Last month, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, Benjamin Netanyahu made a connection between the Islamic State and Hamas. These terrorist entities, Netanyahu said, have a lot in common. Separated by geography, they nonetheless share ideology and tactics and goals: Islamism, terrorism, the destruction of Israel, and the establishment of a global caliphate.
And yet, Netanyahu observed, the very nations now campaigning against the Islamic State treated Hamas like a legitimate combatant during last summer’s Israel-Gaza war. “They evidently don’t understand,” he said, “that ISIS and Hamas are branches of the same poisonous tree.”
Peter Tomsen, who once served as the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and who published in 2011 what many consider to be the definitive book, thus far, about the war there, has a review in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs of three recent books on the same subject. The review and the books (War Comes to Garmser by Carter Malkasian, The Wrong Enemy by Carlotta Gall, and No Good Men Among the Living by Anand Gopal) are thoughtful works by deeply informed writers, and all are worth a read.
On the way to providing some interesting proposals for future international policy in Afghanistan, Tomsen considers the question of what has gone wrong thus far. His discussion of the most recent book—Gopal’s—is particularly interesting.
Cultivation of the illegal poppy plant in Afghanistan has reached an “all time high” following a $7.6 billion counternarcotics campaign paid for by the United States, according to government oversight investigators.
Despite the spending to combat growth of the poppy plant, which is used to make drugs such as opium and heroin, cultivation has reached an “all time high,” especially in places once declared “poppy free,” according to new report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
KABUL (Reuters) – A suicide car bomber rammed a foreign convoy along a major road out of Afghanistan’s capital Kabul early on Monday, killing at least one person, authorities said.
Sixteen military transport planes bought by the United States government for the Afghan Air Force (AAF) at a cost of nearly $500 million were recently destroyed by the Afghan military and sold for scrap parts at around 6 cents per pound, prompting a government inquiry to determine why millions of taxpayer dollars were wasted on the ill-fated program.
KABUL (Reuters) – Officials from Afghanistan and the United States on Tuesday signed a long-delayed security agreement to allow American troops to stay in the country after the end of the year, filling a campaign promise by new President Ashraf Ghani.
The State Department under former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wasted $6.5 million to build communication towers in Afghanistan “that were never used as intended,” according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
Among the many reasons things are such a disaster in Afghanistan is that President Obama’s initial plan for that country—which was meant to reverse the tailspin the place was in as of 2009—generated more confusion than it did clarity, and was never fully accepted by the generals meant to execute it. This is happening again.
The press doesn’t cover it much, but in Afghanistan the Taliban is coming back and the national government is held together by a combination of sticky tack and shoestring. The Kabul government may well fall before the year is out, which would likely precipitate a large-scale civil-war.
President Obama inherited a bad situation in Afghanistan in 2009. After an incredibly long deliberative period, he authorized a substantial troop increase, and gave his generals the task to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, while denying them a safe haven in Afghanistan. In addition, they were to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.” The Afghan government, as a key part of the plan, was to be strengthened to be able to hold its own against its enemies. Simultaneously, the president announced a deadline for the end of his troop increase.
His plan had the sort of sophistication and nuance of which a University of Chicago (adjunct) lecturer could be proud: fight the Taliban this much (but not too much!) and at the same time fight al Qaeda harder—but only in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, fight them a little bit less. Help the Afghan government, but only until a certain pre-determined time. Then, sayonara. It’s almost like achieving a good end-state in Afghanistan wasn’t the president’s priority, but that he felt he had to do something for reasons of domestic politics.