The report said North Korea’s Taepodong-2, last used as a satellite launcher, is continuing to be developed as a long-range missile. The missile “could reach parts of the United States if configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying a nuclear payload,” the 26-page report says.

The reference to hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead followed the disclosure in Congress of a classified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) study April 11 that said North Korea has mastered the technology of placing a nuclear warhead on a missile.

Administration policy and intelligence officials later sought to challenge DIA’s assessment saying the nuclear missile capability is uncertain.

The first annual report to Congress called “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” said North Korea could conduct additional nuclear tests “at any time.” An intelligence official said recently that new activity has been detected at a nuclear test site but that it is unclear if the activity is related to a future underground blast or maintenance on the facility.

The report said North Korea’s space launch development “contributes heavily” to long-range missiles because of the shared technology in both systems.

“However, a space launch does not test a re-entry vehicle (RV), without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to target from an ICBM,” the report said, apparently a caveat to the classified assessment made public last month.

North Korea’s new missile systems include a short-range missile, an intermediate-range Musudan missile, and a road-mobile ICBM called the KN-08. Pyongyang’s military also has hundreds of short-range Scuds and medium-range Nodong missiles.

“These advances in ballistic missile delivery systems, coupled with developments in nuclear technology … are in line with North Korea’s stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. homeland,” the report.

Following North Korea’s third underground nuclear test on Feb. 10, the communist regime launched a “campaign” of threatening media releases and threatening statements, including an unprecedented threat to use nuclear missiles against the United States.

The objective, according to the report, is aimed at “reaffirming its need to counter perceived U.S. ‘hostility’ with nuclear-armed ICBMs.”

“North Korea will move closer to this goal, as well as increase the threat it poses to U.S. forces and allies in the region, if it continues testing and devoting scarce regime resources to these programs,” the report said. “The pace of its progress will depend, in part, on how many resources it can dedicate to these efforts and how often it conducts tests.”

The report also said North Korea “probably” has offensive computer cyber attack capabilities and has carried out several operations against banks and other networks in South Korea.

The cyber warfare capability included cyber espionage and distributed denial of serve attacks since 2009. The report said “the North Korean regime may view [computer network operations] as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence.”

The impoverished state sees computer attack operations “as a cost-effective way to modernize some North Korean military capabilities.”

“As a result of North Korea’s historical isolation from outside communications and influence, it is likely to employ Internet infrastructure from third-party nations,” the report said.

Much of North Korea’s weaponry comes from China and Russia with Beijing having more “robust” relations with Pyongyang, the report said.

Richard Fisher, a military affairs expert with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the report, which cost the Pentagon $59,000 to produce, “should have been explicit about China’s direct assistance to North Korea’s ICBM program, which the world saw plain as day on April 15, 2012 when the KN-08 ICBM was paraded on top of its Chinese Sanjiang 16-wheel transporter erector launcher.”

“The Defense Department has had almost two years to figure out North Korea’s new fourth generation surface-to-air missile, which is very likely of Chinese origin,” Fisher said in an email. “China is helping North Korea to obliterate Anchorage and very likely, to shoot down our retaliating strike aircraft. This report only compounds the Obama administration’s failure to respond to China’s enabling a direct threat to Americans. Return this report to sender.”

While much of its military is outdated, North Korea has been modernizing some of its forces, including artillery, submarines, and special operations forces. The special operations commandos are a key asymmetric warfare capability and would be used in wartime to attack targets and leaders in South Korea.

North Korea’s Korean People’s Army has 4,100 tanks, 2,100 armored vehicles, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 5,100 multiple rocket launchers. (For a full size map of the Korean forces, click here.)

Its naval forces include 70 submarines, including mini submarines like the kind that was used to sink the South Korean ship Choenan in 2010, killing 46 sailors.

Missile forces include KN-2, Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-ER short-range missiles with around a hundred launchers each; fewer than 50 620-mile-range Nodong launchers; and fewer than 50 intermediate-range missile launchers with ranges of more than 2,500 miles.

The Taepodong-2 was reported as “not yet deployed” in the reports.

“North Korea will continue using and improving the TD-2, which could reach the United States with a nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM,” the report said. “An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new short-range, solid-propellant ballistic missile are also being developed.”

“North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and development of long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December 2012 Taepodong-2 missile launch and April 2012 display of a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, underscores the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by North Korea,” the report states.

North Korea also poses an arms proliferation threat, sending conventional and nuclear goods to Burma, Iran, and Syria.

Despite U.N. sanctions prohibiting arms sales, North Korea “continues to proliferate weapons-related goods and technology,” the report said.

“Weapons sales are a critical source of foreign currency for North Korea and North Korea is unlikely to cease export activity in spite of UN Security Council sanctions or successful interdictions of its weapons-related exports.”

Adm. James Winnefeld, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon that North Korea’s new, road-mobile KN-08 ICBM has emerged as a threat “a little bit faster than we expected.”

“We believe the KN-08 probably does have the range to reach the United States, and our assessment of where it exists and its lifetime is something that would remain classified,” Winnefeld said.

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday that “we believe North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this [KN-08] system, although it remains untested.”

Winnefeld also warned North Korea the United States is prepared to take military action if deterrence fails and Pyongyang should attack.

“We not only intend to put the mechanics in place to deny any potential North Korean objectives to launch a missile to the United States, but also to impose costs upon them if they do,” he said.

“And we believe that this young lad ought to be deterred by that, and if he’s not, we’ll be ready,” he said, referring to North Korea’s 29-year-old leader Kim Jong Un.

Winnefeld said the KN-08 was first displayed during a military parade in Pyongyang last April and produced mixed assessments of whether the six missiles on a Chinese-made mobile transporter erector launcher were real or fake.

“We’ve also seen their nuclear test recently,” he said. “Obviously without getting into intelligence aspects, we watch this evolving threat very, very closely.”

Miller noted that the Taepodong-2 long-range missile test in December was an additional concern that played into the missile defense upgrades.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced the new long-range interceptor deployments as part of four steps being taken in response to North Korea’s latest nuclear test Feb. 12 and the recent rollout of the KN-08 road-mobile missile that intelligence officials said this week is becoming operational even though it has not been flight tested. The Taepodong-2 rocket that launched a satellite recently also highlights the long-range missile threat, he said.

“The United States has missile defense systems in place to protect us from limited ICBM attacks, but North Korea in particular has recently made advances in its capabilities and is engaged in a series of irresponsible and reckless provocations,” Hagel said.

