

1<sup>st</sup> Draft. Revised version to come.



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To: Bill & Hillary, Mickey, Eli, David, Susan, Harold

From: Derek

Re: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE / Winning in November

(1) Now that Bill's nomination is almost a certainty, the campaign is at a very dangerous point: we risk losing our sense of insurgency and becoming The Official Campaign and Bill, The Candidate.

This happened to both Dukakis and Mondale. They became Official, and hence too bureaucratic and cautious. The Candidate campaigned in the Bubble of Secret Service protection, press and campaign aides; the campaign organized a traditional Campaign Organization and ran a traditional campaign...and lost. Of course, I am generalizing. The candidates had their deficiencies, the campaigns made mistakes, etc., but the biggest error was the most basic: they had no strategy for winning--and the structure and conduct of these campaigns reflected that lack.

(2) If Bill's campaign proceeds along this traditional route, he will most likely lose in the fall, given the tremendous natural advantages of an incumbent President and the semi-lock that the Republicans have on the Presidential election system. I could argue this point at greater length, but I think that it's fairly obvious to everyone or should be after only brief reflection on recent Presidential contests.

(3) In all organizations that achieve their goals, Strategy determines Structure.

Before our campaign structure for the general gets too cast in cement, we need to spell out a tough, hard-headed Strategy for Winning. This strategy then determines, in large part, how resources, personnel, candidate's time, message, etc. are deployed. More on the details below.

(4) The goal is to beat George Bush--i.e. win a majority of electoral votes on a state by state basis, and defeat a particular person, the President George Bush, which means understanding his psychology as well as the strengths and weaknesses of his record.

As yet, I don't see the campaign having a strategy to achieve this goal. Maybe there is one around somewhere--but <sup>one</sup> of our chief strategists Carville confessed only last week while visiting me and Mickey in LA that he had no strategy and didn't know what the campaign's strategy is or will be.

I have some suggestions about what the strategy should be around which I welcome debate, and some suggestions about how to formulate a clear and winning strategy.

(5) A STRATEGY TO WIN:

has two key elements. One is an analysis of which states we must win. Has anyone yet tried to write this out? I hope that Mickey will, if he hasn't, or that he immediately appoints a very small working group to draft a no nonsense state-by-state strategy (Harold Ickes should be part of this group.) This electoral vote analysis then serves as the basis for allocation of resources--media buys, candidate's time, field, etc. it provides the crucial underlying framework for these decisions and gives the necessary driving rationale based on the goal--winning.



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Strategy to Win Continued...

The second element which might engender some disagreement is my firm belief that in order to win we must ATTACK.

Elections are not contests based on cool, rational decision-making, as you all know. Voters are not going to carefully consider whether or not Bill Clinton can be a better President than George Bush by looking closely at their respective programs, careers, characters, etc. The way we win this thing is to drive up Bush's negatives--to make people believe that his is a Failed Presidency and that he is a Failed President, and that if they stick with him for 4 more years, they face 4 more years of decline and division--and that their kids face an even worse future, and that the future of the country, at home and abroad, is thus in peril.

The only strategy that I know that has a chance of success is: ATTACK, ATTACK, ATTACK--at all levels, relentlessly, without let-up, from now until election day.

The election has to be turned into a referendum on George Bush, not on Bill Clinton as the primary has been all too frequently. Of course, we will do everything we can to make voters comfortable with Bill, to trust and admire him and Hillary, to have confidence in his ideas and abilities, etc.--but the bottom line is that the voters who give us victory will be voting against 4 more years of George Bush more than they are voting for Bill Clinton.

(6) Everyone should view the general as a War. In war, the goal is to defeat your enemy and you marshal all your resources at hand to do this in a variety of ways. That's what this campaign must do and the structure of the campaign organization should reflect this, as well as the message. This means that Bill must project himself as the leader of his forces--the Democratic Party and attendant progressive groups. Mondale never led; he followed the agendas of the party's sub-interest groups. And Dukakis never attempted to become leader of the party; he wasn't capable of it, had he tried.

