date and location of death

Figure 12 | Sample ISIS Registration Form

الإدارة العامة للحدود

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
الإدارة العامة للحدود
بيانات مجاهد

1	الإسم واللقب	
2	الكنية	
3	إسم الأم	
4	فصيلة الدم	
5	تاريخ الولادة و الجنسية	
6	الحالة الإجتماعية	أعزب (1) متزوج ( ) عدد الأطفال ( )
7	العنوان و مكان الإقامة	
8	التحصيل الدراسي	
9	المستوى الشرعي	طالب علم ( ) متوسط ( ) بسيط (1)
10	ماهي مهنتك قبل المجيئ ؟	
11	البلدان التي سافرت إليها وكم لبثت بها؟	
12	المنفذ الذي دخلت منه ؟ والواسطة ؟	تل ابيض
13	هل لديك تزكية ومن من ؟	
14	تاريخ الدخول ؟	
15	هل سبق لك الجهاد ؟ وأين ؟	
16	مقاتل أم إستشهادي أم إنغماسي ؟	
17	الإختصاص ؟	مقاتل ( ) شرعي ( ) أمني ( ) إداري ( )
18	مكان العمل الحالي	
19	الأمانات التي تركتها ؟	جواز سفر
20	مستوى السمع والطاعة ؟	
21	العنوان الذي نتواصل معه ؟	
22	تاريخ القتل و المكان	
23	ملاحضات الانتماءات والحياة العلمة والاعتقالات ومطلوب ام لا	

الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام _ شرعي _ الإدارة العامة الحدود

الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام

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[7] There may be additional duplications in the dataset analyzed for this report, however they are a small enough number to not substantively alter the findings included here.

[8] See Appendix for a list of questions asked in the standard IS new joiner registration form.

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[15] As there are few non-Muslim denominated members of ISIS, restricting the rate to the local Muslim population achieves a more accurate picture of the rate particularly in predominantly non-Muslim regions such as Western Europe.

[16] In this table, the percentage of the Muslim population used for Strasbourg and Paris were calculated as a rate for the cities themselves rather than the country's Muslim population as a whole in order to provide a more accurate representation of the data, using figures from: http://www.economist.com/node/12724966?story_id=12724966 (Paris), and http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2355/france-islam-overtaking-catholicism (Strasbourg)

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