The new steps include:

• Adding 14 Ground-based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.;
• Moving a second TPY-2 long-range missile defense radar to Japan to monitor and track North Korean missile launches;
• Conducting an environmental study for a third ground-based Interceptor site on the East Coast to counter long-range Iranian missiles;
• Canceling deployment in 2022 of an advanced and more capable version of the Navy SM-3 missile called variant IIB for use against Iranian long-range-missiles. The program was cut to save money.

Hagel said the SM-3 IIB had been delayed by budget cuts until at least 2022 and with growing Iranian and North Korean missile threats, funding will be added for the 14 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) and advanced kill vehicle for it.

“By taking the steps I’ve outlined today, we will strengthen our homeland defense, maintain our commitments to our allies and partners, and make clear to the world that the United States stands firm against aggression,” he said.

The new GBIs would be in place by the end of 2016, he said.

James Miller, undersecretary of defense for policy, who appeared with Hagel, said China was informed of the new missile defense steps but he declined to say how they reacted.

Beijing in the past has opposed all U.S. missile defenses in Asia as potentially countering China’s large and growing missile forces. China is currently deploying at least three new strategic missiles and a new medium-range conventional missile capable of hitting U.S. aircraft carrier at sea.

Miller said the Pentagon is going ahead with its European Phased Adaptive Approach but dropping the fourth phase in favor of a faster third phase to save money.

“We will still go forward as planned with phases 1 through 3,” he said.

Phase 3 calls for deploying 24 more advanced SM-3 IIA interceptors to be deployed in Poland by 2018. Phase 4 called for deploying the more capable SM-IIB by 2020.

Winnefeld said the additional GBIs and a possible third GBI on the East Coast would cover both Europe and the United States from missile threats that would have been countered by the SM-3 IIB.

“So by doing what we’re announcing today, we’re going to get better defense of the United States, more fulsome coverage of the United States, and we’re going to get it a lot sooner,” Winnefeld said.

The second radar in Japan will be deployed at the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces’ base near Kyotango. The base is about 65 miles northeast of the ancient capital of Kyoto.

The TPY-2 system is based on a high-resolution, phased-array X-band radar to detect missiles shortly after launch. The data is then transferred to missile-defense interceptor systems based on the ground or on Aegis ships carrying interceptor missiles.

Winnefeld said the military currently has about five Aegis-equipped missile defense ships in the Pacific.

Asked about China’s reaction to the new deployments, Miller said: “I won’t predict that. I hope that they understand that we need to take the steps necessary to defend ourselves against potential emerging threats from Iran and North Korea. It’s our policy to stay ahead of those threats, and we’re taking prudent measures to ensure we do so.”

‪The Pentagon announcement drew a mixed response from Sen. James Inhofe (R., Okla.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“Secretary Hagel’s announcement is a step in the right direction but does not go far enough to address the threat from Iran which, according to the Department of Defense, could test an Intercontinental ballistic missile as early as 2015,” he said.

Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, said the missile defense interceptor deployment was welcome news.

“The Obama administration’s decision to deploy more interceptors for the national missile defense system is welcome news after four years of devastating missile defense cuts by this administration,” Rogers said.

Rogers said the administration four years ago “began to unilaterally disarm our defenses and deterrent in the hope our enemies would follow suit.”

“But hope is not a defense strategy,”Rogers said in a statement. ”President Obama is finally realizing what President Reagan taught us 30 years ago. The best way to keep the peace is through strength.”

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, questioned the decision to change the European missle defense plan.

“I call on the administration to go further and reposition available resources and expedite consideration for an East Coast missile defense site to ensure a more robust protection against the very real threat of ICBMs,” Corker said in a statement.

The sanctions were imposed under the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferaiton Act on four Chinese firms as well as two Belarusian companies.

The Chinese firms include the China Precision Machinery Import Export Corp., a company identified recently by the Washington Free Beacon as working with Egypt’s government and North Korea to modernize Cairo’s short-range Scud missiles.

The other Chinese firms were identified as BST Technology and Trade Company, Dalian Sunny Industries, and Poly Technologies Incorporated. A Chinese national sanctioned in the past for his role in illicit arms and missile transfers to the Middle East was also sanctioned. He was identified as Li Fangwei, also known as Karl Lee.

Rick Fisher, a China analyst at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said Dalian Sunny and Karl Lee are well known arms proliferators with activities that span two U.S. administrations.

‪“It does not appear that China is listening to U.S. complaints or sanctions, in much the same way as it refuses to talk about its growing nuclear missile arsenal, and its growing threats to Taiwan and Japan,” Fisher said.

‪“It simply begs credulity that two U.S. administrations have sailed along blithely in hopes that ‘dialogue’ and wrist-slap sanctions would have any impact on a Chinese regime that has clearly decided to sell, give, or facilitate the transfer of missile technology to Iran and North Korea so they can target the United States and its allies with nuclear missiles,” Fisher said.

‪“In Realville, this would be called an act of war, but in Washington, it appears to be cause to reward China’s leaders with invitations to global nuclear control summits.”

Two Iranian companies, the Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) and Marine Industries Organization (MIO) and one Iranian national identified as Milad Jafari were sanctioned. Additionally, two Sudanese companies (Al-Zargaa Engineering Complex (ZEC) and SMT Engineering), one Syrian agency (Army Supply Bureau (ASB)), and one Venezuelan firm (the Venezuelan Military Industry Company (CAVIM)), also were named.

As with past practice, the State Department provided no details of the sanctions activities.

The sanctions were based on “credible information indicating they had transferred to, or acquired from, Iran, North Korea, or Syria, equipment and technology listed on multilateral export control lists (Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement), or items that are not listed, but nevertheless, could materially contribute to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile program.”

Li Fangwei and his company were also sanctioned for “transferring equipment and technology controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex to MTCR-class (Category I) missiles in a non-MTCR country.”

The 34-member MTCR is a voluntary group of nations that seeks to limit sales of missile and related components. Category I includes complete missile systems.

The basis for the sanctions could not be learned Monday night.

However, China transferred strategic missile technology to North Korea last year. That tech consisted of several road-mobile transporter erector launchers first identified in a Chinese military parade in April. The launchers are being used for North Korea’s new road-mobile long-range missile called the KN-08.

Additional sanctions were imposed under a 1994 presidential executive order aimed at curbing missile and weapons of mass destruction transfers on Li, Dalian Sunny Industry, and the Iranian entities Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), Shahid Sattari Ground Equipment Industries, and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

The sanctioned entities were involved in missiles and weapons of mass destruction transfers that were not specified.

The two-year sanctions are largely symbolic and prevent U.S. government agencies from doing business with the entities. Additionally, they prohibit the granting of U.S. export licenses for U.S. companies to sell items to the entities.