Bill must stop talking just about himself, his problems with press or electorate, how he feels about good ole boy Ross Perot, etc. and start talking about the Democratic Party that he now leads--what the party as a progressive force has stood for at its best--Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson--and what it must stand for now.

While Bill ascends to and embraces this leadership role, the campaign and its leadership must take on the job of organizing all of the resources of the party and attendant groups to defeat Bush. This means giving people and groups assignments that utilize their talents and resources, and making sure that they implement actions that fit with the campaign's strategy for winning. It means giving orders as well as making requests.

A few specific examples (more below):

+The unions that have endorsed all have press and research depts. Put them to work immediately. For example, ask AFSCME to take the Perot desk for now, research his career, how he got rich (not such a pretty story), etc. prepare materials for background for press. The point is that the unions can be used for more than just the traditional GOTV. They should be factored into our attack strategy on Bush.

+Women's Senate Races in Key States of Penn., Ill. and California--Our campaign should work in coordinated fashion with Braun, Yeakel,



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Feinstein, (Boxer, if she wins primary). The power of womens' issues--not just choice, but harassment, day care, equal pay, etc.--has already been demonstrated in the primaries in these key states. Our campaign should embrace these issues, and work with these womens' campaigns in these states--and with womens' groups across the country to beat up on Bush on these issues.

+Research--we've made a start at a cooperative relationship with DNC Opp. Research, but it must be set out more clearly. We need to work out ways to make good use of all of the Public Interest research on Bush that has already been developed--both in D.C. and through the host of state citizen action and public interest groups around the country.

Utilizing and mobilizing these resources requires staff deployment and clear staff assignments. It just does not happen by itself. And you don't want it to happen by itself. It should be coordinated and party of a strategy for winning.

Such coordination and strategic thinking ~~is~~ also needed for a surrogate speakers program and for the strategy that the Congress adopts vis a vis Bush in the remaining months. The campaign needs to recruit members of the House and Senate who will be part of the relentless ATTACK. For example, Lee Hamilton might give some speeches attacking Bush on the arming of Iraq; Moynihan should be asked to hit Bush on Welfare; Gore might take on environment, etc. Of course, Maxine can be counted on to do tough attack speeches. But in all of these cases, as much as possible, the campaign should be involved in crafting the message and seeing that it gets noticed by the press.

(8) Having argued that we need an Attack Strategy to win and that the structure of the campaign should reflect this strategy, I want to offer a few specific suggestions for preparing the campaign and candidate to implement such a strategy after June 2.

As I'm certain you all agree, this campaign is not yet ready for the general--lots of work needs to be done and I know that others are thinking about it as well. If I am critical in some of my comments/suggestions below, it is only because I know that we have to be hard headed about this to win in November. All of these suggestions for action are premised on the Attack Strategy discussed above:

#### A. The Candidate -

+Bill needs to agree to lose 20 lbs. by convention time, and the campaign needs to help him do it by scheduling a run every day, by providing healthier food on the plane (more salads, etc.). This is not a trivial issue. When Bill opens his coat and is seen on TV, the visual is that of a fat politician. It's the image of a fat, good ole boy Southerner. It sends a message. Bill's failure to lose weight will not only be noticed by voters; it will also become, as it already has, the subject of jokes on Late Night Talk Shows, and a metaphor in the press for his inability to discipline himself, make hard choices, etc. This is important politically, and I think that Bill will feel better with a regular exercise regimen, and be in better mental shape as the pressure builds in the general.

+Bill needs to stay on message and take on Bush, not mess around with Perot and get into criticising the Press. He has to be more disciplined, and the press staff has to do a much better job at helping him with this by keeping the press at a proper distance, and by working out a much



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clearer and sharper press strategy, especially in finding settings where Bill can talk at some length about the issues and Bush's record. This means a much more concerted effort to arrange long interviews with key thoughtful journalists like Moyers, Wicker, etc., and better use of thoughtful radio and TV talk shows in local markets.

+As I suggested above, Bill needs to talk about the Democratic Party more and project himself as the Leader of the Party in the tradition of FDR/Truman/Kennedy.

+Bill should ask his key consultants and aides to call him "Bill," not Governor, at least in private. Calling him Governor inhibits them in providing the most honest advice and puts up a subtle barrier. ~~between~~. When he wins, we will all call him, "Mr. President," but for now he should ask his advisors and consultants to call him Bill.

+Bill should ask for a briefing on George Bush--how he thinks, how he acts, how he reacts. This might come from campaign managers like Sasso who've run against him or from journalists who've written about him. Part of this campaign is about getting George Bush rattled and frantic. Bill should understand how his behavior, words, etc. can help do this, as well as the Attack Strategy of the campaign.

+If Bill has complaints or needs, especially regarding the traveling party, scheduling, regimen, or whatever, he should make them known now so that they ~~can~~ all be remedied before the general. The same goes for Hillary.

#### B. The Consultants

+As others have also argued, Carville should be sent away for a few weeks to come up with a list of 20 or so tactical actions that are designed to upset George Bush in June, July, and August. These should be both little things and big themes from major speeches to encouraging certain press hits to subtle and not-so-subtle psych war.

+All of the consultants should be disciplined about speaking to the press on the record about campaign strategy, about Perot, etc. The goal here is to elect Bill Clinton and defeat George Bush, not enhance reputations in D.C. Human nature being what it is, there will always be some loose chatter, but now there is way too much. Mickey should read consultants and staff the riot act--and appeal to their better natures. Our pollsters, media folks, strategists, etc. should spend their time doing their jobs, and let the press spokes people and campaign leadership talk to the press.

+I agree with those who feel that our media has been weak. Our ads are not up to General quality and not good enough to win with. They are not visual. They play like print ads or illustrated radio ads. Television is a visual medium that touches emotions and feelings and communicates through images and sounds, not primarily through words or especially printed words on the screen. And the ads are not imaginative enough, nor tough enough in their attacks.

+I feel strongly that we should try out an ATTACK ad in the California primary--an Attack ad on Bush. Throw him on the defensive early. I have advocated doing it even sooner--in North Carolina, where rates are low--but we don't seem to have capability to do that, so that California is the soonest we can expect.

#### C. The Convention and the Platform

I know that Harold has prepared or is preparing a comprehensive



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Convention continued....

memo on what should be done to prepare for the Convention. I will offer only a few probably obvious points:

+The Convention should be viewed as a Television Special. It should be planned and scripted just like the Academy Awards or any other big TV event.

+The goal is to provide the best possible visual image of the candidate and the party to the nation.

+We want to lay out key themes of the campaign--what's at stake Bush's failures at home and abroad, and why we must change, and why the Democratic Party under Bill Clinton's leadership can be the agent of change. It's not just Bill alone who's the agent of change, but the party and progressives across the country.

+We should take a two-track approach to the Platform. We want to get a thematic, not a laundry list, platform, that is as close to the Clinton campaign's program as possible. We want to head off bickering and disputes as much as possible, but we also must remain firm on our positions and not seem to be pushed around by single-issue groups or particular individuals (Brown, Jackson, etc.). This requires diplomacy and advance planning--talking to Romer and Pelosi and their aides before hand and working with them, giving them clear signals from the campaign. We would not pick fights unnecessarily nor get defensive. We should be positive and strong--but not domineering. Finesse is the operative word.

+Some of our policy advisors ~~who are smart~~ and have national stature such as Ira Magaziner, Reich, etc. should be involved in Platform process.