A CIA-origin report to Congress made public last year said that Chinese companies, both state-run and private, “continue to engage in [weapons of mass destruction]-related proliferation activities.”

Chinese government steps to halt the transfers continue “to fall short,” the report said.

Defense officials have said China is a major supplier of missiles to Iran and North Korea and the arms proliferation activities received little public notice.

The U.S. government has used sanctions against Chinese companies in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 for illicit transfers of weapons and technology.

China’s state-run Xinhua news agency on Monday reported that one of the sanctioned companies, the defense company Polytechnologies Inc., denied it was involved in illicit arms transfers.

“We have never helped any countries or regions develop any banned weapons, nor have we exported or promised to export weapons or technologies to any countries or regions that are under United Nations Security Council Resolutions Sanctions,” the company said, according to Xinhua.

“We hereby demand the U.S. side to respect the fact and immediately lift the sanctions,” the firm said.

According to a State Department cable made public by Wikileaks, Pakistan in 2008 provided Polytechnologies with U.S.-origin precision-guided bomb technology used on MK-82 bombs.

A 2008 cable stated that Chinese national Karl Lee “is a serial proliferator who has provided large quantities of materials and missile-relevant equipment to SBIG.”

Lee in 2008 supplied gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iran that are used in missile production.

A March 18, 2009 cable stated that in late December 2008, a Chinese company called LIMMT “continued to supply SBIG with tungsten copper, graphite, and aluminum, and that Karl Lee offered SBIG a model 3GFF-700 cold flow forming machine. Such a machine is capable of manufacturing re-entry vehicle shells and solid rocket motor cases, and is controlled by the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.”

Special operations forces tied to Iran’s navy participated in a series of drills over the weekend in the Strait of Hormuz, a pathway used to ship oil and gas across the globe.

The drills, dubbed “Velayat 91,” are being viewed as a warning sign to the West and Israel that if Iran’s nuclear sites are attacked it will disrupt the world’s oil supply.

Iranian military leaders also emphasized that most of these new weapons and devices were domestically produced, indicating that Western economic sanctions have failed to thwart the regime’s military buildup.

Tehran announced on Monday that it had successfully launched a newly created RAAD surface-to-air missile, according to Iranian press reports. The missiles are meant to target fighter jets, unmanned drones, and various missiles that might be fired by Western forces.

Iranian Rear Admiral Amir Rastegari told the Mehr News Agency that the new RAAD system had been “optimized and installed” for use on warships.

Military leaders also unveiled on Monday several new missiles and torpedoes that Iranian leaders claim to have been developed in their entirety by Iranian scientists.

These missiles include the short-range Nasr cruise missile and other rocket-propelled arms that could be used in a naval confrontation, according to a report by Mehr.

The Nasr cruise missile could be fired from either land or a submarine and obliterate a “3,000 ton watercraft,” according to the report.

“Deployed on shore defensive layers, Nasr smart cruise missile will complement coastal defense artillery system, as it would destroy watercrafts invading the coastal waters,” according to the Mehr report, which is based on information provided by Iranian military leaders.

Tehran also claims to have successfully launched a new stealth submarine that can avoid detection by Western radar systems.

The “diesel submarine has been known as ‘black hole,’” military leaders told Mehr over the weekend.

“It produces the least acoustic signature, with fully sound insulation of the shaft,” the report claims. “The shaft is covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduce the risk of detection.”

The stealth submarine is said to be the first Iranian-made submarine to take to international waters since the early 1990s.

Iranian diving teams performed mock operations in the ocean during the drills and cyber attack simulations were performed on Saturday, Reuters reported.

New details of China’s strategic and tactical nuclear warheads levels were disclosed by retired Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, former commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, during a conference several months ago. A copy of Yesin’s paper was translated last month by the Georgetown University Asian Arms Control Project and obtained by the Washington Free Beacon.

Yesin for the first time disclosed details on China’s theater and tactical nuclear warheads showing a total of 719 to 749 warheads used on bombers, short- and medium-range missiles, and a new land-attack cruise missile, in a recent paper published in the book titled Prospects for China’s Participation in Nuclear Arms Limitation.

Yesin concludes that China’s nuclear arsenal is “appreciably higher than many experts think.”

“In all likelihood, the [People’s Republic of China] is already the third nuclear power today, after the U.S. and Russia, and it undoubtedly has technical and economic capabilities that will permit it to rapidly increase its nuclear might if necessary,” he said.

Yesin first revealed higher estimates of the Chinese warhead stockpile last spring that he says contain as many as 1,800 warheads, including up to 900 warheads deployed and ready for use. That estimate is based on China’s stockpile of more than 50 tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium and contradicts lower warhead estimates done by U.S. intelligence agencies and private arms control groups.

U.S. intelligence agencies have asserted in classified studies that China’s total nuclear force includes about 300 nuclear warheads. Two liberal arms control groups, the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council several years ago accused the Pentagon of exaggerating China’s nuclear forces. They asserted China’s total nuclear warhead force is about 200 warheads, with no tactical warheads.

A forthcoming annual report by the congressional United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission states that China’s nuclear arsenal includes between 100 and 500 weapons, with a general consensus that Beijing has around 240 nuclear weapons.

The draft annual report also said China is moving ahead with deployment of nuclear missile submarines.

“China has had a symbolic ballistic missile submarine capability for decades but is only now on the cusp of establishing its first credible, ‘near-continuous at-sea strategic deterrent,’” states the report obtained by the Free Beacon.

The report warns Congress to “treat with caution any proposal to unilaterally, or in the context of a bilateral agreement with Russia, reduce the U.S.’s operational nuclear forces absent clearer information being made available to the public about China’s nuclear stockpile and force posture.”

According to Yesin, China’s bombs and warheads include B-4 and B-5 aerial bombs, 2-megaton missile warheads, and 500- and 300-kiloton strategic missile warhead. A megaton is the nuclear equivalent to a million tons of TNT; a kiloton equals a thousand tons of TNT.

For its tactical and theater warhead arsenal, the Chinese also have a 350-kiloton warhead for medium range DF-21 missiles and five to 20 kiloton warheads for DF-15 and DF-11 short-range missiles that are mainly targeted on Taiwan. The 350-kiloton warhead can also be deployed on China’s new DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles, Yesin said.

For submarine-launched JL-2 missiles, China has a 500-kiloton warhead.

According to the Russian general, China also is building multiple-warhead missiles that will require large increases in the number of warheads.

“An advanced development is the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV),” he said, for DF-5A and DF-31A ICBMs, and the JL-2.

Experimental MIRV prototypes may have been fabricated and used in flight tests in 2011, he said.

The Free Beacon first disclosed that China conducted the flight test of a new long-range missile called the DF-41 that U.S. intelligence agencies assess will be outfitted with multiple warheads.

China’s aerial bomb arsenal for its Hong-6 bombers includes 440 B-5 and B-4 bombs, Yesin said.

For missiles, the retired general said that “all told, 207 missile launchers are deployed within the Strategic Missile Forces—48 with ICBMs, 99 with [medium-range ballistic missiles] MRBMs, and 60 with [short-range] SRMs.”

Total strategic warheads—those capable of reaching the United States—include 208 nuclear warheads, Yesin said.

The figures presented by the former Russian general are renewing debate about the threat posed by Chinese strategic and tactical nuclear forces and whether U.S. intelligence agencies have accurately assessed the threat.

The Yesin report was produced as part of a series of papers that examined the prospect of trilateral strategic arms talks between the United States, Russia, and China. It concludes that China’s communist government see little interest in joining such talks unless it can use them to force concessions from the United States to reduce its nuclear weapons stocks.

Phillip Karber, a Georgetown University professor who sparked the debate through a university project that exposed China’s 3,000-mile long underground nuclear complex, said the Russian debate on China’s nuclear forces shows its strategic analysts are “thinking about the instability and dangers of a potential ‘tripolar’ nuclear balance” that has received scant attention from U.S. military or arms control advocates.

“The Russian report raises important questions about their and our ability to stay in existing arms control treaties and implement deep nuclear cuts when the Chinese are not constrained and have tactical/theater missile dominance as well as an emerging breakout potential over the next decade with unverified numbers of mobile MIRVed ICBMs hidden in a extensive underground infrastructure,” Karber said.

Karber said the Russian specialists quoted in the report have credibility because of Moscow’s past and current role in China’s nuclear program. Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces also has good intelligence on China’s nuclear arsenal because it targeted China for three decades.

“This close proximity and long track record means that Russian ‘realism’ about Chinese nuclear force potential cannot be blithely ignored or discounted as ‘paranoia,’” Karber said. “Their warning against American ‘idealism’ [on China’s nuclear arms] needs to be taken seriously.”

Richard Fisher, a China military specialist with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, also said the latest Yesin report is a wake-up call for U.S. analysts.

“If Yesin’s numbers for Chinese theater nuclear weapons approaches reality, then the Obama administration’s 2010 reduction in U.S. theater weapons via the retirement of the Navy’s TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles amounted to an act of unilateral disarmament that may prove destabilizing if it tempts China to consider military action,” Fisher said.

Fisher also said the estimates presented by Yesin may differ from western estimates but “we cannot forget that Yesin once was in command of Russia’s strategic missile forces, so it would have been his business to know about China’s nuclear forces.”

Fisher said Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan currently are developing long-range offensive missiles or already have advanced space launchers that could be converted to intermediate-range missiles.

“If Washington does not take steps to strengthen non-nuclear deterrence in Asia, apparently our allies are not going to simply accept China’s nuclear missile hegemony,” he said.

The Navy is developing a new long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile to bolster aircraft carrier strike groups.

“New long range non-nuclear armed missiles combined with new very long-range radar in Japan and the Philippines could become a new reconnaissance-strike-complex that could balance China’s emerging similar missile strike forces,” Fisher said.

The new missiles could check China’s missiles for at least the next decade, Fisher said, and “until the U.S. moves in this direction, there is probably no chance that China would consider entering into any formal missile limitation agreements.”

The sponsor was the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

“There are serious fears concerning the fact that the nuclear potential of the PRC is appreciably higher than had been previously thought,” an introduction to the book states. “It is entirely likely that, even as we speak, the PRC is the third nuclear power after the US and Russia, and that it undoubtedly has the technical and economic capabilities needed in order to quickly increase its nuclear firepower if necessary.”

“The most important takeaway from this collection, though, is not any particular fact or proposition,” said Jonathan Askonas, the Georgetown student director of the Asian Arms Control Project. ”It is a new strategic reality. China is modernizing its military in a way that challenges the security interests of other great powers interested in Asian stability.”

Military sources told the Yonhap news agency in the neighboring southern Republic of Korea (ROK) that if North Korea had acquired the data two of its agents were attempting to buy from one Ukrainian defense plant, some of the current missiles in Pyongyang’s arsenal could see their range extended to the point where they could hit targets in the continental U.S.

The two intelligence agents from the DPRK, identified as Ryu Song-Chul and Lee Tae-Kil, were caught by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) in July 2011 after they met with a Ukrainian engineer employed at the Production Association Southern Machine-Building Plant—more commonly known as Yuzhmash—in the city of Dnepropetrovsk.

The engineer, who had tipped off the SBU in advance, passed the two agents files of design information with classified markings before the Ukrainian service stepped in to arrest them.

The arrests occurred last July, but it was only last week that a Ukrainian court tried and convicted the two agents, sentencing each of them to eight-year prison terms. Both agents intend to appeal their convictions.

Yuzhmash was once a major production center of ballistic missiles for the Soviet Union. Today, much of the production is geared towards modifying ballistic missile designs into booster rockets that can launch commercial payloads such as communications satellites. However, the company still retains designers and other technical personnel that are fully proficient in the design of intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.

The two DPRK agents had been officially assigned to their country’s trade mission in Minsk, capital of the former Soviet republic of Belarus—one of the few trade missions North Korea maintains in the former USSR and Warsaw Pact nations.

Belarus has evolved into a post-Soviet, anti-U.S. dictatorship that is friendly to any nation opposed to Washington’s policies. State arms export agencies in Belarus and other middlemen based in Minsk have been accused several times of serving as conduits for illicit transfers of arms and defense industrial technology to both the DPRK and Iran.

What prompted the Yuzhmash engineer to immediately alert the SBU that the DPRK was attempting to illegally acquire this missile design data is unknown, according to Ukrainian news outlets. “Whether or not the sum [of money] offered was not adequate, or if there were political considerations that caused him to not pass these industrial secrets to his North Korean comrades, or if there were ideological reasons involved is not known,” reported Ukrainian news site GudVin.

One of the key pieces of design data that the DPRK agents were trying to obtain regarded the fuel control system used in different Yuzhmash designs. Ballistic missile rocket motors that run on liquid chemical propulsion require extremely powerful fuel pumps that can push through a large volume of propellant in very short periods of time without breaking apart or otherwise interrupting the fuel flow.

The fuel system for liquid-propelled missiles is one of the key “single points of failure” that countries encounter when trying to develop a ballistic missile program, according to U.S. defense analysts.