+Who gives what speeches should be carefully stage managed and fit in with the campaign's strategy. The campaign should be tough about this. For example, in 1988 Ann Richards' attack on Bush played well on the floor, but it didn't work nationally on TV, because many voters, especially men, didn't react well to a woman making fun of Bush in so harsh and derisive a manner. Every convention speech in anything approaching prime time, should have a clear political purpose.

+There will be some references to Bill's 1988 speech. One way to deal with it, might be a light joke: open his acceptance speech with the words, "As I was saying..."

#### D. VP Selection Process

+Susan and others have good ideas about how to vet possible candidates. My major suggestion is that the process should be directed by a separate team, and not eat up valuable staff time, and certainly not eat up Bill's time.

+Bill should not be sitting down in Little Rock in June interviewing candidates for VP. He should be out campaigning and taking it to George Bush on the issues. Keeping the pressure up as part of of the Attack strategy.



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### E. Issues: *The Economy and Women*

+As part of the two-track approach to the Platform, the campaign will have ready by Convention time and for release right after, a new Vision/Plan book (already described in previous memos and in the works). This Vision/Plan book will serve the campaign in many ways. We will use it to demonstrate that Clinton has both vision and a plan for action--and we will do this through free media and perhaps through a paid ad "Plan and Vision". The book will help rally the troops by giving them substance. The book will become a collector's item and a coffee table status symbol for all of our supporters around the country. Above all, doing this updated Plan/Vision book will let the campaign remain in control of the substance of the message, and not be adversely affected by anything a bit off that makes it into the platform.

+This book and the ongoing series of substance speeches contain the positive message (combined with the negative on Bush--he has no plan or the plans that he has favor the rich and privileged). We must, however, do a much better job at researching negative attacks on Bush's record, including ~~his~~ foreign policy. For example, we don't need more foreign policy briefing papers for Bill from the FP group. Instead, we need Attack memos on areas where Bush is weak and can be hit--arms sales, arming Saddam, kowtowing to Chinese, inaction on Burma, etc. We should attack him regularly on his foreign policy failures. Bill should do this in major speeches, and surrogates in Congress should do this in speeches, press releases, etc. We can even get the unions involved, by blasting him for failing to stand up for workers' rights or peoples' health in Mexico or other Third World countries. China and slave labor, for example.

+We have done a terrific job at preparing a positive program for governing, and we know that Bill is a great Policy Wonk--but we will not win, as I have argued, solely on a positive program. We have to attack Bush for the negative aspects of his program and lack of program.

+We all know that the Number One Issue is the Economy. However, I would argue that the Number Two Issue is Women (Anna Quindlen is right in her recent NYT column/memo to Clinton). If this is true, then the campaign must devote more resources to our message to women, and to mobilizing women's organizations to help us win the election. It also means we have to be sensitive to the issue of women in the campaign, and deal with it in a substantive not a symbolic way--that is, seek out smart, competent women for numerous positions, to help us win this thing. (For example, at Bill's urging, I've already made a point of reaching out to two women economists to join our economics working group.) And obviously, we will want to do similar outreach to Hispanics, Blacks, Asian/Americans--but not symbolically. We want talented, tough campaigners. And we have to be absolutely certain that the Candidate doesn't visit nor speak at any elite clubs that keep out women or people of color.

We obviously don't want our campaign fighting internally ~~about~~ about women and minorities and their role--we just want to proceed to recruit and work with women and minorities to attack George Bush. We have to unite our forces to win!



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F. Staffing and Organization: A Structure that Follows a Strategy

I think that everyone would agree that we cannot continue with decision-making by conference call and the decentralized campaign structure. Winning requires a disciplined and directed campaign operation.

+Foremost, there has to be closure on who's in charge. Is Mickey going to come on fulltime and take command? If so, that should be made clear and Bill should let everyone know that this is the case--or if it's not the case, then will it be someone else (Eli?)--or can it be David? I think that it has to be someone like Mickey, Eli, or Harold--someone who has Bill's complete confidence and who can talk to Bill in the toughest and most honest way when needed. This means it has to be a peer in age and experience, and I see only the above three possibilities.