The recent failed test launches by the DPRK are “symptomatic of defects in the fuel control system,” said one analyst. In both of the most recent tests—one in April 2009 and another in April of this year—the Unha-2 (2009) and Unha-3 (2012) missiles failed to reach orbit.

Western intelligence officers familiar with arms trafficking activity in Ukraine state that the country is a “target-rich environment” for nations such as the DPRK and China that use weapon systems that are of Russian design or utilize Russian-made on-board systems. Many of the vital subcomponents for Russian weapons platforms were developed or manufactured in Ukraine. Still other systems can be overhauled and modernized in Ukraine at a lower cost than if procured from Russia.

Agents acting on behalf of Chinese intelligence services have also been caught by the SBU on several occasions while trying to secure classified information from Ukrainian defense industrial and test facilities. A Russian national living in Ukraine, Aleksandr Yermakov, was tried and convicted in February 2011 for working on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) foreign intelligence service.

Yermakov and his son had been working with the PRC’s intelligence services and making regular trips to China. His conviction centered around efforts to steal classified information on the design of Ukraine’s Land-based Naval Aviation Testing and Training Complex, or NITKA.

NITKA, located in the Crimea near the city of Saki and built in Soviet times, was developed to train carrier pilots to fly the Sukhoi Su-33 and Mikoyan MiG-29K carrier-capable fighters. Today it is the only facility of its kind that can properly prepare pilots to launch from and trap back aboard deck on one of the two Kuznetsov-class ski jump-configured takeoff ramp aircraft carriers built in the USSR in the 1980s.

China acquired one of these carriers, the Varyag, more than two decades ago from Ukraine and has conducted sea trials of the ship after almost 20 years of re-fitting, but no Chinese carrier pilots have yet successfully conducted an arrested landing or even a “touch-and-go” test run on the ship while at sea.

Building an analogue of this training center in China is necessary for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) carrier program, which is why the MSS recruited Yermakov to steal design data from NITKA, experts said.

The deal, expected to be announced this week, will result in South Korea’s military moving ahead with plans to build ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 341 miles from the current range limit of 186 miles set under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The new agreement will also open the way for South Korea to purchase U.S.-made long-range Global Hawk intelligence drones, currently limited for export due to MTCR restrictions.

South Korea has been seeking to purchase Global Hawks for surveillance of North Korea since 2009.

The current U.S.-South Korean missile agreement limits South Korea from building or buying ballistic missiles—those that travel into space and re-enter the atmosphere—with ranges greater than 186 miles. The new agreement modifies that 2001 accord to increase the ballistic missile range limit from 300 kilometers to 550 kilometers, or 341 miles.

The extended range missile accord would give South Korea the ability to attack targets throughout most of North Korea.

Some arms control proponents inside the Obama administration opposed the new arrangement, arguing that it undermines international efforts to limit missile proliferation.

The agreement has been under discussion for the past several months.

A State Department spokesman could not be reached for comment on the agreement.

In April, South Korea’s defense ministry requested $2.1 billion over five years for new missiles. The missile buildup is being sought as a response to North Korea’s development of long-range missiles.

South Korea’s defense ministry on April 19 released video of two new missiles, including a cruise missile with a range of over 620 miles, and a tactical ballistic missile with a range of 186 miles. The old U.S.-South Korea agreement does not limit cruise missile ranges.

The video quoted a South Korean general as saying the new ballistic missile is more powerful than the U.S.-made MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System deployed with South Korean forces.

One defense official said the missile range extension pact is raising new questions about U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea, which could influence that nation’s decision to remain a non-nuclear power.

Extending the range of ground-launched missiles could be the first step toward developing a South Korean nuclear deterrent to counter the small arsenal in the communist North.

The Obama administration is seeking sharp nuclear force cuts that some specialists say could undermine so-called extended deterrence—the umbrella of U.S. nuclear forces that are designed to counter nuclear powers in Asia and Europe.

An administration Nuclear Posture Review implementation study group was directed to examine the possibility of cutting deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads to as low as 300, less than are estimated to be in China’s currently known strategic arsenal.

The agreement follows North Korea’s recent test of a long-range missile and comes amid growing concerns that Pyongyang will follow the launch with a third underground nuclear test, as it did in the past when two nuclear tests followed two long-range missile launches.

Signs of activity have been detected at a North Korean nuclear test site, although China’s government is said to be urging its North Korean ally to avoid further provocation.

Last month, U.S. intelligence agencies detected work that appeared to be improving a North Korean missile launch facility at Musudan-ri, in the northeast part of the country. The construction has fueled new worries about North Korea’s development of a long-range missile.

Also, on April 15 North Korea displayed for the first time a new long-range, road-mobile ICBM deployed on a Chinese-made transporter-erector launcher, highlighting continued Chinese assistance to North Korea’s strategic missile program.

The missile launcher export was traced to a Chinese company and violates United Nations sanctions on North Korea that prohibit the transfer of any goods related to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

Last month, North Korea’s state-run newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported that South Korea’s government is using the North’s test firing of what it claimed is a satellite launch as an excuse to build new missiles in response.

John Tkacik, a former State Department intelligence specialist, said the South Koreans “have reached the end of their collective rope with North Korea” after several deadly military confrontations since 2010.

The recent failed missile test was the last straw, he said, along with the brazen display by the North of the new mobile ICBM launcher.

“Understandably, Korean President Lee and President Obama realize that the United States is no longer in a position to claim any legal, ethical, or logical reason – certainly no arms control reason – to restrain South Korea from developing the types of weapons systems it needs to deter Pyongyang’s viciousness,” Tkacik told the Free Beacon.

“The whole rationale for restraining South Korea’s missile development was to keep a damper on North Korea’s weapons, but it’s just nutty to keep on citing that as a goal. That genie is already long burst from its bottle. However, that’s not to say the nuttier side of the arms-control community won’t argue against South Korea’s ability to defend itself.”

South Korean press reports from April said the missile extension agreement was discussed during the visit to Washington in late April by Kim Tae-hyo, a senior national security aide to South Korean President Lee Myung-bak.

One report at the time said the new missile accord would not be made public because of concerns that it would undermine agreements between the Untied States and other countries not to develop longer-range missiles.

A Pentagon spokeswoman would not address the new missile accord.

“The U.S. and the Republic of Korea are in regular discussion on the security alliance and how it is best postured and equipped to maintain peace and security on the Korea Peninsula,” said Maj. Cathy Wilkinson.

South Korea in 2001 signed up to the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime, an informal political understanding that seeks limits on trade in missiles and related technology.

The 2001 New Missile Guidelines prevent South Korea from buying or building complete rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) that can carry payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km.

Missile subsystems, including rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, and re-entry vehicles, are banned under the 2001 agreement, as are related software and technology, and production facilities.

According to a State Department cable made public by Wikileaks, South Korea carried out “repeated and continued … development of new missiles systems that are inconsistent with the 2001 U.S.- New Missile Guidelines (NMG) agreement constraining their missile systems to MTCR Category I limits.”

The cable said that if Global Hawks are sold to Seoul, delivery would take place around 2014.

Also, current Global Hawk deployments in Guam do not provide enough intelligence coverage of North Korea.

“The United States understands the ROK’s need for enhanced ISR capabilities and is carefully reviewing the ROK’s request for Global Hawk,” the 2009 cable said.

Another 2009 cable quotes a South Korean official asking the United States to reconsider the MTCR restrictions on exporting space launch technology following a failed South Korean space launch. The request is an indication that South Korea would like to better develop space launchers with U.S.-origin technology. Space launch rocket boosters are very similar to long-range missiles.

The unclassified assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was sent in April to Congress following a request from Capitol Hill to explain the current state of Moscow-Tehran missile trade. The new intelligence on the missile trade could trigger sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria sanctions law or limit U.S. government interaction with Moscow.

“We assess that individual entities have provided assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs,” the DNI statement by legislative director Kathleen Turner said.

The new assessment differs from an earlier intelligence statement supplied to Congress that was more categorical on the transfers and did not contain legalistic references included in an apparent effort to avoid linking the Russian government to recent missile-related transfers.

The assessment could affect a requested presidential waiver sought by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that is needed prior to the next U.S. payment to Russia for the International Space Station.

A State Department official said the Russia-Iran missile trade has not been raised in recent meetings between U.S. and Russian officials.

Current law requires the president to certify that it is Russia’s policy to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear and missile technology and systems.

“NASA wants another waiver to allow us to make payments to Moscow for the International Space Station, but the president cannot certify that Russia has a policy to prevent their own assistance to Iran’s missiles, to say nothing of the nuclear program, and what’s going on in Syria,” said a congressional aide close to the issue.

The waiver is required under the nonproliferation law before any payments can be made.

Additionally, the administration is pressing Congress to pass permanent normal trade relations legislation for Russia, raising further questions that the administration is ignoring Russian arms proliferation to Tehran.

“What message will all this send to Putin,” the aide said. “I think we know: The Obama administration reset cancer is now metastatic to all U.S. policy.”

The statement concludes that, while it is not official Russian policy to assist Iran’s missile programs, Moscow is incapable of implementing a policy to halt such exports or prevent state-owned arms manufacturers from assisting Iran, the aide said.

The assessment appears to be in line with President Obama’s conciliatory policies toward Russia. The president was overheard during a conversation with then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in March as telling the Russians not to pressure him during the current election campaign. Obama promised “more flexibility” in stalled talks on missile defenses after his presumed reelection, according to the conversation that was recorded by television cameras.

According to the DNI, currently headed by James Clapper, the U.S. intelligence community “assesses that Moscow almost certainly is not pursuing an official policy of providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile program,” although it did not explain why, since all Russian weapons exports are under the control of the state-run arm exporter Rosoboronexport.

The assessment went on to state that Moscow has “taken steps to improve controls on ballistic missile technology and its record of export enforcement—though still mixed—has improved over the last decade.”

“Russian space entities have entered into agreements with Iran but Moscow almost certainly views commercial space-related ventures with Iran as consistent with its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).”

The MTCR is a loose-knit arms control accord that limits states that adhere to its provisions from exporting missiles with ranges greater than 300 kilometers and the capability of carrying warheads heavier than 500 kilograms.

The congressional aide said the DNI statement is related to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act that is designed to punish arms proliferators that supply nuclear and missile goods to those states.

An initial 2005 version of the law outlined Russian support for Iran’s nuclear and strategic missile programs.

A CIA-drafted report to Congress made public earlier this year said Iran’s missile arsenal is “one of the largest in the Middle East” and includes an array of short- and medium-range missiles. Iran continues work on long-range missiles.

“Entities in China and Russia along with North Korea are among likely suppliers,” the report said, noting that Tehran remains “dependent on foreign suppliers for some key missile components.”

Classified cables made public by Wikileaks reveal extensive efforts by Iran to obtain missile technology from Russia, as well as other European and Asian states.

In one case in February 2009, the Russian firm Crystaltechno Ltd. worked to buy a German-origin, single-axis turntable for Iran’s defense industry-related Malek-Ashtar University of Technology. The machine can be used to test gyroscopes and micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors used in missile guidance and navigation systems.

In 2008, U.S. sanctions were imposed on Rosoboronexport, the state arms exporter, for sales of TOR-M1 air defense missiles to Iran. Four Russian arms makers were sanctioned in 2007 for weapons transfers to Iran.

A December 2006 cable said Russian arms broker Aleksey Safonov transferred a shipment of Russian-origin VG-951 fiber optic and MG-4 dynamically tuned gyroscopes, A-16 accelerometers, and other guidance, navigation, and control equipment to the Iranian missile entity Fadjr Industries Group in 2005.

Meanwhile, a senior House Republican is calling on the president to explain efforts by the administration to reach an agreement with Moscow on missile defenses.

“There is still a great deal of concern about what you meant when you were overheard during a recent meeting in Seoul with Russia’s former President Dmitri Medvedev, that after this election, your ‘last election,’ you ‘would have greater flexibility’ to make a deal with Russia concerning U.S. missile defenses,” said Rep. Michael R. Turner, chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, which oversees missile defense programs.

“What is it you and your administration are concerned the American people would object to in such a deal with Russia?” Turner asked. “Would it be limitations, unilateral or bilateral, with Russia on the speed, range, or geographical deployment of U.S. missile defense interceptors?”

Turner also asked the president in a May 23 letter to explain plans for up to an 80 percent cut in deployed U.S. nuclear warheads as part of the nearly completed Nuclear Posture Review implementation study.

“Many in Congress, me included, are deeply troubled that you may be willing to further trade or give away U.S. missile defenses to get closer to your goal of a world without nuclear weapons,” Turner said.

Turner called on the president to make public several draft missile defense agreements with the Russians that have been reported in news accounts but which remain secret.

“Such transparency would be the best way to resolve concerns in the Congress about your statement to President Medvedev … about your intentions for missile defense,” Turner said.

Ellen Tauscher, the administration’s special envoy for missile defense, has denied any secret agreements with Russia—draft or otherwise—exist.