+Equally important, a decision must also be made about centralizing all of the campaign in one locale, except for a small support staff in Little Rock and Betsey's defense operation. I disagree with those who argue that the location of the campaign HQ has important symbolic value. Voters don't vote for candidates by where their HQ's are located. The point is to locate it where the campaign can best function to win.

I agree with Mickey and others who argue that the only place that makes sense is a suburban location in Virginia or Maryland, across the river from D.C. Most of the resources that this campaign needs to mobilize to win have a base or HQ in Washington, D.C. with which we need to work. Most of the people whom we need to hire to build our staff in a HQ already live there or live near or are willing to move to D.C., but not to Little Rock nor to some ~~other~~ regional spot. Others have argued this point at greater length.

My point is: decide--This process of operating out of one central office with a clear person in charge can't wait until after the Convention. It should be ready to happen right after California.

+To be an insurgent campaign (which we have to be to win), does not require some odd location. It requires a strategy (as discussed) and the discipline and will to implement it. The campaign needs to be disciplined--by that I mean, people should be expected not only to work hard (which almost everyone has already been doing), but to perform--and if they don't, then they must be replaced or shifted to another spot.

+I know that Eli has been working on an organization chart and personnel list. Below are few areas where I have seen holes or weakness when I have traveled with Bill or been at our various offices:

Press--The operation is weak. More discipline needed and creative thinking in message of the day and who delivers it (when it isn't the candidate). We need an on camera spokesperson other than Bill who is designated as such for replies on TV and radio when we don't want the candidate to speak or don't have him. (not Carville, he looks like Dr. Death on TV). Is this the role for George? I think he'd be great at it.

We also need more coordination in back channel development of press stories and strategizing about which stories to push with the press.

As I've said above, we need to do a much better job in using free media outlets in states and with national press.



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Paid Media--I've already given my opinion. This is a very serious and major matter, and should be dealt with very soon, or we will be in big trouble in the general. Someone, Bill or Mickey, is going to have to make a tough decision about personnel here.

Speech Writing/Humor - We are very thin and overworked. Bruce Reed has been a trooper at the major speeches, and Begala excellent on daily stuff, and one or two contract speeches (Rossner's environment speech) have worked out--but this is not adequate for the general. We need a team of speech writers directed by Bruce for the general. He needs to have at least two fulltime speech writers working on staff for him, in addition to a larger stable for contract folks like Jeremy. Without such a set of resources, the campaign can't deliver on our strategy of a series of substantive speeches, nor can we keep up the quality of the daily remarks and message. The daily stump speech must be constantly replenished.

In addition, Hillary needs at least one fulltime speechwriter to work for her operation.

We need to organize more input of humor into speeches and daily comments. We need to rely on Linda B. and her people and organize some other writers in LA (I have some good prospects) to provide humor to the speech writers. There should be a clear channel--a fax number and responsible person with whom Linda and others can communicate and who can communicate with them with requests. Of course, all humor has to be vetted for taste and politics--but the point is that joke writing is an art that can be organized for a campaign and utilized in a regular, not a haphazard fashion.

Political Operation - Very weak. No sense of strategy nor how to mobilize potential resources (unions, womens groups, environmental groups, public interest groups). As a result, others of us have had to do it on an ad hoc basis. This needs more staff and a strong person in charge who understands strategic mobilization and has the will and ability to organize friends and allies to do work. We obviously need staff people to work closely with the groups above, and to make sure that we mobilize the resources of our allies in the key states that we target.

Scheduling - Bill should be given a less crowded day, with time for exercise. He should spend more time doing fewer events/press, etc. and doing them better, in coordination with a message for the day.

As stated, scheduling should be driven by the state strategy for winning, by the themes of the campaign--the economy, women, education, etc., and by a grassroots insurgency. Look for people events and locales, not elite events.

Scheduling of Hillary should fit the strategy for winning.