However, U.S. officials said Tauscher drafted an agreement meant to be signed by Obama and Medvedev at the 2011 summit meeting in Deauville, France, that was withdrawn from consideration by White House lawyers amid concerns that the draft contained legally binding constraints on U.S. missile defenses.

Russia is demanding the U.S. government provide written legal assurances that U.S. missile defenses planned for Europe are not intended for use against Russian missiles, something the Pentagon has refused over concerns that it would limit U.S. sovereign rights of defense.

Instead of declassifying secrets of the Chinese military—which include an array of high-technology weapons and other advanced military capabilities—the report spends an entire chapter on military exchanges, which Beijing has repeatedly cut off in recent years to protest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

The report also left out last year’s reference to China’s development of a new, road-mobile long-range missile that is likely to be equipped with multiple nuclear warheads. Earlier references to secret underground nuclear facilities contained in some 3,000 miles of tunnels also were left out of the latest report.

The report said China’s military continued decades-long investments in advanced cruise and ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities.

The Chinese military, according to the report, is focused on a war over Taiwan and stopping U.S. intervention on behalf of its island ally.

One key development was the flight testing of a new J-20 stealth fighter last year, the launch of China’s first aircraft carrier, deployment of new integrated air defenses, submarine warfare developments, and nuclear and strike capabilities.

However, the report plays down the potential impact of the Chinese military in Asia by highlighting the possible role for the new aircraft carrier in conducting humanitarian operations, instead of being used for military coercion in the disputed South China Sea and in other parts of Asia.

China routinely protests publication of the report for what it says are “groundless” accusations that promote what Beijing calls the “China threat theory,” according to State Department cables made public by Wikileaks.

China’s military also has launched a covert influence operation involving former Chinese and U.S. military leaders who have lobbied Congress and the Pentagon to do away with the annual report. Congress obliged two years ago by changing a portion of the report’s title from “military power” to “military and security developments,” apparently in response to Chinese protests.

China’s military evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya last year also was highlighted as a positive development. But the report makes no mention of the discovery of Libyan government documents last year that revealed Chinese arms makers were preparing to ship arms to bolster the dying regime of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.

The report identifies a key objective of the Chinese military doctrine as “preserving Communist Party rule” along with economic development and defending national sovereignty.

The report said China’s military is expanding space activities but downplays China’s secret space arms programs. Key anti-space weapons include “a multidimensional program to limit or deny the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict,” the report says.

“In addition to the direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon tested in 2007, these counter-space capabilities also include jamming, laser, microwave, and cyber weapons,” the report said, noting that “proximity” maneuvers by satellites in space are a prerequisite for space warfare attacks.

In the cyber warfare and cyber espionage arena, China-based hackers continued to conduct attacks around the world against computer networks and systems, the report said.

“Intrusions in 2011 occurred in key sectors, including companies that directly support U.S. defense programs,” the report said, without mentioning the Chinese military’s role in cyber attacks.

The report also said China continues aggressive theft and legal acquisition of dual-use civilian-military technology and goods mainly from the United States.

“China has a long history of cooperation between its civilian and military sectors and openly espouses the need to exploit civilian technologies for use in its military modernization,” the report said.

That finding would seem to undermine the Obama administration’s push to loosen controls on exports of dual use products.

In a new section of the report, the Pentagon said military exchanges with China are a “key component” of the U.S. approach to the Asia Pacific region.

It quotes Vice President Joe Biden as saying U.S.-China cooperation will help meet “global challenges together.”

However, China has failed to cooperate with the United States on such issues as Syria, Iran, and North Korea.

The report makes no mention of the six Chinese-made long-range missile launchers revealed in a North Korean military parade in Pyongyang April 15.

A Pentagon spokesman had no immediate comment.

David Helvey, acting assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, said the report was “streamlined and consolidated” as part of Pentagon guidance on reports for Congress. “However, we continue to address the same range of questions and issues that’s requested by the Congress in the legislation,” he said.

Richard Fisher, a China military affairs specialist with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the Pentagon report is a “lesser document” than its 2011 counterpart.

“A shorter report does not mean the Chinese military threat to U.S. interests has seen any reduction,” Fisher said.

“Democracies require facts and debate in order to yield decisions that ensure survival. When a government reduces or limits the facts, then democracies are less able to produce optimal decisions, and tragedy becomes a greater danger.”

Fisher said more facts about the Chinese military buildup are needed to help inform Congress in its debate over how to deal with new threats.

“If the Administration believes that it can improve China’s attitude by containing or reducing the effectiveness of this report, it is sadly mistaken,” he said. “The only lesson China will learn is that if it complains loud enough, it can bully even American officials into constraining their own political process necessary for their defense.”

Fisher criticized the report for failing to mention the planned arms shipment to Qaddafi. “China’s near villainy was exposed in captured Libyan government documents; so why does it not rate mention by the Department of Defense?”

On the Chinese long-range missile launcher driven through Pyongyang in April, Fisher said, “This amazing direct Chinese assistance to help North Korea launch nuclear warheads against the United States receives no mention in this year’s PLA report.”

Missile charts in the paper also show the exact same numbers for Chinese strategic and tactical missiles and launchers as last year, something almost sure to be inaccurate, Fisher said.

One fact omitted in this year’s report was the mention last year of “a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).”

“There is no mention of this missile in the 2012 report, even though the Chinese have allowed Internet images of this missile to be published since 2007,” he said.

Helvey, the Pentagon official, told reporters that China is continuing work on the aircraft carrier-killing anti-ship ballistic missile, that a U.S. admiral said recently had reached the equivalent of being in early deployment.

“We highlight continued development of the anti-ship ballistic missile or the DF-21D,” Helvey said. “It’s got a limited operational capability, and I think that’s reflected in the report.  They continue to work on that and develop that and deploy that.”

Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, said the report appears to be part of an effort by the Obama administration to redefine the threat from China.

“One way for President Obama to conceal the utter inadequacy of his so-called pivot to Asia—an underfunded reallocation of resources meant to obscure his hollowing out of the U.S. military and the vacuums of power he is creating by withdrawing forces from the Middle East—is to dumb-down the threat,” Gaffney said.

“Ignoring the reality of communist China’s buildup and misleading the American people about it will only make the threat more dangerous, not less so,” he said.

New Chinese military developments that caught the United States off guard included new attack submarines, an anti-satellite missile system, aircraft carrier-killing missiles, and a new stealth jet.

“A decade on, it is now clear that much of the conventional wisdom about China dating from the turn of the century has proven to be dramatically wrong,” says the staff report by the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressional group.

“These predictive errors carry with them serious geopolitical consequences,” said the report, made public April 5. “To avoid being similarly caught off-guard in 2022, U.S. analysts should carefully reexamine many of their widely-held assumptions about the Chinese government and its policy goals.”

The report examined what it termed the “surprise” military developments and whether they showed “a pattern of underestimating the speed and depth of Chinese military development.”

The report is the latest in a series of challenges to what critics say has been more than a decade of faulty U.S. intelligence analyses of China that underestimate Beijing’s development in an apparent bid to play down the threat it poses to regional security and the resulting need for a U.S. response.

Commission staff members Amy Chang and John Dotson produced the report. It highlights analytical failures by both government and non-government China hands.

Commission member Carolyn Bartholomew said the staff report was based on open sources and “identified several factors that might have contributed to the U.S. government and intelligence community’s analysis missing some key developments in China’s military modernization.”

“These factors included old ways of thinking about China’s growth, technological competence, and strategic goals,” she said.

It is hoped that the report “will spur a reconsideration of analytical models and an updating of the bureaucratic framework for understanding China’s defense capabilities and its growing role in the world,” she said.

Larry Wortzel, another commission member, said a number of the commissioners believe the panel should be focusing on two areas: whether there were intelligence shortcomings, like missed clues on the J-20 and submarines; and continuing failures in a number of agencies to understanding China’s political and military system.

The latter has produced “false portrayals or the acceptance of false explanations about what senior leaders know.”

“For instance, arguably the Central Military Commission and the Politburo Standing Committee knew about the J-20 and the anti-satellite test, but since the Foreign Ministry is not part of any national security apparatus, they had no idea what was going to happen,” Wortzel said. “Yet many in the U.S. government accepted the suggestion that it was the PLA acting on its own.”

Also, Wortzel said the Navy for a long time refused to accept that the Chinese military was capable of building the DF-21D, which can be used against Navy carriers.

Government sources said the report appears to coincide with intelligence shortcomings outlined in a version of the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on China’s military. That report included a section on under- and over-estimates of Beijing’s decades-long military buildup and modernization that included both conventional and strategic force enhancements.

A Defense Intelligence Agency spokesman said the U.S. intelligence community’s annual threat assessments have addressed Chinese military modernization, along with diplomatic and economic progress, for more than 10 years. “The intelligence community reassessed threats over time and IC leaders’ testimonies to Congress have reflected awareness of China as a rising power with ongoing military modernization efforts,” the spokesman said.

Separately, another U.S. official defended analysis of China, saying intelligence agencies have “consistently throughout the years described China as a rising power.” The official said the commission’s new report “contains many old criticisms.”

“The intelligence community regularly reviews its analytic assessments for accuracy—including those on China’s military—to inform and improve future analysis,” this official said.

But one U.S. official said the report is a wake-up call for Congress to conduct a probe into intelligence failures related to China. “Members of Congress should request details of the failures identified by the report,” the official said.

Spokesmen for the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees had no immediate comment on whether those panels would pursue the intelligence shortcomings identified by the report.

The report examined four key weapons systems now being developed or deployed by China. They include the Type 039 Yuan-class diesel-electric attack submarine, the satellite-killing SC-19 anti-satellite (ASAT) missile, the DF-21D precision-guided anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), and the J-20 stealth fighter jet.

The Yuan submarine was developed in secret. U.S. intelligence agencies did not learn about it until photos of the submarine, which employs an advanced air-independent drive system, appeared on the Internet in 2004. Four of the new submarines—part of China’s more than 40 new submarines built in the past three decades—are deployed.

The anti-satellite missile program was known in 2007, but the test firing against a Chinese weather satellite that year was a surprise. It left tens of thousands of pieces of debris orbiting in space that threaten both manned and unmanned spacecraft, the report said.

“The test, which produced history’s greatest single instance of human-created space debris, provoked U.S. and international concern about space environmental safety and further raised questions regarding the implications of the test for the vulnerability of U.S. satellite systems to adversarial attacks,” the report said.

China’s speedy development of its anti-ship ballistic missile also caught U.S. intelligence by surprise.

Regarding the missile, the report quoted Navy Vice Adm. David “Jack” Dorsett as saying, “We’ve been on the mark on an awful lot of our assessments but there [have also] been a handful of things we have underestimated.”

Navy and defense officials have said the DF-21 threatens U.S. carriers and could have the effect of forcing the Navy to operate at further distances from China’s coasts. That would undermine U.S. support of key allies and freedom of navigation in strategic Pacific waterways.

China’s new J-20 stealth jet fighter was also a surprise development when it was first flight tested in January 2011, the report said.

U.S. officials have said that the Pentagon canceled the purchases of the Air Force’s most advanced stealth jet, the F-22, based on intelligence indicating that the J-20 would not be deployed until the 2020s.

Richard Fisher, who specializes in Chinese military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the commission report is the kind of analysis Congress is not getting from the executive branch, which “was at times ignoring or even suppressing the truth about China’s military intentions.”

Fisher noted that the commission should also examine the intelligence community’s failure from 2003 when they claimed that Beijing would not build aircraft carriers. China has a carrier nearing deployment and at least two others on the drawing board.

Another intelligence shortcoming, according to Fisher, is the failure to clearly assess the military role of China’s manned space program.

Fisher said the commission report failed to clearly explain the mistakes and who made them.

“There are many analysts who have been warning of China’s threatening intentions and its accumulating military build up,” he said. “These individuals deserve some recognition.”

Also, the commission should make further recommendations about how to respond to the failures to estimate correctly Chinese strategic intentions and capabilities, Fisher said.

A force of 400 F-22s instead of current plans for 187 jets is one suggestion, along with developing space combat capabilities.

“Who will now say that Americans need to prepare for the fact that China intends to pose a global conventional and unconventional military challenge to the United States for as long as it remains a Communist dictatorship?” Fisher asked.

The critical report highlights earlier classified assessments that concluded U.S. intelligence agencies have underestimated Chinese military developments.

The report mentions congressional legislation passed in 2000 that questioned the quality of CIA analysis on China. That led to a classified study by a group of analysts led by retired Army Gen. John Tilelli that criticized China analysis for minimizing the military threat.

In 2008 the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board criticized State Department intelligence analysis of China and noted that “Chinese military modernization is proceeding at a rate to be of concern even with the most benign interpretation of China’s motivation.”

A 2005 study produced by CIA-affiliated contractor concluded that U.S. intelligence missed key military developments by China, including several other weapons systems identified in the congressional study.

That still-classified report concluded that analysts missed China’s development and deployment of the DH-10 land attack cruise missiles, the development of warships equipped with stolen U.S. battle management technology, and China’s importation of advanced weapons systems including submarines, warships, and fighter bombers.